Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Davison v. Berg | 243 So.3d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018) | 44 Fla. L. Weekly D641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018); 2018 WL 1415485 | Deborah Davison volunteered at her local Humane Society to help take care of a dog park. Three years later, Rebecca Berg’s dog who was chasing other dogs collided with Davison. Davison suffered a broken leg that required extensive medical care. Davison then filed an action against Berg under a Florida statute that “imposes liability on dog owners for damage their dogs cause to other persons and animals.” The trial court granted final summary judgment in favor of Berg for two reasons. The first reason was that the signs outside of the park sufficiently warned Davison of the risks of injury inside. The second reason was that Davison essentially consented to the risk of potential injuries by being a volunteer for the dog park. On appeal, this court stated that the Florida statute was a strict liability statute that makes an owner the insurer of their dog’s conduct. The only defense to the statute is for an owner to display in a prominent place on his or her premises a sign that includes the words “Bad Dog.” Berg presented evidence that the park had two signs prominently displayed at the entrance to the park with the title “Dog Park Rules.” The two signs listed rules for entrance to the dog park. One of these rules stated that park use is at the dog owner’s risk. Another rule stated that rough play and chasing were not allowed if any dogs or owners were uncomfortable with that behavior. The last rule stated that visitors enter at their own risk. Even though Davison entered the park at her own risk, the purpose of the sign requirement in the statute was to give notice that a bad dog is on the premises. The Court found that the trial court erred in finding that the signs at the dog park were sufficiently equivalent to “Bad Dog” signs to preclude liability under the Florida statute. The trial court also found that by virtue of Davison volunteering at the dog park, she was aware that she could be injured during the course of her work and that she signed a volunteer application form that acknowledged that she could be exposed to “bites, scratches, and other injuries.” Davison had also witnessed a prior collision between a dog and an individual that resulted in a broken leg. After witnessing that, Davison began to warn others at the Humane Society about the dangers of being inside the dog park with dogs chasing each other. The Court held that even though there may be evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Davison consented to the risk of injury, “an actual consent or assumption of the risk defense cannot bar liability.” The Court reversed the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment in favor of Berg. | Case | |
| NJ - Fur - Chapter 14. Fur Products. | NJSA 56:14-1 to 56:14-3 | NJ ST 56:14-1 to 56:14-3 | This law represents New Jersey's fur labeling law. Under the 2009 law, no person shall sell or offer to sell any new coat, jacket, garment or other clothing apparel made wholly or in part of fur, regardless of the price or value of the fur, without the name of the animal(s) used to produce the fur and the name of the country of origin of any imported fur. A person who violates this act shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $500 for the first offense and not more than $1,000 for each subsequent offense, to be collected in a civil action by a summary proceeding. | Statute | |
| MD - Hunting - Subtitle 9. Captive Wildlife. | MD Code, Natural Resources, § 10-901 - 911 | MD NAT RES § 10-901 - 911 | This Maryland statute states that it is in the state's public interest to preserve native species by strictly regulating the possession, importation, exportation, breeding, raising, protection, rehabilitation, hunting, killing, trapping, capture, purchase, or sale of certain wildlife which pose a possibility of harm to native wildlife. | Statute | |
| City of Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners of Texas | 794 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1990). |
City's animal control ordinance banning the keeping of pit bulls was not preempted by state Penal Code provisions governing the keeping of vicious dogs. |
Case | ||
| People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd. | 895 P.2d 1269 (Nev.,1995) | 111 Nev. 615, 23 Media L. Rep. 1961 (Nev.,1995) |
In this Nevada case, respondent Berosini claimed that two animal rights organizations, PETA and Performing Animal Welfare Society (PAWS), and three individuals defamed him and invaded his privacy. The trial court entered judgment on jury verdicts on the libel and invasion of privacy claims in the aggregate amount of $4.2 million. On appeal, this Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict and reversed the judgment. The court found that the videotapes of Berosini beating his animal performers before the show was not libelous because they were not false or defamatory. The videotape was not “false” because it was an accurate portrayal of the manner in which Berosini disciplined his animals backstage before performances and it was not not defamatory because Berosini took the position that the shaking, punching, and beating that appear on the tape were necessary, appropriate and “justified” for the training, discipline, and control of show animals. With regard to his invasion of privacy claims, the videotaping did not invade the scope of Berosini's expectation of privacy because his asserted expectation was "freedom from distracting intrusion and interference with his animals and his pre-act disciplinary procedures." Thus, the filming did not intrude upon Berosini's expected seclusion. |
Case | |
| Colombia, Resolución 002341, 2007 | Resolution 002341 de 2007 sets parameters and requirements with the goal of guaranteeing the efficiency of the different processes that are part of the system of production of cattle for slaughter, while taking into account the livestock’s health and safety. Some of the topics that this resolution regulates include registration of production farms, requirements of the farming facilities, animal health and biosafety, veterinary medicines good practices, animal feeding good practices, farm and livestock transportation personnel, animal welfare and animal transportation. | Administrative | |||
| MS - Hunting - § 49-7-68. Computer-assisted remote hunting | Miss. Code Ann. § 49-7-68 | MS ST § 49-7-68 | This Mississippi law makes it a Class I offense a person to engage in computer-assisted remote hunting. It is also unlawful for a person to provide or operate a facility for computer-assisted remote hunting if the game animal or bird being hunted is located in this state. | Statute | |
| CO - Exotic Pets and Wildlife - Chapter 11. Wildlife Parks and Unregulated Wildlife. | 2 Colo. Code Regs. 406-11:1100 to 11:1116 | 2 CCR 406-11:1100 to 11:1116 | (Per introduction to regulations). In this introduction to chapter 11 we outline possession requirements for live wildlife as found in Colorado wildlife law. There is growing interest in the private possession of live wildlife. At the same time there is considerable confusion over the laws regarding such private possession. Colorado wildlife law generally prohibits the importation, live possession, sale, barter, trade, or purchase of any species of wildlife native to Colorado (33-6-113(1), C.R.S.). In addition, these same laws restrict or prohibit the importation and possession of exotic (non-native) wildlife (33-6-109(4), C.R.S.); and non-commercial (pet) possession of regulated mammals has been prohibited by these regulations since 1983. The Wildlife Commission also maintains a prohibited species list in Chapter 0. The possession of these species is severely restricted. | Administrative | |
| IL - Protected species - Article II. Game Protective Regulations. | 520 I.L.C.S. 5/2.1 to 2.5a; 520 I.L.C.S. 5/2.36a | IL ST CH 520 § 5/2.1 to 2.5; § 5/2.36a | This collection of statutes provides that the title of all wild birds and mammals rests with the state. A new section in 2011 vests the Department of Natural Resources with the ability to control the possession and release of species deemed exotic or invasive. Other sections concern the possession of certain wild birds and animals. Possession of any listed wild bird or its parts (including the eagle) is illegal under the statute, except for the bona fide scientific or zoological exhibition. | Statute | |
| Howard v. Chimps, Inc. | 284 P.3d 1181 (Or. App. 2012) | 2012 WL 3195145 (Or. App. 2012); 251 Or.App.636 (2012) |
While cleaning a cage at a chimpanzee sanctuary, the plaintiff was twice attacked by a chimpanzee, which left the plaintiff without much of her thumb. Plaintiff brought a suit against the sanctuary based on claims of strict liability; under a statute and common law; negligence; and gross negligence. At the district court, the plaintiff lost because she had signed a waiver releasing the sanctuary from liability "on all claims for death, personal injury, or property damage" and because she failed to state a claim in regards to the gross negligence charge. In affirming the lower court's decision, the appellate court found an enforceable contract existed with the waiver, and that there was no evidence of reckless disregard on defendant's part to rise to the level of gross negligence. |
Case |