Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GREEN v. LECKINGTON | 236 P.2d 335 (Or. 1951) | 192 Or. 601 (Or. 1951) |
In this Oregon case, defendant appeals a judgment of $700 in damages obtained against him after he shot plaintiff’s dog. The dog had gone onto to defendant’s property and was chasing his chickens. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that because it was a general verdict, there was no way to determine a basis for the jury’s verdict; specifically, whether erroneous instructions on exemplary damages and the proper measure of damages influenced the verdict. Because the Court had the whole record before it (and in the interest of “harmony between neighbors”), the Court fixed the damages at the true market value of the dog ($250). |
Case | |
| RSPCA v. McCormick | [2016] EWHC 928 (Admin) | It was held that for an animal fight to have taken place, contrary to Section 8 of the Animal Welfare Act, the following must have occurred: a "protected animal" must have been placed with another animal in an environment where the ability of both to escape is restricted and controlled by some person or persons connected with that activity or by some artificial restraint. ‘Placed with’ is to be construed as a ‘matter of normal language.’ | Case | ||
| UT - Endangered Species - Chapter 20. Enforcement--Violations and Penalties | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-5-309 - 314 | UT ST § 23A-5-309 - 314 | This Utah statute criminalizes the intentional or reckless abandonment of a carcass or killing of wildlife for pecuniary gain. The statute lists the restitution value of species protected under the code (bald eagles $1,000 and golden eagles $500). Further, the statute proscribes mandatory incarceration for felony convictions (aggregate value of species taken over $500) where the motive of the individual was pecuniary gain. | Statute | |
| NY - Eagles - Chapter 43-B. Of the Consolidated Laws. | N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-0537 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 11-0537 | New York makes it illegal to "knowingly or with wanton disregard for the consequences" take, transport, possess, or engage in commerce of bald eagles or their parts without a valid permit. This incorporates the exact language of the federal act. | Statute | |
| State v. Overholt | 193 P.3d 1100 (Wash. App. Div. 3,2008) |
Defendant was convicted of several counts of second degree unlawful hunting of big game after a game agent (“agent”) followed vehicle tracks to Defendant’s home upon finding fresh cow elk gut piles, and Defendant showed the agent two cow elk carcasses hanging in Defendant’s shed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3 found that because the agent was in fresh pursuit of criminal activity and did not enter Defendant’s property with the intent to obtain consent to search in order to evade a search warrant, the agent was not obligated to issue Ferrier warnings, and that suppressing the seized carcasses from evidence would not have altered the outcome of the case in light of the substantial evidence obtained prior to seizing the carcasses. |
Case | ||
| Schindler v. Mejias | 100 A.D.3d 1315 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012) | 2012 WL 5950370 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.); 955 N.Y.S.2d 252 |
This appeal is an appeal of the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment in a defamation action. Plaintiff, an attorney, brought an action against Hector L. Mejias Jr., an employee of defendant Ulster County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, claiming that Mejias falsely accused him of misrepresenting himself as the Ulster County District Attorney during a sworn deposition. The statement occurred during an incident at the SPCA where Plaintiff-Schindler was trying to pick up a dog owned by his client. The particular issue on appeal is whether the supreme court erred in determining that Mejias's supporting deposition constitutes libel per se. The court found that the alleged act was sufficiently egregious because such a claim would suggest professional misconduct on an attorney's part and invites both disciplinary action and damage to an attorney's professional reputation. Further, defendants failed to meet their burden of showing an absence of malice. The order was affirmed. |
Case | |
| US - AWA - House Debate 1966 AWA | House Resolution 821 |
This the debate in the House of Representatives for the initial adoption of the Animal Welfare Act in 1966. For discussion of Act see, Overview |
Administrative | ||
| Historical Materials |
Historical Collection
|
Basic page | |||
| RI - Spay/Neuter - Chapter 19. Animal Care. § 4-19-18. Penalties for violations | Gen.Laws 1956, § 4-19-18 | RI ST § 4-19-18 | This Rhode Island statute provides that violations of Sec. 4-19-16, relating to the mandatory spay/neuter agreement from a licensed releasing agency. Violations of the written agreement executed pursuant to § 4-19-16 by an adopting party are punishable by a fine of fifty dollars ($50.00) for the first offense, one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for the second offense and four hundred dollars ($400) for the third and subsequent offenses. Second and subsequent offenses may constitute grounds for seizure and forfeiture of the dog or cat. | Statute | |
| Cotton v. Ben Hill County | 208 F. Supp. 3d 1353 (M.D. Ga. 2016) | 2016 WL 5387627 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2016) | In this case, Cotton filed suit against Ben Hill County after Cotton’s cattle was seized for alleged animal cruelty and roaming at large. Cotton filed suit against Ben Hill County and the Sheriff’s Department arguing that he had been deprived of his property in violation of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the violation of the Constitution of Georgia. The court reviewed the issue and granted summary judgment in favor of Ben Hill County and the Sheriff's Department. The court granted summary judgment because Cotton was unable to establish that his rights were violated under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cotton was unable to establish that his Due Process rights were violated because he was unable to provide any evidence that the allegations against Ben Hill County and the Sheriff’s Department were “the result of an official policy, custom or practice of the county or that the County acted with deliberate indifference to these rights.” Also, the court found that there was not a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause because under state law, Georgia provided for a “post deprivation remedy for the loss.” Lastly, the court found that Cotton’s claims against the Sheriff's Department failed as a matter of law because Cotton was unable to establish that anyone from the Sheriff’s Department actually participated in the seizure and impoundment of the cattle. For those reasons, the court held in favor of Ben Hill County and granted summary judgment. | Case |