Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MD - Ecoterrorism - Title 6. Crimes Against Property. | MD Code, Criminal Law, § 6-208 | MD CRIM LAW § 6-208 | This law reflects Maryland's "ecoterrorism"/animal research interference law. A person may not break and enter a research facility without the permission of the research facility with the intent to: obtain unauthorized control over research property; alter or eradicate research property; damage or deface research property; move research property in a manner intended to cause harm to it; destroy or remove research property; or engage in conduct that results in the removal of research property. Violation of the law is a felony with imprisonment of up to 5 years or a fine of up to $5,000, or both. | Statute |
| Flikshtein v. City of New York | 273 A.D.2d 439 (N.Y. 2000) | 710 N.Y.S.2d 112 |
The New York appellate court held that the dangerousness or viciousness of plaintiff’s pet monkey was irrelevant, and that the city could remove the monkey regardless of its benevolent behavior. |
Case |
| Toney v. Glickman | 101 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir., 1996) | Plaintiffs were in the business of selling animals to research facilities. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that they had committed hundreds of violations of the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131 et seq. The ALH then imposed what was, to that point, the harshest sanction, $200,000, in the history of the Act. The Judicial Officer affirmed the ALJ's findings and denied the Plaintiffs' request to reopen the hearing for consideration of new evidence. While the 8th Circuit affirmed most of these findings, it held that the evidence did not support all of them. Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the Department for redetermination of the sanction. The court also affirmed the Judicial Officer's refusal to reopen the hearing and denied the Plaintiffs' Request for Leave to Adduce Additional Evidence. The Plaintiffs were free, however, to seek leave to offer this additional evidence on remand to the extent it was relevant to the sanction. | Case | |
| MT - Trusts - Chapter 2. Upc--Intestacy, Wills, and Donative Transfers. | MCA 72-2-1017 | MT ST 72-2-1017 | This Montana statute states that a trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid (but for no longer than 21 years, even if the trust provides for a longer term). The trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in determining the transferor's intent. Except as expressly provided otherwise in the trust instrument, no portion of the principal or income may be converted to the use of the trustee or to any use other than for the trust's purposes or for the benefit of a covered animal and a court may reduce the amount of the property transferred if it determines that that amount substantially exceeds the amount required for the intended use. | Statute |
| Hanrahan v. Hometown America, LLC | 90 So.3d 915 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) | 2012 WL 2327814 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) |
While walking his dog one evening, the plaintiff's husband was attacked by fire ants. In an attempt to remove the ants off his person, the plaintiff's husband collapsed in the shower. Two days later, he died. As a representative for her husband's estate and in her own capacity, the plaintiff filed a negligence suit against her landlord. After the trial court granted the landlord's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed. Affirming the lower court's decision, the appeals court reasoned that since the landlord did not harbor, possess, or introduce the fire ants onto the premises, the landlord owed no duty to the plaintiff. |
Case |
| Anderson v. Christopherson | 816 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 2012) | 2012 WL 2913222 (Minn.) |
This appeal asks two questions: whether defendant-dog owners (Christophersons) were strictly liable under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 for plaintiff Anderson's injuries suffered when he attempted to break up a fight between defendants' and plaintiff's dogs; and (2) whether one of the defendants was an "owner" for purposes of this law. In the case at hand, the court found that the events leading to Anderson's injury could produce three reasonable alternative inferences such that summary judgment was inappropriate. The court found there was an issue whether the father Dennis Christopherson was "harboring" the dog at the home for purposes of the animal owner liability statute. |
Case |
| IL - Humane Slaughter - Humane Slaughter of Livestock Act | 510 I.L.C.S. 75/0.01 - 8 | IL ST CH 510 § 75/0.01 - 8 | This Illinois section comprises the state's humane slaughter laws. It begins with a statement of policy that calls for the humane slaughter of commercial animals. Animals must be slaughtered in a manner that renders them insensible to pain prior to hoisting or shackling. As a result, the use of a manually operated hammer, sledge or pole-ax or shackling as well as the hoisting or hanging any animal while such animal is conscious are prohibited. Any violation of this Act or of the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director is a petty offense. | Statute |
| Moden v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife | 2008 WL 4763025 (D.Or.) |
Plaintiffs filed claim against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) alleging arbitrary and capricious agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and failure to perform a nondiscretionary act under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). The United States District Court, D. Oregon, granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend, and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ APA and ESA claims, and that it remains without jurisdiction to mandate action by the agency if rulemaking has not been initiated by the FWS at its discretion, regardless of whether a determination resulting from a five year review suggests a listing status should be changed or should remain the same. |
Case | |
| Swilley v. State | 465 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 3637850 (Tex. App. 2015) | In the indictment, the State alleged Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly tortured or in a cruel manner killed or caused serious bodily injury to an animal by shooting a dog with a crossbow, a state jail felony. The dog in question was a stray, which fell within the statutory definition of an “animal.” After a jury found Appellant guilty, the trial court assessed his punishment at two years' confinement in a state jail. On appeal, Appellant contended that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard evidence of an extraneous offense also involving cruelty to animals. Since the video that mentioned the extraneous offense was admitted without objection, the court held the Appellant waived the error and the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's motion for mistrial or by giving the instruction to disregard and overrule Appellant's first issue. Appellant further asserted the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The court, however, held the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly tortured or in a cruel manner killed or caused serious bodily injury to an animal by shooting it with a crossbow. The trial court's judgment was therefore affirmed. | Case |
| MI - Exotic Pets - CHAPTER 287. ANIMAL INDUSTRY; ANIMAL INDUSTRY ACT | M. C. L. A. 287.731 | MI ST 287.731 | Michigan completely prohibits the importation into the state of "any species having the potential to spread serious diseases or parasites, to cause serious physical harm, or to otherwise endanger native wildlife, human life, livestock, domestic animals, or property." For other wild or exotic animals, Michigan regulates various aspects of their importation, such as requiring physical exams by vets, negative disease tests, and proper animal care and restraint. | Statute |