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Displaying 5881 - 5890 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn. | 768 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2014) | 2014 WL 4637546 (6th Cir. 2014) | In June 2010, a private non-profit corporation that contracted with the City of Chattanooga to provide animal-welfare services, received complaints of neglect and unsanitary conditions at a mall pet store. Investigations revealed animals in unpleasant conditions, without water, and with no working air conditioner in the store. Animals were removed from the store, as were various business records, and the private, contracted non-profit began to revoke the store's pet-dealer permit. Pet store owners brought a § 1983 suit in federal district court against the City of Chattanooga; McKamey; and McKamey employees Karen Walsh, Marvin Nicholson, Jr., and Paula Hurn in their individual and official capacities. The Owners alleged that the removal of its animals and revocation of its pet-dealer permit without a prior hearing violated procedural due process and that the warrantless seizure of its animals and business records violated the Fourth Amendment. Walsh, Nicholson, Hurn, and McKamey asserted qualified immunity as a defense to all claims. On appeal from district court decision, the Sixth Circuit held the following: Hurn, acting as a private animal-welfare officer, could not assert qualified immunity as a defense against suit in her personal capacity because there was no history of immunity for animal-welfare officers and allowing her to assert qualified immunity was not consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Walsh and Nicholson acting both as private animal-welfare officers and as specially-commissioned police officers of the City of Chattanooga, may assert qualified immunity as a defense against suit in their personal capacities. With respect to entitlement to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in the procedural due-process claims: Walsh and Nicholson are entitled to summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of the animals, Nicholson is entitled to summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of the permit, and Walsh is denied summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of the permit. Regarding entitlement to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims: Walsh and Nicholson are entitled to summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of the animals, Nicholson is entitled to summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of the business records, and Walsh is denied summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of the business records.Because qualified immunity was not an available defense to an official-capacity suit, the court held that employees may not assert qualified immunity as a defense against suit in their official capacities. The district court’s entry of summary judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. | Case |
| GA - Rabies - Chapter 19. Control of Rabies | Ga. Code Ann., § 31-19-1 to 10 | GA ST § 31-19-1 to 10 | This GA statute pertains to the control of rabies. Any person bitten by an animal suspected of being rabid must notify the county board of health. The owner of any animal which has bitten any person or animal, or exhibits signs of rabies, must notify the county board of health. The owner must also confine the animal. A violation is a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| CA - Hunting - Chapter 4. Deer. | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 4301 - 4304 | CA FISH & G § 4301 - 4304 | These sections regulate the selling of deer meat and other parts of the deer, namely the skin, hide and head. Once a deer has been legally taken, the code allows the skin or hide to be sold, purchased, tanned, or manufactured into articles for sale. There is also a provision which prohibits the capturing or destroying of any deer and detaching or removing from the carcass only the head, hide, antlers, or horn. This same section also forbids any person from leaving through carelessness or neglect any game mammal or game bird which is in his possession, or any portion of the flesh thereof usually eaten by humans, to go needlessly to waste. | Statute |
| Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon | 515 U.S. 687 (1995) | 115 S.Ct. 2407, 40 ERC 1897, 132 L.Ed.2d 597, 63 USLW 4665, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,194, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8573, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8575, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8566 (1995) | (edited from Syllabus of the Court) As relevant here, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA or Act) makes it unlawful for any person to “take” endangered or threatened species, § 9(a)(1)(B), and defines “take” to mean to “harass, harm, pursue,” “ wound,” or “kill,” § 3(19). In 50 CFR § 17.3, petitioner Secretary of the Interior further defines “harm” to include “significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.” Respondents, persons and entities dependent on the forest products industries and others, challenged this regulation on its face, claiming that Congress did not intend the word “take” to include habitat modification. Held: The Secretary reasonably construed Congress' intent when he defined “harm” to include habitat modification. | Case |
| Allen v. Pennsylvania Society For The Prevention of Cruelty To Animals | 488 F.Supp.2d 450 (M.D.Pa., 2007) | 2007 WL 1454514 (M.D.Pa.) |
This is a § 1983 civil rights action brought by Robert Lee Allen against certain state actors arising from their search of his property, seizure of his farm animals, and prosecution of him for purported violations of Pennsylvania's cruelty-to-animals statute. The animals Allen typically acquires for his rehabilitation farm are underweight, in poor physical condition, and suffer from long-standing medical issues. After receiving a telephone complaint regarding the condition of the horses and other livestock on Allen's farm, humane officers visited Allen's property to investigate allegations. Subsequently, a warrant to seize eight horses, four goats, and two pigs was executed on a day when the officers knew Allen would be away from his farm with "twenty five assorted and unnecessary individuals." The court held that the farmer's allegations that state and county humane societies had a custom, policy or practice of failing to train and supervise their employees stated § 1983 claims against humane societies. Further, the defendants were acting under color of state law when they searched and seized farmer's property.
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| Denise Venero v. Prince George's County Maryland | Slip copy, 2024 WL 1285642 (D. Md. Mar. 26, 2024) | Plaintiffs filed this putative class action to challenge the Prince George's County, Maryland Pit Bull Ordinance and enforcement of the ordinance. Plaintiffs assert multiple due process and equal protection claims in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as several violations of the Fair Housing Act. The ordinance bans the keeping of pit bull terriers in the county, and requires any pit bull owners at the time the ordinance was adopted to register the dog, pay a fee, maintain a secure kennel, and keep the dog secure at all times. The court in this case found that the plaintiffs lack standing, since they could not show an injury in fact relating to the county's enforcement of the ordinance, the county has returned seized dogs to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs have been afforded due process through the county's administrative process. | Case | |
| CO - Animal control - Ley 769 | Ley 769 | This law is Colombia's National Code of Traffic. Article 97 delegates to the territorial entities the duty to create municipal shelters ("cosos municipales" or animal deposits") adequate for the keeping of animals of minor species, major species, and wildlife. | Statute | |
| ND - Initiatives - Initiated Statutory Measure 2 (game farm hunts) | Measure 2 (2010) | This 2010 ballot measure provided: A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if the person obtains fees or other remuneration from another person for the killing or attempted killing of privately-owned big game species or exotic mammals confined in or released from any man-made enclosure designed to prevent escape. This section does not apply to the actions of a government employee or agent to control an animal population, to prevent or control diseases, or when government action is otherwise required or authorized by law. It failed at the polls (43.4%). | Statute | |
| DC - Horses - Chapter 20. Horse-Drawn Carriages. | DC CODE § 8-2001 - 2013 | DC ST §§ 8-2001 - 2013 | This DC regulation makes it unlawful to operate a horse-drawn carriage trade without a license and an ID card. The regulations forbid certain types of bits and require that each horse wear a diaper. Horses may not be worked or driven for more than 8 hours a day. Horses must be rested, provided with food and water. A violation of the regulations may result in a fine of $300 (1st offense). A serious intentional injury to the horse by neglect or inhumane treatment shall be fined up to $2,500. | Statute |
| US - Native American - American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIFRA) | 42 USC 1996 | This act created an executive policy of respect for Native American religious ideas and practices. While it does not create any substantive right of action by a Native American, AIFRA has been used substantiate claims against federal acts that infringe the exercise of Native American religions (policy affirmed by a 1994 executive order). | Statute |