Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Thompson v. Dover Downs, Inc. | 887 A.2d 458 (Del.Supr.,2005) | 31 NDLR P 135 (Del.Supr.,2005) |
Vernon Thompson appeals from a Superior Court order reversing a decision and order of the Delaware Human Relations Commission (DHRC) after Thompson was denied access to defendant's casino because Thompson insisted that his dog accompany him, but refused to answer the officials' inquiries about what his alleged support animal had been trained to perform. The DHRC determined that by denying access, Dover Downs had unlawfully discriminated against Thompson in violation of the Delaware Equal Accommodations Law. The Supreme Court here agreed with the Superior Court in reversing the DHRC. It found that Dover Downs' personnel were entitled to ask Thompson about his dog's training. Since Thompson refused to answer these questions, there is no rational basis to conclude that Dover Downs' refusal to admit Thompson accompanied was pretextual. |
Case | |
| OK - Commercial Breeder Act Regulations - Chapter 55. Commercial Pet Breeders | OK ADC 35:55-1-1 to 35:55-7-6 | Okla. Admin. Code 35:55-1-1 to 35:55-7-6 | Pursuant to the authority granted in the Oklahoma Commercial Breeders Act, these Oklahoma Department of Agriculture, Food, and Forestry regulations out line the licensing procedures, the standards of care, the transportation, and the record keeping provisions Oklahoma commercial breeders must follow. | Administrative | |
| WA - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | West's RCWA 9.91.170 - 175; 28A.642.010; 49.60.010 - 040, 215, 218, 222; 224; 225; 49.60.370 - 380; 49.90.010; 70.84.010 - 900 | WA ST 9.91.170 - 175; 28A.642.010; 49.60.010 - 040, 215, 218, 222, 224, 225; 49.60.370 - 380; 49.90.010; 0.84.010 - 900 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute | |
| VA - Virginia Beach - Chapter 1 General Provisions and Chapter 5: Animals and Fowl (ARTICLE V: ANIMAL WELFARE. DIVISION 3: PROHIBITED ACTS) | Virginia Beach City Code §§ 1-9, 5-540 |
Under this Virginia Beach ordinance, if a person knows or has reason to believe a dog is a guide dog or a leader dog and that person, without just cause, willfully impedes or interferes with said dog, then that person is guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor and is subject to fines not to exceed more than $500. However, if a person knows or has reason to believe a dog is a guide dog or a leader dog and that person, without just cause, willfully injures said dog, then that person is guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor and is subject to fines not to exceed more than $2,500. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Fleet v District Court of New South Wales | [1999] NSWCA 363 |
The appellant's dog was removed by police officers and later euthanised. The dog was emaciated and suffering from numerous ailments. The appellant was charged and convicted with an animal cruelty offence and failure to state his name and address when asked. On appeal, it was found that the court had failed to address the elements of the animal cruelty offence and that the charge of failing to state name and address could not stand. |
Case | ||
| Friends of Animals v. Salazar | 690 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.D.C.,2010) | 2010 WL 936222 (D.D.C.) |
Friends of Animals (FOA), an animal advocacy group, brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior, et al, (Defendants) under the Endangered Species Act seeking declaratory and injunctive relief by claiming that the Secretary failed to make statutory 90-day and 12-month findings related to the petition to have 13 species of birds listed as threatened or endangered. The Court found that FOA's claim that Defendants failed to make a 90-day finding on its endangered-species petition was moot, and its claim that Defendants failed to meet the 12-month deadline provided by the ESA had to be dismissed due to FOA's failure to provide Defendants with proper notice. The Court did find, however, that FOA's lawsuit was the catalyst prompting Defendants to ultimately issue a 90-day finding as required. Thus, the Court here considers FOA's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. The Court held that FOA could recover fees for work on the notice letter, complaint, and petition for fees to the extent it related to the claim that prompted the 90-day finding. However, the court reduced the amount of time spent on the complaint by fifty percent. |
Case | |
| ND - Hunting, Internet - § 20.1-01-35. Hunting through the internet prohibited--Penalty | NDCC 20.1-01-35 | ND ST 20.1-01-35 | This law prohibits hunting through the Internet or otherwise enabling such activity as described in the law. A person who violates this section is guilty of a class C felony. | Statute | |
| Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough | 705 P.2d 454 (Alaska, 1985) |
This case concerns the proper measure of damages for the death of a pet dog caused by a municipality's negligence after the Fairbanks North Star Borough Animal Shelter violated a Borough ordinance and mistakenly killed the Richardsons' pet dog, Wizzard. The court indicated it is willing to recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for the intentional or reckless killing of a pet animal in an appropriate case. However, the court held that in this case, the Richardsons made an offer of proof regarding their emotional distress and the evidence in the record indicates that the trial judge properly made a threshold determination that the severity of the Richardsons' emotional distress did not warrant a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. |
Case | ||
| TX - Hunting - Subchapter F. Unlawful Controlled Killing of or Attempting to Injure Dangerous Wild Animals. | V. T. C. A., Parks & Wildlife Code § 62.101 - 107 | TX PARKS & WILD §§ 62.101 - 107 | This Texas statute provides that no person may kill or attempt to injure a dangerous wild animal that is in captivity in this state or released from captivity in this state for the purpose of being killed. | Statute | |
| Rabon v. City of Seattle | 957 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1998) | 135 Wash.2d 278 (1998) |
Petitioner dog owner sought an injunction against a Seattle ordinance that allowed the city to destroy a vicious dog once the owner has been found guilty of owning a vicious dog (two lhasa apsos) . The majority held that the state statute regulating dogs did not preempt field of regulating dangerous dogs and the city ordinance did not irreconcilably conflict with state statute. Notably, Justice Sanders filed a strong dissent, pointing out that these dogs are the primary companions for the elderly petitioner. While the state law regulating dangerous dogs allows cities to regulate "potentially dangerous dogs," the Seattle ordinance in question fails to make a distinction between the two types of dogs. Justice Sanders wrote: "As Mr. Rabon notes, if the City were correct, dog owners and defense attorneys would find themselves arguing the bite was so vicious that the dog qualifies as "dangerous" in order to spare the dog's life." Thus, the ordinance "eviscerates" the dual definition and violates the overriding state law on dangerous dogs. |
Case |