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Displaying 31 - 40 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LA - Domestic Violence - Chapter 28. Protection from Family Violence Act. | LSA-R.S. 46:2135 | This Louisiana law allows a court to enter a temporary restraining order, without bond, as it deems necessary to protect from abuse the petitioner. Among the provisions is subsection (A)(7) that allows the court to grant ". . . to the petitioner the exclusive care, possession, or control of any pets belonging to or under the care of the petitioner or minor children residing in the residence or household of either party, and directing the defendant to refrain from harassing, interfering with, abusing or injuring any pet, without legal justification, known to be owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either party." In 2015, the state allowed the court shall consider any and all past history of abuse, or threats thereof, in determining the existence of an immediate and present danger of abuse. | Statute | |
| Howle v. Aqua Illinois, Inc. | 2012 IL App (4th) 120207 (Ill.App. 4 Dist.) | 2012 IL App (4th) 120207 | As the result of a dog bite on the defendant’s rental property, the plaintiff suffered a torn cheek and irreparable damage to her ear. The plaintiff therefore attempted to recover damages from the defendant on the common law theory of negligence and through Illinois’ Animal Control Act. The trial court, however, dismissed the Animal Control Act claim and, later, granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim. Upon appeal, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision, though it stated a motion for summary judgment was more appropriate then the motion to dismiss for the Animal Control Act claim. | Case |
| DE - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | 16 Del.C. § 3041F - 3059F; 7 Del.C. § 570; 7 Del.C. § 1701 - 1708; 22 Del.C. § 116; 29 Del.C. § 327 | These statutes comprise Delaware's dog laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning hunting field trials, and the dangerous dog subchapter. | Statute | |
| Art and Antique Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Seggos | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL 3817305 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019) | The plaintiffs are trade organizations representing arts and antique dealers. Plaintiff’s members have an “economic and professional interest in. . .the purchase, sale, distribution or trading of antique elephant ivory.” The Defendant is the Commissioner of DEC which is a state agency tasked with protecting New York’s natural resources and environment. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits the import and export of endangered species and the sale, offering for sale, or movement of endangered species in interstate or foreign commerce. The prohibitions, however, had exceptions for “antique articles” that are 100 years of age or older. Those wishing to import such antique articles needed to first obtain a federal permit. Under the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, trade of African elephant ivory is generally prohibited. Only certain items containing a de minimus quantity of ivory are exempt. The state of New York imposed a ban on elephant ivory with even narrower exceptions than the ESA. The DEC only issued licenses authorizing trade in ivory pursuant to the State Ivory Law’s exceptions. The licenses actually issued by the DEC restricted the advertisement and display of ivory products. Plaintiff’s filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the State Ivory Law on preemption and First Amendment grounds. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Defendants and Intervenors crossed-moved to dismiss. The Court examined the ESA and determined that section 1535(f) did not preempt the State Ivory Law because the ESA prohibitions only applied to interstate or foreign commerce while the State Ivory Law applied to intrastate commerce. As result, the exceptions contained in the State Ivory Law did not prohibit what was authorized by the ESA. The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss on Count I because it was not “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt state laws restricting purely intrastate commerce in ivory.” The Plaintiff’s second count alleged that the State Ivory Law’s permit requirement violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The display restriction in the license prohibited the physical display for sale of any item not authorized for intrastate sale under the State Ivory Law even if the merchant was authorized under the ESA to sell the item in interstate commerce. The Court determined that the in-store display of ivory products constituted commercial speech because the display constituted lawful activity, New York had a substantial interest in regulating the sale of ivory within its borders and the display restriction directly advanced that interest. The Court was unable to determine whether the display restriction burdened substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. Ultimately the Court granted the Defendant’s and Intervenor’s cross-motions to dismiss with respect to preemption and denied both the Defendant’s and Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment with respect to the First Amendment Claim. | Case | |
| NJ - Education - 18A:35-4.25. Right of pupil to refuse participation in dissection activities | N.J.S.A. 18A:35-4.25 | This New Jersey law allows a public school pupil from kindergarten through grade 12 to refuse to dissect, vivisect, incubate, capture or otherwise harm or destroy animals or any parts thereof as part of a course of instruction. The school must notify pupils and parents at the beginning of each school on the right to decline participation. Any pupil who chooses to refrain from participation in or observation shall be offered an alternative education project for the purpose of providing the pupil with the factual knowledge, information or experience required by the course of study. A pupil shall not be discriminated against, in grading or in any other manner, based upon a decision to exercise the rights of this act. | Statute | |
| VA - Domestic Violence - Protective orders | Va. Code Ann.§§ 16.1-253, 16.1-253.1, 16.1-253.4, 16.1-279.1, 19.2-152.8, 19.2-152.9, and 19.2-152.10 | VA ST §§ 16.1-253, 16.1-253.1, 16.1-253.4, 16.1-279.1, 19.2-152.8, 19.2-152.9, and 19.2-152.10 | In 2014, Virginia amended its Protective Order laws to grant petitioners possession of any “companion animal," so long as the petitioner is considered the owner. Companion animals include any family pets, such as dogs, cats, hamsters, etc., but do not include farm animals. To be considered an owner, a petitioner must either have a property interest in the animal, keep or house the animal, have the animal in their care, or have acted as a custodian of the animal. This new provision is now included in Virginia's Emergency Protective Orders, Preliminary Protective Orders, and Protective Orders. | Statute |
| IA - Lost Property - Chapter 556F. Lost Property | I. C. A. § 556F.1 - 18 | IA ST § 556F.1 - 18 | This section comprises Iowa's Lost Property Act. The lost property provisions and procedures cover "any lost goods, money, bank notes, or other things of any description whatever, of the value of five dollars and over." | Statute |
| Priebe v. Nelson | 140 P.3d 848 (Cal. 2006) | 39 Cal.4th 1112, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 553 |
A kennel worker who was bitten by a dog while the dog was in the care of the kennel sued the owner of the dog under a theory of strict liability under a statute and under the common law. The court found that the dog owner was not liable to the kennel worker because under the "veterinarian's rule," the kennel owner had assumed the risk of being bitten by the dog. |
Case |
| Winingham v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. | 859 F.Supp. 1019 (1994) |
Ostrich owners sued to recover actual and exemplary damages, attorney fees, costs and interests for gross negligence after an airship flew over their property at low altitude, which frightened interfered with the ostriches’ breeding. The District Court held that: (1) allegations of fright and temporary loss of libido failed to allege compensable injury absent proof of physical injury; and (2) owners were not entitled to recover speculative value of unborn offspring; and (3) absent actual damages, exemplary damages could not be awarded. |
Case | |
| CA - Horse slaughter - § 597o. Humane transportation of equine to slaughter; vehicle requirements; | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597o | CA PENAL § 597o | This statute outlines the requirements for transporting equine to slaughter, including, but limited to, proper ventilation, sufficient space for equine to stand, and the use of ramps and floors with nonskid surfaces. | Statute |