Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| O'Rourke v. American Kennels (Unpublished Disposition) | 7 Misc.3d 1018(A) (N.Y. 2005) | 801 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Table), 2005 WL 1026955 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct.), 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 50656(U) Unpublished Disposition |
In this highly entertaining Small Claims case, claimant seeks to recover the purchase price of her dog, Little Miss Muffet. The issue presented, in large part, concerns the dog's weight. Claimant contends that Muffet was supposed to be a "teacup dog." At eight pounds, she is well above the five pounds that is considered the weight limit for a "teacup" Maltese. Plaintiff paid an additional $1,000 above the standard $1,500 to purchase the smaller variety of Maltese. Plaintiff was awarded the differential in price, but not veterinary fees for a knee condition that developed after the warranty protections expired in the purchase agreement. |
Case |
| VA - Endangered Species - Article 6. Endangered Species. | Va. Code Ann. §§ 29.1-563 - 570 | VA ST §§ 29.1-563 - 570 | The taking, transportation, possession, sale, or offer for sale within the Commonwealth of any fish or wildlife appearing on any list of threatened or endangered species published by the United States Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the provisions of the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-205), or any modifications or amendments thereto, is prohibited except as provided in § 29.1-568. Interestingly, the state mandates that anyone who keeps a non-native or exotic reptile must keep the reptile so as to prevent it from running-at-large or escaping. Violation of this provision is a Class 2 misdemeanor. | Statute |
| CT - Hunting - § 26-80b. Sale or use of computer software or service to remotely hunt | C. G. S. A. § 26-80b | CT ST § 26-80b | This Connecticut law states that no person shall operate, provide, sell, use or offer to operate, provide, sell or use any computer software or service that allows a person, when not physically present, to remotely control a firearm or weapon to hunt a live animal or bird. Violation is a class A misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar | Slip Copy, 2011 WL 6000497 (D.Ariz.) |
Plaintiffs filed action against Interior and FWS to set aside FWS's finding that the desert bald eagle does not qualify as a distinct population segment (“DPS”) entitled to protection under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment was granted. The Court found that FWS' 12–month finding was based on the 2007 delisting rule, which failed to comport with the notice, comment, and consultation requirements of the ESA. The Court set aside the 12–month finding as an abuse of discretion.
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Case | |
| KS - Sterling - Breed - Pit Bull Ordinance (2-113. Prohibited owning; exemptions) | STERLING, KS., CITY CODE § 2-113 |
In Sterling, Kansas, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or in any way possess any "Rottweiler" dog or "Pit Bull" dog. Pit Bulls include the Staffordshire bull terrier, American pit bull terrier, the American Staffordshire terrier, or any dog which has the appearance and characteristics of being predominantly of these breeds or a combination of any of these breeds. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Becker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. | 416 N.W.2d 906 (Wis.,1987) | 141 Wis.2d 804 (1987) |
Motorist sued dog owner after he was injured in a car accident allegedly caused by dog. The Court of Appeals held that the “injury by dog” statute creates strict liability for any injury or damage caused by dog if owner was negligent (with public policy exceptions). Here, the dog owner was not strictly liable because he was not negligent when his dog escaped from its enclosure. |
Case |
| State v. Ziemann | 705 N.W.2d 59 (Neb.App.,2005) | 14 Neb. App. 117 |
The petitioner-defendant challenged her criminal conviction for cruelly neglecting several horses she owned by asserting that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated. However, the court of appeals side stepped the petitioners claim that she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a farmstead, that she did not own or reside on, because she leased the grass on the farmstead for a dollar by invoking the “open fields” doctrine. The court held that even if such a lease might implicate the petitioners Fourth Amendment rights in some circumstances, the petitioner here was only leasing a open field, which she cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy in. |
Case |
| SC - Equine Activity Liability - Article 7. Equine Liability Immunity. | Code 1976 § 47-9-710 - 730 | SC ST § 47-9-710 - 730 | This South Carolina section provides that an equine activity sponsor or an equine professional is not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from an inherent risk of equine activity. The statute also requires the visible displaying of warning signs that alert participants to the limitation of liability by law. Failure to comply with the requirements concerning warning signs and notices provided in this section prevents an equine activity sponsor or equine professional from invoking the privileges of immunity provided by this article. | Statute |
| Colorado Dog Fanciers v. City and County of Denver | 820 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1991) | The plaintiffs, dog owners and related canine and humane associations (dog owners), filed a complaint in the Denver District Court against the defendant, City and County of Denver (city), seeking both a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the "Pit Bulls Prohibited" ordinance, Denver, Colo., Rev.Mun.Code § 8-55 (1989), and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement. The dog owners in this case claim the ordinance is unconstitutional, violating their rights to procedural and substantive due process and equal protection, is unconstitutionally vague, and constitutes a taking of private property. | Case | |
| Harris v. Anderson County Sheriff's Office | 673 S.E.2d 423 (S.C.,2009) | 381 S.C. 357 (2009); 2009 WL 294756 |
In this South Carolina case, the court considered the meaning of the term "or" in the state's dog bite statute, SC ST 47-3-110, and whether that word allows a plaintiff to pursue a statutory claim against the owner of the dog while that dog is in the care of another. The facts concerned a veterinary assistant who sued a county sheriff's officer after she was bitten by a police dog while the dog was kenneled at the veterinary clinic where she worked. The lower court granted summary judgment for the sheriff's office. The Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation. Based on a plain language reading of the statute, the Court concluded that the Legislature intended to allow a claim against the owner of the dog when another person has the dog in his care or keeping. |
Case |