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Displaying 6111 - 6120 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NH - Commercial breeders - art Agr 1704. Operating Standards Relative to Commercial Kennels | NH ADC Agr 1704.01 - 10 | N.H. Code Admin. R. Agr 1704.01 - 10 | These New Hampshire regulations address minimum standards at commercial animal facilities. The regulations cover general aspects (i.e., housing must be structurally sound and maintained in good repair) as well as more specific aspects related to indoor heating/cooling and ventilation requirements. The sizing and construction of primary enclosures and minimal feeding requirements are described. | Administrative | |
| IA - Impoundment - 351.37. Dogs running at large--impoundment--disposition | I. C. A. § 351.37 | IA ST § 351.37 | This Iowa statute provides that a dog shall be impounded by a local board of health or law enforcement official if the dog is running at large and the dog is not wearing a valid rabies vaccination tag. The statute requires that written notice be sent to the owner (if the owner's name can be reasonably determined from a tag or other source) who then has seven days to redeem the dog before it is euthanized. | Statute | |
| Moden v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife | 2008 WL 4763025 (D.Or.) |
Plaintiffs filed claim against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) alleging arbitrary and capricious agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and failure to perform a nondiscretionary act under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). The United States District Court, D. Oregon, granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend, and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ APA and ESA claims, and that it remains without jurisdiction to mandate action by the agency if rulemaking has not been initiated by the FWS at its discretion, regardless of whether a determination resulting from a five year review suggests a listing status should be changed or should remain the same. |
Case | ||
| ME - Police Animal - § 164-B. Immunity from civil liability for assistance given to law enforcement dogs, search and rescue | 14 M.R.S.A. § 164-B | This Maine law gives immunity from damages to an emergency medical services person, a security services dog handler or a law enforcement officer who voluntarily, without the expectation of monetary or other compensation, renders first aid, emergency treatment or rescue assistance to a law enforcement dog, search and rescue dog or service dog that is unconscious, ill, injured or in need of rescue assistance unless it is established that the injury or the death was caused willfully, wantonly or recklessly or by gross negligence on the part of the emergency medical services person, security services dog handler or law enforcement officer. | Statute | ||
| State v. Ancona | 991 A.2d 663 (Conn.App.,2010) | 120 Conn.App. 324 (Conn.App.,2010), 2010 WL 1190539 |
Defendant Michael Ancona appealed his conviction of permitting a dog to roam at large in violation of General Statutes § 22-364(a). The defendant claims that (1) the court improperly held him responsible as a keeper of a dog when the owner was present and known to the authorities, and (2) the state adduced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. The plain language of the statute § 22-364(a) states that an “owner or keeper” is prohibited from allowing a dog to roam on a public highway. Either the owner or keeper or both can be held liable for a violation of the statute. The court also found sufficient evidence that defendant was the keeper of the pit bull: the dog stayed at his house, he initially responded to the incident and tried to pull the dog away, and defendant yelled at the Officer Rogers that she was not to take "his dog." |
Case | |
| Crow Indian Tribe v. United States | 965 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2020) | Several Indian tribes, environmental organizations, and animal-welfare groups filed suits claiming that Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) violated Endangered Species Act (ESA) and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing final rule “delisting” or removing grizzly bear population in Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem from threatened species list. The distinct population segment of the Yellowstone grizzly bear population has been so successful under the ESA that the FWS has been trying to delist it for almost 15 years, according to the court. This specific case was triggered by a 2017 D.C. Circuit case (Humane Society v. Zinke) that requires the FWS to address the impact that removing a DPS from protection under the ESA would have on the remaining listed species. At the time that ruling was issued, the FWS had already published a 2017 Rule that sought to delist the grizzly bear Yellowstone DPS. This then resulted in cross motions for summary judgment in district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and vacated the 2017 rule, remanding it to the FWS. This remand resulted in a second delisting rule by FWS that was again vacated and remanded by the district court, demanding consideration of several discrete issues by FWS. The FWS now appeals that remand for consideration that require the study of the effect of the delisting on the remaining, still listed, grizzly population in the coterminous 48 states, as well as further consideration of the threat of delisting to long term genetic diversity of the Yellowstone grizzly. In addition, states in the region of the DPS (Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming) as well as some private hunting and farming organizations have intervened on the government's behalf. On appeal, the Court of Appeals first found that it had authority to review the district court order and that the intervenors had standing to pursue an appeal. As to the order by the district court that the FWS needs to conduct a "comprehensive review" of the impact of delisting on the remnant grizzly population, the appellate court vacated that portion of the order using the phrase "comprehensive review." Instead, it remanded to the lower court to order a "further examination" on the delisting's effects. The court also agreed with the district court that FWS' 2017 Rule was arbitrary and capricious where it had no concrete, enforceable mechanism to ensure the long-term genetic viability of the Yellowstone DPS. Finally, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court order to mandate a commitment to recalibration (changes in methodology to measure the Yellowstone grizzly bear population) in the rule since that is required by the ESA. The Court affirmed the district court’s remand order, with the exception of the order requiring the FWS to conduct a “comprehensive review” of the remnant grizzly population. | Case | ||
| MS - Facility, courtroom dog - § 99-43-101. Child witness standards of protection | Miss. Code Ann. § 99-43-101 | MS ST § 99-43-101 | Under Mississippi law, in any proceeding in which a child testifies, a child shall have the right to be enforced by the court on its own motion by an attorney in the proceeding to permit a properly trained facility animal or comfort item or both to be present inside the courtroom or hearing room. | Statute | |
| WV - Scientific research - § 20-2-50. Permit to hunt, kill, etc., wildlife for scientific or propagation purposes | W. Va. Code, § 20-2-50 | WV ST § 20-2-50 | Under this West Virginia law, the director may issue a permit to a person to hunt, kill, take, capture or maintain in captivity wildlife exclusively for scientific purposes, but not for any commercial purposes. | Statute | |
| IN - Domestic Violence - 31-9-2-42 “Domestic or family violence” | I.C. 31-9-2-42 | IN ST 31-9-2-42 | This section of the Family Law Code defines "domestic or family violence" as "[a]busing (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), torturing (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), mutilating (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), or killing a vertebrate animal without justification with the intent to threaten, intimidate, coerce, harass, or terrorize a family or household member." | Statute | |
| CO - Emergency - § 25-3.5-203. Emergency medical service providers--certification | C. R. S. A. § 25-3.5-203 | CO ST § 25-3.5-203 | This law concerns emergency medical service providers. An emergency medical service provider may provide preveterinary emergency care to dogs and cats to the extent the provider has received commensurate training and is authorized by the employer to provide the care. Requirements governing the circumstances under which emergency medical service providers may provide preveterinary emergency care to dogs and cats may be specified in the employer's policies governing the provision of care. “Preveterinary emergency care” means the immediate medical stabilization of a dog or cat by an emergency medical service provider, in an emergency to which the emergency medical service provider is responding, through means including oxygen, fluids, medications, or bandaging, with the intent of enabling the dog or cat to be treated by a veterinarian. “Preveterinary emergency care” does not include care provided in response to an emergency call made solely for the purpose of tending to an injured dog or cat, unless a person's life could be in danger attempting to save the life of a dog or cat. | Statute |