Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fiori v. Conway Org. | 746 N.Y.S.2d 747 (2001) | 192 Misc.2d 408, 2001 N.Y. Slip Op. 21577 |
In this New York case, a customer brought a negligence action against the owner of a retail store after she was allegedly attacked by a stray cat while shopping at store. The owner of the store moved for summary judgment. The Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County, held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the presence of a stray or feral cat in a retail store constituted a particular danger for unassuming visitors and/or customers whose presence on premises was foreseeable precluded summary judgment. |
Case | |
| Ammon v. Welty | 113 S.W.3d 185 (Ky.App.,2002) |
In this Kentucky case, the plaintiffs brought an action against the county dog warden for shooting their dog. Before the statutorily imposed 7-day waiting limit had expired, the warden euthanized the dog by shooting him in the head. The Court of Appeals held that while a family dog can be beloved by a family, loss of the pet does not support an action for loss of consortium. Further, the dog warden was not liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress because his actions did not rise to the outrageous level where the dog was not shot in the presence of the family and there was no evidence that Brewer intended to inflict emotional harm. |
Case | ||
| SD - Vehicle - 41-1-5.7. Disposition of deer and antelope killed by motor vehicle | S D C L § 41-1-5.7 | SD ST § 41-1-5.7 | This South Dakota statute states that if any deer or antelope is killed by a motor vehicle on a public highway, the person who desires to possess that animal shall notify a conservation officer. The conservation officer may give a dated and written authorization allowing possession of the animal at no fee. However, no part of an animal so obtained may be sold, bartered, or traded. | Statute | |
| Strickland v. Pinellas Cty. | --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 6518761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2018) | Andy G. Strickland appealed an order dismissing with prejudice his complaint for declaratory relief against Pinellas County. The request stems from letters he received from Animal Services of Pinellas County about his dog. Strickland and a neighbor were involved in a dispute after their dogs attacked each other. The neighbor filed a complaint with Animal Services claiming that Strickland's dog was the "aggressor dog" and then sent a letter to the Pinellas County Board of Commissioners. The County then sent two letters to Strickland, the first informing him that his dog had exhibited dangerous propensities, and the second, from an assistant county attorney, informing him of the possible criminal ramifications for keeping a dangerous dog or being an "Irresponsible Pet Owner" under the county code. As a result of these letters, Strickland filed a complaint in circuit court saying that he was not afforded any opportunity to dispute those claims and that he is entitled to have the threat of criminal prosecution removed. The County moved to dismiss Strickland's complaint arguing that he failed to allege a justiciable controversy and a bona fide dispute between the County and him. The County claimed that there were no legal findings made with respect to Strickland's dog and that the letters were possible ramifications and explanations of law. The trial court agreed and granted the County's motion, finding the letters were not accusatory and the case presented no justiciable issue. On appeal here, this court upheld the lower court's order because Strickland's allegations did not present a bona fide dispute. Both letters emphasized that his dog had not been classified as dangerous and that no action was being taken by the county. A speculative fear by Strickland that he may be subject to future consequences does not warrant declaratory relief and does not show imminent danger of prosecution. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Strickland's complaint. Affirmed. | Case | ||
| FL - Equine Activity Liability Statute- Chapter 773. Equine Activities. | West's F. S. A. § 773.01 - 773.06 | FL ST § 773.01 - 773.06 | This Florida statute provides that an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person shall not be liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities. Liability will not be limited by statute, however, where the equine professional or sponsor knew the tack or equipment was faulty, failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity, owns or is otherwise in lawful possession of the land or facilities where the injury is attributable to a known dangerous latent condition, commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, or intentionally injures the participant. Posting of warning signs alerting participants to the limitation of liability by law is also required. | Statute | |
| RI - Dogs at campgrounds, beaches - § 42-17.1-45. No prohibition on pets | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 42-17.1-45 | RI ST § 42-17.1-45 | This law provides that the Department of Environmental Management shall not promulgate or enforce any rule or regulation that would prohibit a pet dog or cat from accompanying its owner or caretaker at any state owned campground. | Statute | |
| Sykes v. Cook Cty. Circuit Court Prob. Div. | 837 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2016), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (Oct. 27, 2016) | This case dealt with the plaintiff's denial of the use of her service dog while in a courtroom to present a motion. After the denial, the plaintiff filed an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) action, alleging that there was a violation for denial of reasonable accommodations under the ADA. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, because as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The Court of Appeals agreed, and held that as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state court losers challenging state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Additionally, the district court held that it should exercise Younger abstention because the proceeding was ongoing and because the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to raise her federal claims about her dog in state court, but the Court of Appeals held that "Younger is now a moot question because there is no ongoing state proceeding for [the Court of Appeals] to disturb." As a result, the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was AFFIRMED. | Case | ||
| CA - Hunting - Chapter 4. Deer. Article 3. Archery Deer Hunting. | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 4370 - 4371 | CA FISH & G § 4370 - 4371 | These two sections govern archery deer hunting in California. Archery hunting is done with a bow and arrow and hunters which participate in this type of hunting are restricted from carrying a firearm. | Statute | |
| US - Wildlife - Disposal of Forfeited or Abandoned Property | 1981 WL 150053 (F.R.) |
The Service proposes regulations to dispose of property forfeited or abandoned to the United States under the provisions of 50 CFR Part 12. This property, which includes wildlife, plants, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, cargo, guns, nets, traps, and other equipment, would be separated into two types for disposal. All property, except wildlife and plants, would be disposed of under existing Service procedures, which are based on current Federal Property Management Regulations and Interior Property Management Regulations. Wildlife and plants, however, would be disposed of at the discretion of the Director by one of the following means: return to the wild, use by the Service or transfer to another government agency for official use, donation or loan, sale, or destruction. This action would enable the Service to insure that wildlife and plants are disposed of in accordance with the conservation aims of the statute under which they were obtained while establishing an orderly, cost efficient disposal procedure. This procedure is needed both to eliminate unnecessary expense and overcrowding at government storage facilities and to provide a uniform means of satisfying the variety of possible uses of wildlife and plants which are ready for disposal. |
Administrative | ||
| NM - Impound - Chapter 77. Animals and Livestock. | NMSA 1978, § 77-1-17 | NM ST § 77-1-17 | This New Mexico statute provides that the owner or operator of a veterinary clinic or hospital, a doctor of veterinary medicine, a kennel, grooming parlor or other animal care facility is not liable for disposing of abandoned animals after proper notice has been sent to the owner of record. | Statute |