Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Altman v. City of High Point | 330 F.3d 194 C.A.4 (N.C. 2003) |
This case arises out of several shooting incidents in the City of High Point, North Carolina. In each incident, a High Point animal control officer shot and killed one or more dogs that were running at large in the city. Plaintiffs, the owners of the animals, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers' actions violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals concluded that the dogs at issue in this case do qualify as property protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the officers seized that property. However, because in each instance the seizure involved was reasonable, it concluded that the officers did not violate the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. |
Case | |
| Pray v. Whiteskunk | 801 N.W.2d 451 (S.D., 2011) | 2011 S.D. 43; 2011 WL 3207821 (S.D.) |
In this South Dakota case, the plaintiff suffered a broken knee after Defendant's Rottweiler brook loose from its owner and ran toward the street, causing plaintiff to fall. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the dog owner and the city, specifically alleging the the city knew the dog was dangerous and failed to enforce its vicious animal ordinance. On appeal of the granting of summary judgment for the city, this court found that plaintiff failed to establish that the action taken by the city caused the harm to Pray or exposed her to greater risks, thereby leaving her in a worse position than she was in before the city took action. While this Court found that the city had actual knowledge of the dog's dangerousness, this alone is insufficient. |
Case |
| ID - Lien - § 45-805. Liens for services on or caring for property | I.C. § 45-805 | ID ST § 45-805 | This Idaho law deals with liens livery or boarding or feed stable proprietors and others pasturing livestock who have a lien. If the liens are not paid within sixty days after the work is done, service rendered, or feed or pasturing supplied, the person in whose favor such special lien is created may proceed to sell the property at a licensed public livestock auction market, or if the lien is on equines, to sell the animals at a sale offered to the public, after giving ten days' notice to the owner or owners of the livestock and the state brand inspector. Requirements for proper notice are provided in the law. | Statute |
| VA - Trusts - § 64.2-726. Trust for care of animal | VA Code Ann. § 64.2-726 | VA ST § 64.2-726 | This Virginia pet trust law becomes effective July 1, 2006. The law provides that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. | Statute |
| OK - Research - Chapter 13. Use of Unclaimed Animals for Scientific Investigation and Education. | 4 Okl. St. Ann. § 391 - 402 | OK ST T. 4 § 391 - 402 | These Oklahoma statutes provide the rules for scientific or medical research facilities that use animals obtained from animal shelters or dog pounds. Among the provisions are licensing procedures, inspection requirements, municipal ordinance requirements relating to duration that animals must first be impounded, and a provision specifying that anyone who fails to undertake the duties required by the act is subject to a misdemeanor. Notably, a municipality must provide that an owner of an animal who voluntarily delivers it to a public pound has the right to specify that it not be used for scientific research; it shall be the duty of the pound superintendent to tag such animal properly and to make certain that such animal is not delivered to an institution for scientific purposes. However, institution is immune from liability resulting from an improper delivery to such an institution. | Statute |
| Stephens v. State | Stephans v. State, 3 So. 458 (Miss. 1887) (Arnold J. plurality). |
The Mississippi Cruelty to Animal statute was applied to the Defendant who killed several hogs that were eating his crops. The lower court refused to instruct the Jury that they should find him not guilty, if they believed that he killed the hogs while depredating on his crop and to protect it, and not out of a spirit of cruelty to the animals. The Supreme Court of Mississippi found it to be an error by the court to refuse to give such instructions because if the defendant was not actuated by a spirit of cruelty, or a disposition to inflict unnecessary pain and suffering, he was not guilty under the statute. |
Case | |
| Frank v. Animal Haven, Inc. | 107 A.D.3d 574 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2013.) | 967 N.Y.S.2d 370, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 04711 |
Plaintiff was bitten by the dog that she adopted from Animal Haven, Inc. and sued that entity for personal injuries stemming from the bite. In affirming the decision to dismiss the complaint, this court noted that the adopting parties signed a contract a the time of adoption where they undertook a "lifetime commitment" for the responsible care of the dog. While the contract stipulated that Animal Haven had the right to have the dog returned if the plaintiff breached the contract, this did not reserve a right of ownership of the dog. Further, the contract also explicitly relieved Animal Haven of liability once the dog was in the possession of the adoptive parties. |
Case |
| State v. Avella | --- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 2552529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2019) | The Defendant was charged with practicing veterinary medicine without a license and for cruelty to animals. The Defendant made a homemade device attempting to treat his dog for a problem because he did not have the money to take his dog to the vet. The home treatment ended up injuring the dog and he took the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. The veterinarian stated that the dog needed to be taken to an advanced care veterinary facility, however, the Defendant could not do so due to lack of funds. The trial court dismissed the charges brought against the Defendant and the State of Florida appealed. Florida law forbids a person from practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The Defendant was not a veterinarian. The Defendant relied upon statutory exemptions in Florida’s statue that permit a person to care for his or her own animals and claims that he was just trying to help his dog, Thor. The Defendant also argued that the purpose of the statute was to prevent unlicensed veterinary care provided to the public rather than to criminalize the care an owner provides to his or her animals. The Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I for unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine given the stated purpose of the statute and the statutory exemptions. As for Count II, animal cruelty, the State argued that the Defendant’s conduct in using a homemade tool to remove bone fragments from the dog’s rectum and then failing to take the dog to an advanced care clinic fits under the Florida animal cruelty statute. Although the Defendant argued that he had no intention of inflicting pain upon his dog and was only trying to help him, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that “the statute does not require a specific intent to cause pain but punishes an intentional act that results in the excessive infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.” Ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Count II and remanded for further proceedings on the animal cruelty charge. | Case | |
| TN - Ecoterrorism - Part 8. Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection | T. C. A. § 39-14-801 - 806 | TN ST § 39-14-801 - 806 | This chapter comprises the Tennessee Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act. A person commits an offense if, without consent, the person exercises control over an animal facility, an animal from an animal facility, or other property from an animal facility with the intent to deprive the owner of the facility, animal, or property and to disrupt the enterprise conducted at the animal facility. Other offenses include destruction of property, including freeing of animals located there, or entering an animal facility with the intent to disrupt or damage the enterprise or its property. A violation is a Class C felony if the person exercises control over the facility or the damage is $500 or more. A violation is a Class B misdemeanor if the damage is less than $500 or the person illegally enters the facility with intent to damage it. Any person who has been damaged by reason of a violation of this part may recover all actual and consequential damages, punitive damages, and court costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, from the person causing the damage. | Statute |
| NH - Equine Activity Liability - Chapter 508. Limitation of Actions. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 508:19 | NH ST § 508:19 | This New Hampshire statute provides that an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person engaged in an equine activity, shall not be liable for an injury or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities. However, liability is not limited by this statute where the equine professional knowingly provided faulty tack or equipment, failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity, owns or otherwise is in lawful possession of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a known, dangerous latent condition, or if he or she commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant or intentionally injures the participant. The statute also sets out several definitions and specifically states that the term "engages in an equine activity" does not include being a spectator at an equine activity, except in cases where the spectator is in an unauthorized area and in immediate proximity to the equine activity. | Statute |