Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Putnam County Humane Society v. Marjorie Duso d/b/a/ Oakwood Kennels, Putnam County Florida |
The Putnam County (Florida) Humane Society brought an action seeking permanent custody of 41 dogs from Marjorie Duso, the operator of a kennel. The PCHS is a not-for-profit corporation that is devoted to the prevention of cruelty to animals pursuant to Florida law. Under that authority, the PCHS seized and took custody of the dogs after an investigation led to the discovery of neglect and mistreatment of the dogs at the kennel. The PCHS seized and took custody of the dogs after an investigation led to the discovery of neglect and mistreatment of the dogs at the kennel. The Putnam County Court granted the PCHS custody of the dogs (except for Ms. Duso’s personal pet dog, which the PCHS was given the right to check on at least once a month). Further, the court enjoined Ms. Duso from owning, possessing, or breeding dogs except those kept as personal pets. |
Pleading | ||
| People v. Chung | 185 Cal. App. 4th 247 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.), 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 253 (2010), as modified on denial of reh'g (July 1, 2010) | 2010 WL 2198201 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.), 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6881, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8189 |
Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence in an animal cruelty case. Defendant claimed officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his residence without a warrant or consent to aid a dog in distress. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied because officers reasonably believed immediate entry was necessary to aid a dog that was being mistreated. |
Case |
| UT - Impound - (Repealed) § 77-24-1.5. Safekeeping by officer pending disposition--Records required | U.C.A. 1953 § 77-24-1.5 (§§ 77-24-1 to 77-24-5. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 394, § 40, eff. July 1, 2013) | Sections 77-24-1 to 77-24-5. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 394, § 40, eff. July 1, 2013 (Formerly: this Utah statute, amended in 2011, states that each peace officer shall hold all "property" in safe custody until it is received into evidence or disposed of as provided in this chapter. He or she must also maintain a record that identifies it. Note that the provisions related to specifically to animal impoundment/euthanasia were removed.) | Statute | |
| Colombia - Cruelty - LEY 84, 1989, Statue of Animal Protection | LEY 84, 1989 | Ley 84 is the National Statute of Animal Protection in Colombia. Ley 84 establishes the general duties of humans towards animals. Among these duties includes the duty to provide animals with enough food, water and medicine to guarantee their well-being; the duty to provide animals with appropriate space so they can move adequately; and the duty to provide appropriate shelter. Article 7 contains the exceptions to the duty to protect animals, meaning that the practices listed in this section are legal under the current legal system even though they might be inherently cruel. These exceptions correspond to the different variations and forms of bullfighting rejoneo, coleo, las corridas de toros, novilladas, corralejas, becerradas y tientas, and cockfighting. Ley 84 also regulates the slaughter of animals for non-consumption, animals in experiments and research, animal transportation, as well as hunting and fishing, resources, penalties, legal competency, and procedures to follow in regard to this law. | Statute | |
| KS - Roeland Park - Breed - 2-211 Pit Bulls | ROELAND PARK, KS., CITY ORDINANCE § 2-211 | On January 1, 2018, the prohibition on the keeping of more than one pit bull on any property in the City of Roeland Park, Kansas officially expired. Before this 2015 ordinance that made the possession of more than one pit bull unlawful, the city had a complete pit bull ban that prohibited the keeping, harboring, or owning a pit bull dog, including Staffordshire bull terrier, American pit bull terrier, American Staffordshire terrier, or any dog that has the appearance and characteristics of being one of those breeds. Now, unless the city enacts another ordinance related to pit bulls, the ban has ended. | Local Ordinance | |
| Coyote v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service | (no F.Supp. citation) 1994 E.D. California |
Defendant brought a motion after the USFWS denied his application to obtain eagle feathers for religious use where defendant failed to obtain certification from the Bureau of Indian Affairs that he was a member of a federally-recognized tribe. The court held that this requirement is both contrary to the plain reading of that regulation and arbitrary and capricious. For discussion on formerly recognized tribes and the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion. |
Case | |
| WY - Feral animals - Chapter 48. Feral Livestock | W. S. 1977 § 11-48-101 to 102 | WY ST § 11-48-101 to 102 | This Wyoming chapter deals with feral livestock. Under the chapter, "feral" means a domestic animal that is not under the control of nor cared for by a person and which has returned to a wild or semi-wild state. Before livestock can be declared feral, an attempt must be made to locate the owner. If the owner cannot be located, the director of the Wyoming livestock board or state veterinarian can then capture or dispose of any feral livestock damaging public or private property, and destroy any feral livestock thought to be infected with disease. The owner of feral livestock is responsible for costs associated with this chapter for damage or care of the feral livestock. | Statute |
| SC - Impound - § 47-3-540. Destruction of identifiable dog by animal control officer; prior notification of owner | Code 1976 § 47-3-540 | SC ST § 47-3-540 | This South Carolina statute provides that animal control officers must not destroy any positively identifiable dog until they have notified the owner at his or her last known address by registered mail that they have the dog in their possession. The owner then has two weeks to reclaim his or her dog, after which the animal may be destroyed. | Statute |
| ME - Hunting - § 11215. Use of motorized vehicle to kill, injure, or molest wild animals or wild birds | 12 M. R. S. A. § 11215 | ME ST T. 12 § 11215 | This Maine statute states that a person may not intentionally kill, injure or molest a wild animal or wild bird with a Motor vehicle, Motorboat, or Aircraft. A person who violates the statute commits a Class E crime. | Statute |
| BARKING HOUND VILLAGE, LLC., et al. v. MONYAK, et al. | 299 Ga. 144, 787 S.E.2d 191 (Ga., 2016) | S15G1184, 2016 WL 3144352, (Ga. June 6, 2016) | In 2012, Plaintiffs Robert and Elizabeth Monyaks took their dogs Lola and Callie, for ten days to a kennel owned by Defendants Barking Hound Village, LLC (“BHV”) and managed by William Furman. Callie, had been prescribed an anti-inflammatory drug for arthritis pain. However, three days after picking up their dogs from BHV, Lola was diagnosed with acute renal failure and died in March 2013.The Monyaks sued BHV and Furman for damages alleging that while at the kennel Lola was administered toxic doses of the arthritis medication prescribed for Callie. BHV and Furman moved for summary judgment on all the Monyaks' claims asserting that the measure of damages for the death of a dog was capped at the dog's fair market value and the Monyaks failed to prove that Lola had any market value. The Court of Appeals concluded that the proper measure of damages for the loss of a pet is the actual value of the dog to its owners rather than the dog’s fair market value. The court stated that the actual value of the animal could be demonstrated by reasonable veterinary and other expenses incurred by its owners in treating injuries, as well as by other economic factors. However, evidence of non-economic factors demonstrating the dog's intrinsic value to its owners would not be admissible. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed in part and held that the damages recoverable by the owners of an animal negligently killed by another includes both the animal's fair market value at the time of the loss plus interest, and, in addition, any medical and other expenses reasonably incurred in treating the animal. The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he value of [a] dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown.” The Supreme Court also affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and found no error in the court's determination that Georgia precedent does not allow for the recovery of damages based on the sentimental value of personal property to its owner. | Case |