Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Woudenberg v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | 794 F.3d 595 (6th Cir., 2015) | 2015 WL 4503212 (6th Cir., 2015) | According to Department of Agriculture regulations promulgated under the federal Animal Welfare Act (with certain exceptions not applicable here), persons who were in the business of buying and selling dogs and cats (i.e. class B dealers) may not obtain dogs or cats from an individual donor “who did not breed and raise them on his or her premises.” Another provision required a dealer in such a case to “obtain [ ] a certification that the animals were born and raised on that person's premises.” The question in this case was whether there was a violation when the dealer obtained the required certification, but the certification was false. The regulatory language was clear that a dealer violated the law by obtaining a dog or cat from an individual donor who did not breed or raise it on the donor's premises and it was still a violation even when the dealer in good faith obtained certifications that the animals had been so bred and raised. The certification requirement was an enforcement mechanism for the prohibition, not an exception. The Department of Agriculture therefore properly entered a cease-and-desist order against the petitioner. | Case |
| LA - Leash - Chapter 18. Animals Running at Large | LSA-R.S. 3:2771 | This Louisiana law states that no person shall permit any dog in his or her possession to run at large on any unenclosed land, or trespass upon any enclosed or unenclosed lands of another. | Statute | |
| DE - Equine Activity Liability - § 8140. CHAPTER 81. PERSONAL ACTIONS. | 10 Del.C. § 8140 | DE ST TI 10 § 8140 | This Delaware statute provides that an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional or any other person shall not be liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities. Liability is not limited, however, when the equine professional knowingly used faulty tack, failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage in the activity, owns or otherwise is in lawful possession of the land upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a dangerous latent condition which was known, commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, or intentionally injures the participant. Equine professionals and sponsors are also required to post warning signs alerting the participants to the limitation of liability by law. | Statute |
| Bohan v. Ritzo | 679 A.2d 597 (N.H.,1996) | 141 N.H. 210 (N.H.,1996) |
In this New Hampshire case, a bicyclist brought suit against a dog owner under the state's strict liability statute for injuries he sustained when he fell from his bike after the owners' dog ran toward him. The jury awarded him $190,000 at trial. On appeal, this court found that the bicyclist's allegations were sufficient to sustain the jury's finding even though there was no evidence that the dog actually bit the plaintiff or made any physical contact. The Court held that there is nothing in the plain language of RSA 466:19 that would limit the statute's application actual bites or other direct physical contact. Instead, the statute makes dog owners strictly liable to “[a]ny person to whom ... damage may be occasioned by a dog not owned or kept by him.” RSA 466:19. |
Case |
| Huff v. Dyer | 297 Ga.App. 761, 678 S.E.2d 206 (Ga.App.,2009) | 2009 WL 1299046 (Ga.App.), 09 FCDR 1707 |
In this Georgia case, the plaintiff was injured from being bitten by defendants' dog who was chained to the bed of their pickup truck while the defendants were inside an adjacent restaurant. The plaintiff sued defendants, claiming that they failed to warn her of their dog's dangerous propensities and that they committed negligence per se by violating the state's strict liability statute (OCGA § 51-2-7) and the Hall County Animal Control Ordinance. A jury found in favor of the defendants. The court found that the evidence was therefore more than sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that defendants' dog was “under restraint” for purposes of the ordinance. Further, there was no evidence that the owners had knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity. Affirmed. |
Case |
| Mathis v. Crawford | Not Reported in N.E. Rptr., 2021 WL 3127697 (Ill.App. 5 Dist., 2021) | 2021 IL App (5th) 190012-U | Plaintiff filed this suit in small claims court seeking damages for the destruction of his three dogs, that were mauled to death by dogs owned by defendant over a period of 15 years. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded him $5,000. Defendant appealed to request that the court of appeals amend the trial court's award of damages to a lesser amount of $500. The court found that, although plaintiff was able to show that he suffered damages at the result of defendant's dogs killing his dogs, the value of the dogs was still unclear. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial solely to discern the issue of the value of the dogs. | Case |
| Riley v. Bd. of Commissioners of Tippecanoe Cty. | Slip Copy, 2016 WL 90770, 2016 WL 90770 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2016) (unpublished) | The plaintiff filed suit based on violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA) after he was denied entrance into the Tippecanoe County Courthouse with his service dog. Initially, defendant's claims were dismissed because the Court did not adequately allege that his dog was a service dog. Defendant then filed an amended complaint with plausible allegations that his dog is a service dog. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, stating that the plaintiff had not established that his dog was a service dog according to the definition listed under rules promulgated under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that the plaintiff’s dog was a service dog under the definition because the dog was “individually trained to, among other things, provide [plaintiff] with balance support and assistance during episodes of PTSD.” As a result, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case was denied. | Case | |
| IA - Hunting, interference - 481A.125. Intentional interference with lawful hunting, fishing, or fur-harvesting | I. C. A. § 481A.125 | IA ST § 481A.125 | This law reflects Iowa's hunter harassment provision. Under the law, a person interferes with hunting, fish, or fur-harvesting activities when he or she: intentionally places him or herself in a location where his or her presence affects the behavior of the game thereby affecting the feasibility of taking the animal; intentionally creates a visual, aural, olfactory, or physical stimulus for the purpose of affecting the behavior of the animal to harass or obstruct the hunter; or alters the condition or placement of the hunter's personal property to obstruct that person. A first offense is a simple misdemeanor; a second or subsequent offense is a serious misdemeanor. | Statute |
| CA - Bullfights - § 597m. Bullfights prohibited; exceptions; penalty | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597m | CA PENAL § 597m | This statute makes it unlawful for any person to promote, advertise, stage, hold, manage, conduct, participate in, engage in, or carry on any bullfight, but does not prohibit rodeos or bloodless bullfights, contests, or exhibitions held in connection with religious celebrations or religious festivals. | Statute |
| Com. v. Erickson | 905 N.E.2d 127 (Mass.App.Ct.,2009) | 74 Mass.App.Ct. 172 (Mass.App.Ct.,2009) |
In this Massachusetts case, the defendant was found guilty of six counts of animal cruelty involving one dog and five cats after a bench trial. On appeal, defendant challenged the warrantless entry into her apartment and argued that the judge erred when he failed to grant her motion to suppress the evidence gathered in the search. The Court of Appeals found no error where the search was justified under the "emergency exception" to the warrant requirement. The court found that the officer was justified to enter where the smell emanating from the apartment led him to believe that someone might be dead inside. The court was not persuaded by defendant's argument that, once the officer saw the dog feces covering the apartment that was the source of the smell, it was then objectively unreasonable for him to conclude the smell was caused by a dead body. "The argument ignores the reality that there were in fact dead bodies in the apartment, not merely dog feces, to say nothing of the additional odor caused by the blood, cat urine, and cat feces that were also found." |
Case |