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Displaying 31 - 40 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws | I. C. A. § 717B.1 - 717E3 | IA ST § 717B.1 - 717E.3 | Under Title XVI of Iowa's criminal code, there are several chapters that outlaw forms of animal cruelty and animal fighting. The main animal cruelty provisions are contained in chapter 717B (Injuries to Animals other than Livestock). This chapter defines "animal" as any nonhuman vertebrate. However, it excludes livestock, game, fur-bearing animal, fish, reptile, or amphibian unless a person owns, confines, or controls the game, fur-bearing animal, fish, reptile, or amphibian, and any nongame considered a "nuisance." There are separate prohibitions against animal abuse, animal neglect, animal torture, abandonment of a cat or dog, and injury to a police service dog. Under both the animal abuse and animal torture sections, a first offense results in an aggravated misdemeanor. However, animal torture requires a mandatory psychological evaluation and graduates subsequent convictions to felony status. Exclusions under the various sections include veterinary care, hunting, animal husbandry, and scientific research, among others. Other criminal chapters include chapters 717C.1 (Bestiality), 717D (Animal Contest Events), and 717E (Pets as Prizes). | Statute |
| Friends of Animals v. Bernhardt | 961 F.3d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 2020) | Appellants consisting of conversation organizations and a safari guide challenged a series of actions of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) governing imports of sport-hunted animal trophies from Africa. The Appellants challenged certain findings that the Service made allowing animal trophies to be imported. The Court had reviewed a similar set of findings in another case and concluded that they were legislative rules illegally issued without notice and comment. FWS subsequently withdrew all its findings that were issued without notice and comment including the ones that were challenged by the Appellants in a subsequent memorandum. The Appellants still desired to contest the withdrawn findings. The Appellants alleged that it was illegal for the FWS to abandon its prior findings without engaging in APA informal rulemaking and that it was illegal for the FWS to announce its intent to the make the necessary findings through informal adjudications in the future. The Appellant’s claims fell into three categories: (1) challenges to the 2017 Zimbabwe findings that sport-hunting of elephants would enhance the survival of the species; (2) challenges to the memorandum by the FWS withdrawing their prior findings; and (3) challenges to the memorandum’s announcement that the FWS intends to making findings on a case-by-case basis when considering individual permit applications. The Court found that since the FWS had withdrew the 2017 findings, they no longer caused the appellants any injury which made any challenges to them moot. The Appellants attempted to argue that the flaws in the 2017 Zimbabwe elephant finding were capable of repetition yet would evade review. The Court rejected this argument. As for the second challenges regarding the memorandum’s withdrawal of its prior findings, the Court found that the withdrawal caused no injury to the Appellants. The Court rejected the challenges to the memorandum’s announcement that the FWS intended to make findings on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. | Case | |
| CA - Abandonment - § 597s. Abandonment of animals | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597s | CA PENAL § 597s | This statute makes it a misdemeanor to willfully abandon an animal, but does not apply to the release or rehabilitation and release of native California wildlife pursuant to statute or regulations of the California Department of Fish and Game. | Statute |
| OR - Animal Racing - Chapter 462. Racing. | O.R.S. § 462.010 - 990 | OR ST §§ 462.010 - 990 | Oregon created a Racing Commission that has the authority license, regulate, and supervise all race meets within the state and shall cause the race tracks that hold races to be inspected at least once each fiscal year. A race meet is not to be held unless a license is obtained from the Oregon Racing Commission. All employees of the race track as well as any public training facility or kennel for greyhounds involved in racing are also required to obtain a license from the Commission prior to engaging in their duties. The Commission may require each applicant to obtain a recommendation in writing of the board of county commissioners of the county in the event a race meet is to be held outside of a city and of the governing body of such city if the race meet is to be held within a city. The Commission is tasked with determining the number and classes of race meets to be held in any fiscal year and the total number of racing dates to be granted to a licensee, not to exceed 350 days in any metropolitan area in any fiscal year. The Commission is entitled to require chemical testing of the urine, blood, saliva, or other bodily substances of animals participating in races. Animals are prohibited from participating in races if they have been administered a drug that is prohibited by the Commission, prohibited drugs have been detected in the animal's system, and the animal has been stimulated or depressed in any way by a mechanical device not sanctioned by the Commission. | Statute |
| American Horse Protection Assoc. v. Andrus | 608 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1979) |
The court stated that the Secretary’s decision to remove 3,500 to 7,000 wild horses in order to maintain the horse population at a permanent level might qualify as “major” federal action and thus require an EIS before removal could occur. While the secretary has wide discretion under the WFRHBA, he has no discretion regarding compliance with NEPA. The court also held that the exercise of jurisdiction by two courts over public lands created no threat of conflicting decisions on range utilization, because the courts only determined whether the land use decision was an informed one. |
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| US - MMPA - Legislative History of 1972 | U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 1971 WL 11285 (Leg.Hist.) |
This document contains most of the legislative history surrounding the 1972 adoption of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. |
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| State v. Agee | --- N.E.3d ---- , 2019 WL 3504010 (Ohio App., 2019) | 2019-Ohio-3107 | The Humane Society brought this action in response to a complaint regarding a dog tangled in a tether. Three German Shepherds were discovered that belonged to the Defendant, Shawn Agee, Jr. The dogs were suffering from maltreatment. All three had been restrained without access to water or food and one of the dog’s tethers was wrapped so tightly that its leg had started to swell. Two of the dogs were suffering from fly strike. The State charged the Defendant with 12 criminal misdemeanors relating to the treatment of the three animals. The trial court acquitted the Defendant of 10 of those counts because of his unrebutted testimony that he had been out of town for the weekend and had left the dogs in the care of his mother. The Defendant was found guilty to two second-degree misdemeanors relating to the two dogs suffering from fly strike because those particular injuries were long time, very painful injuries that were not being treated and the Defendant was the dogs’ “confiner, custodian, or caretaker.” The Defendant was sentenced to community control, a fine of $100, a suspended jail sentence of 180 days, the surrender of the two dogs with fly strike, and the proviso that the remaining dog be provided with regular vet appointments and various other conditions. This appeal followed. The Defendant asserted that the Court erred by finding that he had in fact violated the statute that he was found guilty of and that his convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence. The Defendant argued that he did not qualify as the type or class of persons subject to criminal liability merely as an owner. The Court noted that the trial court did not impose liability due to his status as the dogs’ owner, but rather due to this having served as the two dogs’ confiner, custodian, or caretaker when they developed fly strike and should have been but were not properly treated. As for the second assignment of error, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to find that the Defendant had violated the statute. The Defendant had admitted that he knew that the two dogs had fly strike “two or three weeks before he left town for the weekend.” The dogs were not treated before he left town. The Court ultimately affirmed both convictions. | Case |
| AR - Exotic Pets - Subchapter 4. Ownership and Breeding of Wolves and Wolf-Dog Hybrids | A.C.A. § 20-19-401 - 408 | AR ST § 20-19-401 to 408 | This chapter of Arkansas laws concerns the regulation of wolves and wolf-dog hybrids kept as companion animals. Under the law, a "wolf-dog hybrid” means any animal which is publicly acknowledged by its owner as being the offspring of a wolf and domestic dog; however, no animal may be judged to be a wolf or wolf-dog hybrid based strictly on its appearance. The specific rabies vaccination requirements for wolf-dog hybrids are detailed as well as confinement requirements (i.e, specific fence dimensions). If a wolf or wolf-dog hybrid bites a person or injures or destroys another animal while out of its confined area, the person responsible for the adequate confinement of the animal upon conviction shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. | Statute |
| VT - Education - § 912. Student's right of refusal; animal dissection | 16 V.S.A. § 912 | This Vermont law gives a student in a public elementary or secondary school (or approved independent school) a right to be excused from lessons requiring a student to dissect, vivisect, or otherwise destroy an animal, or observe any of these activities. Each school district must establish procedures for a student to exercise this right and alternatives methods of learning the material covered. School districts must also adopt a statement that no student shall be discriminated against based on his or her decision to exercise the right to be excused afforded by this section. | Statute | |
| Hatahley v. United States | 351 U.S. 173, 76 S.Ct. 745 (1956) | 100 L.Ed. 1065 (1956) |
In the case of Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956), a group of Navajo Indians living in Utah sued the government under the Federal Torts Claim Act, to recover the confiscation and destruction of horses and burros that were kept as pets and uniquely valued to the owners. The federal agents confiscated these animals and then sold them to a glue factory. The petitioners vehemently argued that these horses had unique and sentimental value to them, and served as a means of income to yield crops. Although the government agents argued that they were authorized to engage in this taking pursuant to the Utah Abandoned Horse Slaughter Act, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The court awarded the petitioners a judgment of $100,000 based on the fair market value, consequential damages for deprivation of use, and “mental pain and suffering” of the petitioners. The decision was reversed and remanded to the District Court with instructions to assess damages with sufficient particularity. |
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