Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burgess v. Taylor | 44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. 2001) | 91 A.L.R.5th 749 (Ky. 2001) |
Owner of pet horses sued boarders of horses who sold them for slaughter, asserting tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court held that: (1) element of tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, requiring outrageous and intolerable conduct depends on conduct of wrongdoer, not subject of conduct; (2) boarders' actions constituted tort of outrage; and (3) award of $50,000 compensatory damages and $75,000 punitive damages was not excessive. |
Case | |
| WA - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | West's RCWA 4.24.410; 9.08.010 - 90; 9A.76.200; 9.91.170 - 175; 16.10.010 - 40; 16.54.010 - 40; 16.70.010 - 60; 36.49.020 - 070; 77.12.077; 77.15.240, 245, 440; 77.32.525; 77.32.540 | WA ST 4.24.410; 9.08.010 - 90; WA ST 9A.76.200; WA ST 9.91.170 - 175; 16.10.010 - 40; 16.54.010 - 40; 16.70.010 - 60; 36.49.020 - 070; 77.12.077; 77.15.240, 245, 440; 77.32.525; 77.32.540 | These Washington statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include vaccination requirements, dog control zones in municipalities, dangerous dog laws, and provisions concerning hunting with dogs. | Statute | |
| US - Primate - Animal Welfare; Draft Policy on Environment Enhancement for Nonhuman Primates | Doc. No. 98-121-1 |
Under the Animal Welfare Act, our regulations require that dealers, exhibitors, and research facilities that maintain nonhuman primates develop and follow a plan for environment enhancement adequate to promote the psychological well-being of the nonhuman primates. We have developed a draft policy to clarify what we believe must be considered and included in the plan in order for dealers, exhibitors, and research facilities to adequately promote the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates. |
Administrative | ||
| WA - King County - IV. MANDATORY SPAY AND NEUTER PROGRAM | Sections 11.04.400 to 11.04.580 |
This part of the King County, Washington animal control ordinance states that no person shall own or harbor any cat or dog over the age of six months that has not been spayed or neutered unless the person holds an unaltered animal license for the animal pursuant to K.C.C. 11.04.030 (except for guide dog puppies and police service dogs). The animal care and control authority shall develop and implement a twelve-month program to canvass for compliance with the licensing requirements of this chapter. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Joyce v Visser | [2001] TASSC 116 |
The appellant was convicted of failing to provide food and water to dogs who were chained to a spot. Citing the extreme nature of the neglect and the need for general deterrence, the trial judge sentenced the appellant to three months' imprisonment. On appeal, the appellate judge found the sentence to be manifestly excessive and reduced the sentence. |
Case | ||
| Town of Plainville v. Almost Home Animal Rescue & Shelter, Inc. | 182 Conn. App. 55 (Conn. App. Ct., 2018) | 187 A.3d 1174, 2018 WL 2191572 (Conn. App. Ct. May 15, 2018) | This is an appeal by the town of Plainville following the lower court's granting of defendant's motion to strike both counts of the plaintiffs' complaint. The complaint raised one count of negligence per se for defendant's failure to provide care for animals at its rescue facility. Count two centered on unjust enrichment for defendant's failure to reimburse the town for expenditures in caring for the seized animals. The facts arose in 2015 after plaintiff received numerous complaints that defendant's animal rescue was neglecting its animals. Upon visiting the rescue facility, the plaintiff observed that the conditions were unsanitary and the many animals unhealthy and in need of medical care. The plaintiff then seized 25 animals from defendant and provided care for the animals at the town's expense. Soon thereafter, plaintiffs commenced an action to determine the legal status of the animals and requiring the defendant to reimburse the town for care expenses. Prior to a trial on this matter, the parties reached a stipulation agreement that provided for adoption of the impounded animals by a third party, but contained no provision addressing reimbursement by the defendant to the town. Because there was no hearing on the merits of plaintiff's petition as to whether defendant had neglected or abused the animals for reimbursement under the anti-cruelty law, the court had no authority to order the defendant to reimburse the plaintiffs. Plaintiff then filed the instant action and the lower court held that each count failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, the court held that, with respect to count one on negligence per se under § 53–247, the statute does not impose such liability on one who violates the law. Further, unjust enrichment is only available is there is no adequate remedy at law, and another law, § 22–329a (h), provides the exclusive remedy for the damages sought by the town. On appeal here, this court held that the court properly determined that the plaintiffs were not among the intended beneficiaries of § 53–247 and that that determination alone was sufficient to strike count one. The court found "absolutely no language in the statute, however, that discusses costs regarding the care of animals subjected to acts of abuse or neglect or whether violators of § 53–247 have any obligation to compensate a municipality or other party." Thus, plaintiffs could not rely upon § 53–247 as a basis for maintaining a negligence per se case against the defendant. As to count two, the court rejected plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim. Because the right of recovery for unjust enrichment is equitable in nature, if a statute exists that provides a remedy at law, the equitable solution is unavailable. The court found that Section 22–329a provides a remedy for a municipality seeking to recover costs expended in caring for animals seized as a result of abuse and neglect. The stipulation agreement signed and agreed to by the parties contained no provision for reimbursement and settled the matter before there was an adjudication that the animals were abused or neglected. As a result, the judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| Phillips v. North Carolina State University | 697 S.E.2d 433 (N.C.App.,2010) |
University operated a horse breeding management facility. Industrial Commission found that University was negligent in broodmare's death that occurred during transport. The Court of Appeals held that mare’s owners were entitled to lost profit for a single breeding cycle. |
Case | ||
| Minter-Smith v. Florida | 864 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2003) |
Defendant was convicted of unlawfully owning, possessing, keeping or training a dog or dogs with intent that such dog engage in dogfighting and he appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that: (1) statute under which appellant was convicted was not unconstitutionally vague; (2) testimony of investigator was sufficient for jury to conclude that defendant was in violation of the statute that was not unconstitutional on ground that it was ex post facto as applied to defendant; (3) evidence as to poor conditions of dogs and their vicious propensities was relevant to issue of defendant's intent to fight the dogs; and (4) evidence gained by police officer pursuant to search warrant was not inadmissible. Affirmed.
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Case | ||
| TX - Dangerous - Subchapter E: Dangerous Wild Animals | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 822.101 - 116 | TX HEALTH & S § 822.101 - 116 | Chapter 822, Subchapter E regulates the keeping of dangerous wild animals. It imposes a registration requirement upon the owner of a dangerous wild animal and also sets forth insurance requirements. One thing to note is that Texas animal cruelty laws do not apply to these wild animals. | Statute | |
| U.S. v. White | 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974) |
Defendant was a member of a recognized Indian tribe who killed an eagle upon his reservation. The Court holds that it will not find an intent by Congress to abrogate Indian hunting rights under the BGEPA where the statute did not explicitly state that those rights were abrogated. For further discussion on abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act . |
Case |