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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
State v. Wilson --- P.3d ----, 2019 WL 4955178 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019) Defendant Robert Wilson appeals his conviction of first degree animal cruelty, which arose from an incident at an archery club when Wilson shot a large dog in the hindquarters (70lb. "Dozer") with an arrow after that dog attacked Wilson’s small dog ("Little Bit"). (Dozer recovered from his injuries.) Wilson argues that his action was lawful under RCW 16.08.020, which states that it is lawful for a person to kill a dog seen chasing, biting, or injuring a domestic animal on real property that person owns, leases, or controls. The trial court declined to give defendant's proposed jury instruction based on this statutory language, finding that it only applied to stock animals and not when a dog was injuring another dog. The court did, however, permit the common law defense that allows owners to take "reasonably necessary action" in defense of their animals, which the State must then disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, this court noted that no Washington court has interpreted RCW 16.08.020 in a published case. Under common law cases that allow a person to kill an animal to defend his or her property, the court found those cases require the killing be "reasonably necessary." While the parties dispute whether the statute requires that the actions be "reasonably necessary," the appellate court first found Wilson was still not entitled to a dismissal of charges because he could not establish that the location where he shot the arrow at Dozer was land that he "owned, leased, or had control over" per the statute. As to the Wilson's next argument that the trial court erred in not giving his proposed instruction for RCW 16.08.020, the appellate court agreed. While the trial court found that the statute only applied to stock animals, the appellate court noted that the law does not define the term "domestic animal." Using the plain dictionary meaning for "domestic" - "belonging to or incumbent on the family" - and for "domestic animal," this court stated that "Little Bit certainly belonged to Wilson's family" and a dog fits the meaning of "domestic animal." Finally, the court found that the "reasonably necessary" requirement from the common law cases on shooting domestic animals cannot be grafted onto the statutory requirements of RCW 16.08.020. Thus, the trial court's refusal to give defendant's proposed instruction based on RCW 16.08.020 cannot be grounded in the reasonably necessary common law requirement. The trial court's refusal to give the proposed instruction was not harmless. As such, the appellate court reversed Wilson's conviction and remanded the action for further proceedings. Case
Canada - Alberta - Service Dogs Act S.A. 2007, c. S-7.5 This Alberta, Canada law provides that no person shall deny to any person the accommodation, services or facilities available in any place to which the public is customarily admitted, or discriminate against any person for the reason that the person is a disabled person accompanied by a service dog or a certified dog-trainer accompanied by a dog in training. The law goes into effect January of 2009. Statute
NH - Moultonbourough - An Ordinance Relative to Dog Control Regulation ORDINANCE TOWN OF MOULTONBOROUGH, NEW HAMPSHIRE.§§ 1.1 - 1.7

The purpose of Moultonborough, New Hampshire's Leash Law is to keep all dogs under their owners' control in order to ensure against injury to persons, damages to property, or the creation of a nuisance. It is therefore unlawful to permit any dog to run at large in the town of Moultonborough. Anyone who violates this ordinance will be punished by a fine of $25 or more.

Local Ordinance
Florida Key Deer v. Paulison 522 F.3d 1133 (C.A.11(Fla.), 2008) 2008 WL 842423 (C.A.11(Fla.))

FEMA, under the National Flood Insurance Program, issues insurance to promote new development in flooded areas.  Plaintiffs sought to compel FEMA to enter into ESA consultation with FWS, and once that consultation occurred, amended their complaint to challenge the sufficiency of the FWS' biological opinion and reasonable and prudent alternatives.  The Eleventh Circuit held for the plaintiffs, reasoning that FEMA had not sufficiently complied with the obligation on federal agencies to carry out their programs consistent with the conservation of endangered and threatened species.

Case
U.S. v. Corbin Farm Service 444 F. Supp. 510 (D. Cal. 1978)

As related to the BGEPA, the opinion distinguishes the degree of intent under the MBTA from that of the BGEPA.  It also holds that both statutes were designed to apply to activities outside of traditional scope of hunting and poaching (in this case poisoning of birds).  For further discussion on activities such as poisoning and electrocution prohibited under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.

Case
Derecho Animal Volume 11 Núm 4

Dossier.

Policy
Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal Volume 12

SumÁrio

 

Editorial | 9

 

Policy
Hannan v. City of Minneapolis 623 N.W.2d 281 (Minn.App. 2001)

This case held that a state statute permitting the control and ultimate destruction of dangerous animals does not preclude municipal controls that add to the breadth of public powers without regulating conditions expressly prohibited by statute.  In the case, a dog owner sought review of municipal animal control division's order for destruction of his dog.  The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance providing for destruction of dangerous dog did not conflict with statute and thus was not preempted by statute.  The court stated that, after comparing the ordinance with the state statute, it was evident that the local provision is merely additional and complementary to the statute, permitting local action that the state statute does not prohibit.  In fact, state law expressly provides for local regulation, giving municipalities full authority to regulate "potentially dangerous dogs," as long as the regulations are not breed-specific.

Case
Vargas v. Vargas 1999 WL 1244248 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 1999) (unpublished opinion). Court awarded custody of rottweiler to wife, after considering testimony adduced (husband was not treating the dog very nicely) and the state of the husband’s home (scrap metal yard and fact 5-year-old child visits regularly).  This decision was made notwithstanding the fact that dog was gift from wife to husband and the dog was registered to husband with AKC. Case
WY - Domestic Violence - § 35-21-105. Order of protection; contents; remedies; order not to affect title to property; conditions W. S. 1977 § 35-21-105 WY ST § 35-21-105 In 2019, Wyoming amended its domestic violence protection order law by adding subparts (a)(ix) and (a)(x). Subpart (a)(ix) grants sole possession of any household pet, as defined in W.S. 6-3-203(o), owned, possessed or kept by the petitioner, the respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either the petitioner or the respondent to the petitioner during the period the order of protection is effective if the order is for the purpose of protecting the household pet. In addition, under subpart (a)(x), the court may order that the respondent not have contact with the household pet(s) in the custody of the petitioner and prohibit the respondent from abducting, removing, concealing or disposing of the household pet if the order is for the purpose of protecting the household pet. Statute

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