Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman | 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007) | 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6427 |
Plaintiffs, who include the Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF"), the Animal Welfare Institute ("AWI"), and three individuals, challenged the United States Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") decision not to adopt a Draft Policy that would have provided guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other regulated entities in how to ensure the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates in order to comply with the federal Animal Welfare Act ("AWA"). The district court granted USDA's motion to dismiss, to which the ALDF timely appealed. Over a vigorous dissent, an appeals court panel reversed the district court's decision. After a sua sponte call, however, a majority of active judges voted to rehear the case en banc. Yet, before the rehearing occurred, the parties had reached a settlement and had agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice provided that the panel's opinion and judgment were vacated. The majority of the en banc panel agreed to vacate the panel's opinion and judgment with prejudice, but Judge Thomas filed the dissenting opinion. |
Case |
| AZ - Leash Laws - Article 6. Animal Control. | A. R. S. § 11-1012 | AZ ST § 11-1012 | This Arizona laws provides generally that no female dog in her breeding season or vicious dog may be allowed to go at large. It further delineates the state's leash requirements for dogs, including during times of rabies quarantines, in state parks, and at public schools. Exceptions under the law include the training of livestock dogs and hunting dogs, among others. | Statute |
| Illinois 1869: Cruelty to Animals Statute | 1869 Ill. Laws 3 | Historical Law: The first part of this Statute details the incorporation of the Illinois Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. The second part of the statute describes various laws concerning the treatment of animals. | Statute | |
| State v. Hammond | 569 S.W.3d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018) | Defendant Hammond appeals his conviction for misdemeanor animal abuse in violation of § 578.012. The facts underlying the conviction stem from defendant’s conduct with a horse. In 2016, police were dispatched to a horse that was "down" on a road. The officer observed multiple injuries on the horse's hooves, fetlocks, and lower legs. Its hooves were severely abraded, which was confirmed by subsequent veterinary examination. Another officer observed markings on the road indicative of a "blood trail" from defendant's residence to the location of the horse. According to this officer, defendant told him that he had been "doing farrier stuff to his horses and this particular horse had broke away from them five times and broke a couple of lead lines, burned some people’s hands, and that he was going to teach the horse a lesson." Ultimately, the officers were able to get the horse to stand and loaded into a trailer. It later died at the animal clinic to where it was taken. Defendant was charged with felony animal abuse and a jury trial was held. The jury convicted defendant of the lesser-included misdemeanor animal abuse. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow his counsel to read Missouri's right-to-farm amendment when it instructed the jury on the amendment. The court noted that, similar to a prior case evoking the right-to-farm amendment, the amendment itself was not intended to nullify or curtail longstanding laws. The prohibition against animal cruelty existed in some form in the Missouri code for 145 years. Further, the court disagreed with defendant's contention that his prosecution criminalized a legitimate farming practice. The jury convicted defendant based on a finding that, when he pulled the horse behind his truck, his conscious object was to cause injury or suffering to the horse. While defendant contends that his was employing a legitimate, established farming technique to "train" the horse, the jury rejected his claim. Defendant's claim on appeal that the animal abuse law could then be used to prosecute farmers for other legitimate farming activities (i.e., branding, castration, use of whips, etc.) was also rejected. The court found that the conscious object of such activities is not to inflect pain or suffering, but to achieve another goal. The pain is "incidental to the farmer's legitimate objectives." The jury found this not to be the case with defendant. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Hammond to read the right-to-farm amendment to the jury, and when it refused to instruct the jury on the amendment’s terms. Affirmed. | Case | |
| Anti-cruelty laws that restrain future ownership of animals | This map surveys state laws that allow sentencing courts to restrict future ownership or possession of animals by those convicted of animal cruelty, commonly called "Possession Bans." To date (2024), it appears that 39 states have such laws. Generally, these laws apply only to felony convictions except for a couple states. With some state laws like Indiana, Missouri, and Texas, the possession ban covers only the animals who were subject to the cruelty and any other animals possessed by defendant at the time of the offense. Kansas' law makes those convicted of dogfighting who own dogs within five years of conviction a separate crime. Uniquely, Kentucky's laws restrain ownership if the crime involved sexual assault of an animal or if the animal at issue was an equine. The law does not prevent ownership of future animals. Most laws do address the issue of future animals, though. The most common number of years under which ownership of animals is enjoined by the court is five (5) years. However, California allows ten (10) years for a felony conviction and Delaware expands this to fifteen (15) years. Several states including Maine, Michigan, and Washington enable courts to impose permanent relinquishment of the ability to own or possess animals. The majority of states allow the sentencing court to affix a “reasonable” term of restricted ownership. Some states describe this as a term the judge feels “necessary” or “appropriate.” A few states even limit the ability of the defendant to work with animals in current or future jobs for certain convictions. These laws are distinguished from pre-conviction forfeiture laws that authorize law enforcement or humane officers to impound animals subject to suspected cruel treatment during the pendency of the proceedings. | State map | ||
| In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation-MDL No.1993 United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. | 720 F.3d 354 (D.C. Cir. 2013) | 2013 WL 2991027 (D.C. Cir. 2013) |
Hunters and hunting organizations sued the Secretary of Interior, the Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Service itself after the Service listed the polar bear as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and barred the importation of polar bear trophies under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). On appeal, the appeals court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant the defendants' motion of summary judgment. |
Case |
| PH - Cruelty - THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT OF 1998 | REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8485 |
It is the purpose of this Act to protect and promote the welfare of all animals in the Philippines by supervising and regulating the establishment and operations of all facilities utilized for breeding, maintaining, keeping, treating or training of all animals either as objects of trade or as household pets. For purposes of this Act, pet animal shall include birds. |
Statute | |
| Richard B. Rappaport v. Max E. McElroy, D.V.M., Sherwood Veterinary Clinic, Inc. and Does 1 through 30, Inclusive |
In this California case, plaintiff sued a veterinarian for giving his exotic pet (a Serval cat), a flea treatment known to be toxic to cats. The veterinary malpractice action focused on defendant’s negligence in failing to exercise a reasonable level of knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by others practicing veterinary medicine. In fact, plaintiff contended that it is well known in the field and indicated by the manufacturer of Spotton, that the drug should not be used on felines. Plaintiff prayed for damages in the amount of $25,000, which included lost wages, the commercial value of the cat, and loss of companionship, among other things. |
Pleading | ||
| Orangutana, Sandra s/ Habeas Corpus | Orangutana, Sandra s/ Habeas Corpus | This decision was decided on an appeal of the writ of habeas corpus brought on behalf of an orangutan named Sandra after it was denied in its first instance. Pablo Buompadre, President of the Association of Officials and Attorneys for the Rights of Animals (AFADA) brought a writ of habeas corpus against the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the City Zoological Garden of Buenos Aires on behalf of the hybrid of two different orangutan species, Sandra. AFADA sought the immediate release and relocation of Sandra to the primate sanctuary of Sorocaba, in the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil. AFADA argued that Sandra had been deprived illegitimately and arbitrarily of her freedom by the authorities of the zoo, and that her mental and physical health was at the time deeply deteriorated, with imminent risk of death. For the first time, basic legal rights were granted to an animal. In this case, Argentina’s Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation ruled that animals are holders of basic rights. The Court stated that “from a dynamic and non-static legal interpretation, it is necessary to recognize [Sandra] an orangutan as a subject of rights, as non-human subjects (animals) are holders of rights, so it imposes her protection." | Case | |
| HI - Vehicle - § 291C-124. Obstruction to driver's view or driving mechanism | H R S § 291C-124 | HI ST § 291C-124 | This Hawaii law states that no person shall hold in his or her lap or allow to be in the driver's immediate area any animal that interferes with the "driver's control over the driving mechanism of the vehicle." | Statute |