Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shera v. N.C. State University Veterinary Teaching Hosp. | 723 S.E.2d 352 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) | 2012 WL 539989 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) |
After an animal hospital caused the death of a dog due to an improperly placed feeding tube, the dog owners sued for veterinary malpractice under the Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals held that the replacement value of the dog was the appropriate measure of damages, and not the intrinsic value. Owners’ emotional bond with the dog was not compensable under North Carolina law. |
Case | |
| Brown v. Faircloth | 66 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1953) |
In this Florida case, the defendant appealed from an adverse judgment involving the sale of a bird dog. The complaint alleged that the defendant was a professional bird dog trainer and field trial handler and as such knew the qualifications necessary for a dog to have in order to compete successfully on the major field trial circuit. Plaintiff claimed that, in order to induce the plaintiff to purchase a bird dog then owned by the defendant, defendant falsely represented and warranted that the dog was of such quality and was, as is generally known in field trial parlance, a 'three-hour dog.' After plaintiff had the dog for a short time, the plaintiff found that the warranty as to soundness was not true but that the dog was infected with heart worms at the time of sale and was not a 'three-hour dog.' Thereupon the plaintiff sought to rescind the contract by returning the dog and demanding back the purchase price of which defendant refused. On appeal, defendant contended that the jury instructions failed to inform the jurors that where the sale of an animal for a particular purpose is involved, there can be no recovery for the breach of an implied warranty unless it is shown by the buyer that he or she made known to the seller the particular purpose for which the animal was being purchased and relied on the seller's skill and judgment. The Supreme Court noted that this case was not bottomed upon that theory, but upon the theory that the defendant expressly warranted the dog to be a 'three-hour dog.' This express warranty carried with it the implied warranties that the animal was sound physically, was finished in his training, and was capable of running three-hour races. In other words, the Court was of the opinion that the express warranties defined by the Court in the charge to the Jury embraced and included any defined, implied warranty. |
Case | ||
| Eastern Band of Cherokee - Natural resources - Sec. 14-10.10- Cutting timber, removing rock, trapping animals | The Cherokee Code. Part II. Section 14. Article III. Sec. 14-10.10 |
This statute is intended to preserve natural resources and protect wild animals from any trapping conducted without the knowledge of a property owner or the Tribe. The language provides for both land owner through a tribal assignment or lease, as well as lands that are reserved and used exclusively by the Tribe. The language also restricts any person, firm, or corporation from engaging in this conduct without consent and knowledge from the land owner and/or the Tribe. |
Statute | ||
| Stevens v. Hollywood Towers and Condominium Ass'n | 836 F.Supp.2d 800 (N.D. Ill. 2011) | Plaintiffs brought the instant suit contending that their Condo Board's refusal to accommodate the need for an emotional support animal forced them to sell their condo. The Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. After finding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to unrestricted access for their dog despite a no pet waiver and after needing more facts to determine whether Defendants restrictions on Plaintiffs’ access to the building were reasonable, the District Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under the Federal Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). The District Court also found Plaintiffs' interference or intimidation allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. However, the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim because Plaintiffs had not contended that Defendants unreasonably used their own property to interfere in Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their home, but rather, contended that Defendants made rules that interfered with the Plaintiff's ability to use the common areas of the property as they wished. Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was also dismissed because Plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged that Defendants' conduct was extreme or outrageous. Finally, the constructive eviction claim was dismissed because more than a year had past between the owners’ accommodation request and the sale of their condominium. In sum, Counts I, II, and III went forward, but the remainder of the complaint was dismissed. Additionally, Defendant Sudler Building Services was dismissed from the complaint. | Case | ||
| MN - Dangerous - Minnesota Dangerous Dog Definitions, Dog Bites, & Rabies Treatments | M. S. A. § 35.67 - 35.69; M.S.A. § 346.51; M.S.A. § 347.50 | MN ST § 35.67 - 35.69; MN ST § 346.51; MN ST § 347.50 | This Minnesota set of laws outlines the procedure for a town establishing a rabies proclamation and prevents the running at large of unmuzzled dogs in such localities. It also provides that an owner or custodian of a dog which does not have an appropriate antirabies vaccination and which bites or otherwise exposes a person to rabies virus may be penalized under section 346.53.& The statute also defines "dangerous dog" and "potentially dangerous dog." | Statute | |
| HI - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Chapter 711) | H R S § 711-1100 to 1110.5 | HI ST § 711-1100 to 1110.5 | Under this set of Hawaii laws, a person commits the misdemeanor offense of cruelty to animals if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly overdrives, overloads, tortures, torments, cruelly beats or starves any animal, deprives a pet animal of necessary sustenance, mutilates, poisons, or kills without need any animal other than insects, vermin, or other pests, or engages in animal fighting enterprises. Dog fighting constitutes a felony where the person owns or trains the dog to fight. The section has enhanced penalties for cruelty to guide or service animals or interference with their duties. | Statute | |
| Terral v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. | 892 So.2d 732 (La.,2005) |
A motorcyclist hit a dog wandering on the road and sued the defendant under strict liability theory. The court found that the defendant was strictly liable because he owned the dog in fact. Although the dog was originally a stray, the court upheld a finding of ownership because the defendant regularly fed the dog and harbored it on his property. |
Case | ||
| In re: WILLIAM JOSEPH VERGIS | 55 Agric. Dec. 148 (1996) | 1996 WL 189726 (U.S.D.A.) | Except as provided in 9 CFR § 2.11, neither Animal Welfare Act (7 USCS §§ 2131 et seq.) nor regulations issued under Act specifically provide for order prohibiting person who is unlicensed from obtaining license; nevertheless, Act provides that Secretary has general authority to promulgate such "orders," as well as such rules and regulations, as may be necessary to effectuate purposes of Act (7 USCS § 2151), which means that Secretary does have power to order that unlicensed person who violates Act, or regulations or standards under Act, be barred from licensure. | Case | |
| environmental authorities operation to confiscate night monkeys from malaria labs | Slideshow Images | ||||
| KS - Breeders - Article 18. Animal Facility Inspection Program-License and Registration Fees | KS ADC 9-18-1 - 31 | K.A.R. 9-18-1 to 31 | These Kansas regulations set out the fees schedule for licenses, such as animal breeder premises license. Under the regulations, premises that are licensed are subject to routine inspections to determine compliance with the regulations. | Administrative |