Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fuller v. Vines | 36 F3d 65 (9th Cir. 1994) |
Motion for leave to amend § 1983 civil rights complaint to add claims that police officer violated Fourth Amendment by shooting pet dog and by pointing gun at one plaintiff was denied and the United States District Court for the Northern District of California entered summary judgment in favor of police officers and city. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) killing of pet dog stated Fourth Amendment violation, but (2) no seizure of plaintiff occurred when police pointed gun. |
Case | |
| Brown v. Crocker | 139 So.2d 779 (La. 1962) |
This action in tort was instituted by plaintiff, as the administrator of the estate of his minor son, against the defendant to recover the value of a quarter-horse mare and a stillborn colt, and for damages occasioned by shock and mental anguish suffered by the son, as well as for services of a veterinarian and medicines used in treatment of the mare following her wounding by a shotgun blast intentionally inflicted by the defendant. The Court of Appeal in upheld an award of $250 for shock and mental anguish experienced by the child who could not stop crying about the loss of his horse and the colt that never was. As the court stated, "Under the facts and circumstances, an award of $250 for shock and mental anguish suffered by the minor would, in our opinion, do justice between the parties." |
Case | |
| CITIZENS' RAPID-TRANSIT CO. v. DEW | 45 S.W. 790 (Tenn. 1898) | 40 L.R.A. 518, 100 Tenn. 317, 16 Pickle 317, 66 Am.St.Rep. 754 (1898) |
In 1898, this court affirmed a verdict for $200 after defendant train killed plaintiff’s dog. The Court reasoned that, "Large amounts of money are now invested in dogs, and they are extensively the subjects of trade and traffic. They are the negro's associates, and often his only property, the poor man's friend, and the rich man's companion, and the protection of women and children, hearthstones and hen roosts. In the earlier law books it was said that "dog law" was as hard to define as was "dog Latin." But that day has passed, and dogs have now a distinct and well established status in the eyes of the law." |
Case |
| DE - Law-Enforcement Animal - § 1250. Offenses against law-enforcement animals | 11 Del.C. § 1250 | DE ST TI 11 § 1250 | This Delaware statute penalizes those who harass a law-enforcement animal. The statute states what constitutes assault in the first and second degree against a law-enforcement animal. | Statute |
| Australia - Anti Cruelty - New South Wales Regulations |
The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (General) Regulation 2006 are authorative in the state of New South Wales. |
Administrative | ||
| Conservation Force v. Salazar | 715 F.Supp.2d 99 (D.D.C., 2010) | 2010 WL 2244122 (D.D.C.) |
Plaintiffs to this suit — organizations and individuals that support sustainable hunting of the Canadian Wood Bison — alleged that the Secretary of the Department of Interior violated several provisions of the ESA in his treatment of that species. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the Secretary failed to: (1) make a twelve-month finding as to the status of the Canadian Wood Bison upon petition and (2) process Plaintiffs’ applications to import bison hunting trophies. In granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss, the court found that Plaintiffs’ intent to sue letter did not specify to the Secretary that they intended to challenge his subsequent failure to issue a twelve-month finding. Since Plaintiffs gave the Secretary inadequate opportunity to review his actions and take corrective measures, the claim was dismissed. Plaintiffs — four individuals who each successfully hunted a Wood Bison in Canada — sought declaratory judgment against the Service under the ESA for failure to process their applications to import bison trophies. The court also held that the request for declaratory judgment was moot where Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they ever intended to again apply for import permits. |
Case |
| Perez v. County of Monterey | --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- 2019 WL 621483 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2019) | Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1493 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2019) | In this California case, the plaintiffs sued to challenge the validity of the County of Monterey rooster-keeping ordinance, seeking a declaratory judgment that the law is unconstitutional. The ordinance limits residents to no more than four roosters on a single property without a rooster keeping permit and also describes care and keeping requirements. The trial court found that the ordinance did not violate the constitution and entered judgment for the City. Plaintiffs here appeal that decision, arguing that the ordinance: (1) takes property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) infringes on Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce; (3) violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (4) is a prohibited bill of attainder; and (5) violates the rights to privacy and to possess property guaranteed by the California Constitution. With respect to the Fifth Amendment taking challenge, the court found that the regulatory takings argument failed because there is no evidence that the ordinance affected plaintiffs or that they even applied for or were eligible for a permit. As to the interstate commerce challenge, plaintiffs provided no evidence that the ordinance would cause excess roosters to be divested from owners and sold in commerce to support this claim. As to Equal Protection, the plaintiffs correctly assert that the ordinance treats people differently based on age (i.e., students engaged in 4-H or FFA activities are exempted from the four-rooster limitation). However, the court found that the county stated a legitimate objective of public health and safety and this differential treatment of a non-suspect class advances that interest. Finally, the court found the ordinance was not a bill of attainder since it prospectively regulates roosters and also that it does not violate California's right to privacy and property possession. Indeed, the court found that plaintiff did not identify a specific privacy interest implicated by the ordinance. Thus, the judgment was affirmed. | Case |
| MO - Lost Dog - Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act | V. A. M. S. 447.010 - 110 | MO ST 447.010 - 110 | This section comprises Missouri's Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. | Statute |
| WA - Trade - 77.15.260. Unlawful trafficking in fish, shellfish, or wildlife--Penalty | West's RCWA 77.15.260 | WA ST 77.15.260 | This Washington statute pertains to unlawful trafficking in fish, shellfish, and wildlife. A person is guilty of unlawful trafficking in the second degree if s/he traffics in such animals with a wholesale value of less than $250 and the animals are unclassified or classified as game, food fish, shellfish, game fish, or protected wildlife. Unlawful trafficking in the first degree occurs when the animals have a value of $250 or more or the animals are classified as endangered or deleterious exotic wildlife. | Statute |
| State v. Ancona | 991 A.2d 663 (Conn.App.,2010) | 120 Conn.App. 324 (Conn.App.,2010), 2010 WL 1190539 |
Defendant Michael Ancona appealed his conviction of permitting a dog to roam at large in violation of General Statutes § 22-364(a). The defendant claims that (1) the court improperly held him responsible as a keeper of a dog when the owner was present and known to the authorities, and (2) the state adduced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. The plain language of the statute § 22-364(a) states that an “owner or keeper” is prohibited from allowing a dog to roam on a public highway. Either the owner or keeper or both can be held liable for a violation of the statute. The court also found sufficient evidence that defendant was the keeper of the pit bull: the dog stayed at his house, he initially responded to the incident and tried to pull the dog away, and defendant yelled at the Officer Rogers that she was not to take "his dog." |
Case |