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Displaying 111 - 120 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | |||||||
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| US - Air travel, service animals - Subpart H. Services on Aircraft. | 14 C.F.R. § 382.117, § 382.51, and § 382.117 | Note: two of these sections were removed and reserved in 2020, effectively removing provisions related to service animals. Prior to it being removed, it previously stated that carriers must permit service animals to accompany passengers with disabilities. A carrier must permit the service animal to accompany the passenger with a disability at any seat in which the passenger sits, unless the animal obstructs an aisle or other area. The Department of Transportation used to allow identification of a service animal by the presence of harnesses, tags, or "the credible verbal assurances of a qualified individual with a disability using the animal." A carrier is was never required to accommodate certain unusual service animals (e.g., snakes, other reptiles, ferrets, rodents, and spiders). | Administrative | |||||||||
| Indiana v. Massachusetts | 202 L. Ed. 2d 564, 139 S. Ct. 859 (2019) | 139 S.Ct. 859 (Mem) (U.S.,2019) | A coalition of multiple states filed a lawsuit against Massachusetts in the U.S. Supreme Court. Thirteen states, Indiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, filed suit against the state of Massachusetts in response to the animal welfare laws created by Massachusetts Question 3. The states claimed to have direct standing to challenge the Massachusetts law because state agencies and instrumentalities own and operate farms that are subject to the Massachusetts law and wish to continue to sell products to other states, including Massachusetts. The states also claimed parens patriae standing on behalf of farmers and consumers within their borders that would be affected by the Massachusetts law. The plaintiff states filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court requesting that the Court declare the Massachusetts law unconstitutional. The Court denied the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint because hearing the case would not be an appropriate use of the Court’s original jurisdiction. The Court stated that, in order to resolve plaintiff’s challenge and address the issues of standing and the merits of the case, the Court would need to resolve complex factual disputes. The Court reasoned that such disputes are better suited to resolution in federal district court, not the U.S. Supreme Court. | Case | ||||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 12 Núm 2 |
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| State v. Amos | 17 N.E.3d 9 (2017) | 2014 -Ohio- 3097 | After witnessing the 73 year old defendant-appellant emerge from area by the veterinary's dumpster holding an empty, wire cage animal trap, an employee of the clinic followed the defendant-appellant's car and obtained the vehicle's license plate number. Upon returning to the dumpster, the employee found a kitten with matted eyes that seemed unhealthy. The defendant-appellant was charged with one count of animal abandonment in violation of R.C. 959.01 and was found guilty. Defendant-appellant appealed her conviction and sentence on the grounds that the court erred in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she was a keeper or, if she was a keeper, the court erred in determining that she abandoned the animal. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that once the defendant captured the animal in a cage, she assumed the responsibility that she would treat the animal humanely and could therefore be considered a “keeper.” Since Amos captured the animal and released it in another location without taking steps to make sure the animal would be found, the Ohio Court of Appeals also held that a reasonable person could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant-appellant had “abandoned” the animal. The judgment was therefore affirmed. | Case | ||||||||
| Canada - Saskatchewan - Dangerous Animals | S.S. 2005, c. M-36.1, s. 374 - 380 | This set of laws comprises the Saskatchewan, Canada dangerous animal laws. Under the Act, any person who owns an animal for the purpose of fighting, or trains, torments, badgers, baits or otherwise uses an animal for the purpose of causing or encouraging the animal to make unprovoked attacks on persons or domestic animals is guilty of an offence. In addition, a peace officer or designated officer may destroy any animal that he or she finds injuring or viciously attacking a person or a domestic animal. The Act outlines the actions that result in an animal being declared dangerous (i.e., chased a person in a vicious or threatening manner, bit a person or domestic animal without provocation, etc.) and the procedure to declare such an animal dangerous. | Statute | |||||||||
| OH - Reynoldsburg - Breed - 505.35 Control and harboring of vicious or dangerous dogs and other vicious or dangerous animals. | REYNOLDSBURG, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 505.01, 505.35 (1996) |
In Reynoldsburg, Ohio, no person shall own, keep, or harbor any vicious dog, which includes any pit bull dog. A violation is a misdemeanor of the second degree, and the vicious dog shall be seized, impounded, and humanely destroyed. |
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| Thurber v. Apmann | 91 A.D.3d 1257 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012) | 2012 WL 225395 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.); 936 N.Y.S.2d 789 |
In 2007, the plaintiff and defendant were walking their respective dogs when one of defendant's two dogs, a retired K-9 dog, attacked the plaintiff's dog. Plaintiff sued defendant for damages she received as a result. While each dog did received "handler protection" training (where a K-9 dog is trained to react to an aggressive attack on defendant while on duty), that situation had never arisen because the dogs acted in passive roles as explosive detection dogs. Plaintiff countered that the severity of the attack coupled with the dogs' breed and formal police training should have put defendant on notice of the dogs' vicious propensities. In affirming the summary judgment, this court found that the formal police training was not evidence of viciousness and there was no support to plaintiff's assertion that defendant kept the dogs as "guard dogs." |
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| Beasley v. Sorsaia | 880 S.E.2d 875 (2022) | 247 W.Va. 409 (W.Va., 2022) | Petitioner was charged with animal cruelty in West Virginia. The incident stemmed from 2020 where humane officers in Putnam County seized several horses and a donkey that were denied “basic animal husbandry and adequate nutrition[.]” After the seizure, petitioner claimed the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the case because farm animals are excluded under the Code. That motion was granted by the magistrate and the animals were returned to the petitioner. After a short period of time, petitioner was charged with six counts of criminal animal cruelty and again the magistrate dismissed the complaint. However, the magistrate stayed the dismissal on the State's motion so that the circuit court could determine whether § 61-8-19(f) excludes livestock. The circuit court agreed that the section encompasses livestock from inhumane treatment and the magistrate was prohibited from dismissing the complaint. Petitioner now appeals that decision here. This court first examined the anti-cruelty statute finding that the structure of the exception under subsection (f) refers back to the conditional phrase that ends in "standards" for keeping the listed categories of animals. The court disagreed with the petitioner's claim of a "blanket exclusion" for livestock since the Commissioner of Agriculture has promulgated rules that govern the care of livestock animals that includes equines. The court rejected petitioner's attempt to parse the placement of clauses and antecedents to support her claim. The court held that § 61-8-19(f) establishes an exclusion for farm livestock only when they are “kept and maintained according to usual and accepted standards of livestock ... production and management." The circuit court's writ of prohibition was affirmed and the matter was remanded. | Case | ||||||||
| Journal of Animal Law Table of Contents Vol 6 |
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of LawJournal of Animal Law Vol. VI (2010)The table of contents is provided below. |
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| Perkins v. Hattery | 155 N.E.2d 73 (Ohio App. 1958) | 106 Ohio App. 361 |
This Ohio case examined the propriety of a county dog warden killing a dog that had killed a sheep nine hours before such seizure. The Court of Appeals held that dog warden was not authorized to destroy or otherwise dispose of a duly licensed dog found and seized by such warden upon the premises of its owner following a complaint made to the warden by the owner of sheep that the dog had killed certain of his sheep approximately nine hours before such seizure. |
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