Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Chertoff | Slip Copy, 2009 WL 839042 (N.D.Cal.) |
Plaintiff, the Center for Biological Diversity, brought an action against Defendant, the United States Coast Guard, alleging that Defendant violated the ESA by failing to consult with the NMFS to ensure that Defendant’s activities in the Santa Barbara Channel and other shipping lanes off the California Coast would not harm the continued existence of threatened and/or endangered species after Defendant amended Traffic Separation Schemes (“TSS”) and a number of blue whales were subsequently struck by ships and killed. On the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, the United States District Court , N.D. California dismissed Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to Defendant’s implementation of or actions under the TSS in the approaches to Los Angeles – Long Beach and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Defendant’s alleged violations of the ESA arising out of Defendant’s implementation of or actions under the TSS in the Santa Barbara Channel. |
Case | |
| CA - Horse slaughter - § 598c. Horse slaughter for human consumption | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 598c | CA PENAL § 598c | This statute makes it unlawful to possess, to import into or export from the state, or to sell, buy, give away, hold, or accept any equine with the intent of killing it for the purpose of human consumption. Violations could result in a felony conviction with a prison sentence of up to three years. | Statute |
| Animal Protection Institute of America, Inc. v. Hodel | 671 F.Supp. 695 (D.Nev.,1987) | 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,398 |
In this case, animal protection groups sued the Secretary of the Interior to enjoin or restrain him from allowing the adoptions of wild horses and burros under circumstances where the defendants know the horses are being adopted for commercial slaughter or exploitation. Defendants opposed the motion and and argued that the Secretary has duly promulgated regulations permitting adoptions of such animals and provided that the animals are humanely cared for during the one year period provided for in 16 U.S.C. § 1333(c). This Court granted plaintiffs' motion, enjoining the Secretary from transferring the titles of wild free-roaming horses and burros to individuals who have, prior to the expiration of the one year “probationary period” expressed to the Secretary an intent to use said animals for commercial purposes. |
Case |
| Accion Penal 20331-2017- 00179, The case of the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 | Accion Penal 20331-2017- 00179 | In this case, the environmental authorities of the Galápagos National Park (the Galápagos Islands is an archipelago known for its unique species and marine ecosystems) tracked through the satellite monitoring system the Chinese reefer vessel—Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999—in national waters while it was cruising through the Galápagos marine reserve without the required permit. The park issued an alert to the National Guard, which approached the vessel by water and air. Upon searching the vessel, the authorities found approximately 532 tons of fish that included 7.639 sharks (7207 juveniles or adults, 432 unborn). All shark specimens found on board lacked fins, and nine of the 12 species were protected endangered species. In this case, the National Court of Justice set an exemplary precedent by affirming the lower court decision and ordering the confiscation of the vessel and imposing a 5.9 million dollar fine to be used for the restoration of the damage caused to the Galápagos ecosystem. In addition, the crew members were sentenced to 1–3 years in jail. | Case | |
| Perfect Puppy, Inc. v. City of East Providence | 98 F.Supp.3d 408 (D.R.I. 2015) | 2015 WL 1474560 (D.R.I. 2015) | Due to public concern about puppy mills, City passed an ordinance banning pet stores located within its limits from selling dogs and cats unless those animals were owned by a city animal shelter or animal control agency, humane society, or non-profit rescue organization and the pet store maintained those animals for the purpose of public adoption. In its Amended Complaint, Plaintiff, a pet store, raised numerous challenges to the ordinance under the Constitutions of the United States and of Rhode Island, claiming that it violated the dormant Commerce Clause, the Contract Clause, the Takings Clause, and Plaintiff's equal protection and due process rights, and that it was preempted by state statute. Plaintiff and Defendant both sought summary judgment to all challenges. Plaintiff's motion was DENIED and Defendant's motion was GRANTED to all counts in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint except Count Three, the Takings claim, which was REMANDED to the Rhode Island Superior Court. (2016: Affirmed in part and appeal dismissed in part at 807 F.3d 415, 417 (1st Cir. 2015)). | Case |
| Costa Rica- Animal Fighting - Cock Fighting | LEY N.º 3 (1922) | This 1922 law, in Spanish, outlaws cock fighting in Costa Rica. | Statute | |
| US - Environmental - National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 | 42 USC 4321 - 4370j | The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to integrate environmental values into their decision making processes by considering the environmental impacts of their proposed actions and reasonable alternatives to those actions. To meet this requirement, federal agencies prepare a detailed statement known as an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). EPA reviews and comments on EISs prepared by other federal agencies, maintains a national filing system for all EISs, and assures that its own actions comply with NEPA. | Statute | |
| Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | 113 F.Supp.2d 1048 (N.D.Tex.,2000) |
North Federal District Court of Texas ruled that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) only empowered the Food Safety and Inspection Services to prevent the United States Department of Agriculture from allowing companies to sell adulterated meat to the public. To find meat adulterated under FMIA requires that the processor's plants conditions are insanitary, thus the FSIS should focus on the manufacturing process and not the final product to determine that a plant is insanitary. |
Case | |
| AR - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty/Animal Fighting Laws | A.C.A. § 5-62-101 - 127; 5-14-122 | AR ST § 5-62-101 -127; 5-14-122 | This section contains the Arkansas anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. A person commits a misdemeanor if he or she knowingly abandons any animal subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment, fails to supply an animal in his or her custody with a sufficient quantity of wholesome food and water fails to provide an animal in his or her custody with adequate shelter, kills or injures any animal belonging to another without legal privilege or consent of the owner, or carries an animal in or upon any motorized vehicle or boat in a cruel or inhumane manner. Aggravated cruelty to a cat, dog, or horse is a Class D felony if the offense involves the torture. | Statute |
| Cetacean Community v. Bush | 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004) | 59 ERC 1257, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,120, 4 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9331, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,791 |
In this case, the court was asked to decide whether the world's cetaceans have standing to bring suit in their own name under the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the National Environmental Protection Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Cetaceans challenge the United States Navy's use of Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low Frequency Active Sonar ("SURTASS LFAS") during wartime or heightened threat conditions. In finding that the Cetaceans lacked standing, the court here agreed with the district court in Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc., that "[i]f Congress and the President intended to take the extraordinary step of authorizing animals as well as people and legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said so plainly." 836 F.Supp. at 49. In the absence of any such statement in the ESA, the MMPA, or NEPA, or the APA, the court concluded that the Cetaceans do not have statutory standing to sue. |
Case |