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Displaying 41 - 50 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coe v. Lewsader | 64 N.E.3d 817, appeal denied, 77 N.E.3d 81 (Ill. 2017) | 2016 IL App (4th) 150841, 2016 WL 5679604 | In this case, Ryan and Hillary Coe filed suit against Eric and Trish Lewsader for damages resulting from an accident involving the Lewsader’s dog. Ryan Coe was driving his motorcycle while intoxicated on a public highway when he hit the Lewsader’s dog that was lying in the middle of the street. Coe suffered severe injuries as a result of the accident and filed suit against the Lewsader’s according to Section 16 of the Illinois Animal Attacks or Injuries statute. According to the Act, “if a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks, attempts to attack, or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself or herself in any place where he or she may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in civil damages.” In order to be awarded damages under the Act, the Coe’s needed to establish “some overt act” of the Lewsader’s dog . As a result, the question before the court was whether or not the Lewsader’s dog was acting overtly when it was lying in the middle of the street at the time of the accident. Ultimately, the court held that the dog was not acting overtly by lying in the middle of the street. Also, the court rejected the Coe’s argument that the dog had acted overtly when it walked into the street before lying down. The court rejected this argument because the overt act needed to take place at the time of the injury, not before. As a result, the court found that the Lewsader’s were not liable for civil damages under the Act because the dog had not acted overtly at the time of accident and therefore the Act did not apply in this situation. | Case | |
| MI - Enforcement - Chapters 760 to 777 Code of Criminal Procedure. | M. C. L. A. 764.16 | MI ST 764.16 | This law authorizes private citizens to make arrests. | Statute | |
| HI - Disaster; Accomodations for Pets - Chapter 128. Civil Defense and Emergency Act. | HRS § 127A-1, § 127A-2, and § 127A-19 (Formerly cited as HRS § 128-1 et seq.) | These sections replace former HRS § 128-1. In terms of animal-related provisions, the definition for "evacuation" includes mention of animals. In the section on sheltering, the law states that "[c]ounty emergency management agencies shall be responsible for identifying and operating locations and facilities suitable for sheltering" both the public and pet animals. "Pet animal” has the same meaning as defined in section 711-1100. | Statute | ||
| Marek v. Burmester | 37 A.D.3d 668, 830 N.Y.S.2d 340, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 01527 | 37 A.D.3d 668, 830 N.Y.S.2d 340, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 01527 |
In this New York case, a bicyclist was injured after allegedly being chased and attacked by defendant's two dogs. The plaintiff-bicyclist sued to recover damages for his injuries. The Supreme Court , Putnam County, granted a defense motion for summary judgment, and the bicyclist appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that a genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether defendants had constructive notice of the dogs' proclivity to chase bicyclists on the roadway and as to whether those actions put others at risk of harm. |
Case | |
| Barrios v. Safeway Ins. Co. | 97 So.3d 1019 (La.App. 4 Cir.,2012) | 2012 WL 1000864 (La.App. 4 Cir.,2012) |
Louisiana dog owners sued motorist for mental anguish and property damage after their dog was hit and killed by defendant's car. The lower court awarded damages to each of the dog owners in the total amount of $10,000. The Court upheld that the damages award of $10,000 because the dog was killed as a result of motorist's negligence, the owners were nearby and immediately arrived at scene to find their beloved dog dead, the dog was extremely valuable to owners, who had a close family-like relationship with dog for approximately 12 years, and the loss caused the owners to suffer psychic trauma. |
Case | |
| GA - Exotic Animals - 40-13-2-.16. Exotic and Pet Birds. | GA ADC 40-13-2-.16, 17 | Ga Comp. R. & Regs. 40-13-2-.16, 17 | This Georgia regulation provides that all exotic animals and all non-traditional livestock entering Georgia must be accompanied by an official Certificate of Veterinary Inspection identifying each animal with unique permanent individual identification. | Administrative | |
| Night monkey used in malaria research perched on top of a corrugated pipe nest soiled with feces. | Slideshow Images | ||||
| Coffey v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. | 249 F.Supp.3d 488 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017) | 2017 WL 1411465 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017) | As the court here states, "Plaintiff Debbie Coffey knows a great deal about wild horses and burros—and how those animals are treated by the federal Bureau of Land Management—but she wants to learn more." As such, Plaintiff, a hose welfare advocate, filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the BLM to obtain communications between its officials and private citizens, namely those with long-term holding contracts, involved in the Wild Horse and Burro Program. In conjunction with her request, the BLM charged plaintiff $1,680 in processing fees, but ultimately refunded her the fees a year and half later because it failed to meet FOIA statutory response deadlines. On appeal, Coffey filed a FOIA suit and both sides moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff first argues that the BLM violated FOIA when it failed to give her interest on her processing fees. The court, however, found that awarding interest here would violate the longstanding "no-interest rule," where there was no congressional intent to award interest in such cases. As to plaintiff's argument that BLM's search for records was inadequate, the court agreed with plaintiff that the words and phrases used by BLM were too limiting to meet plaintiff's request and were thus unreasonable. The court held that BLM must choose a different set of search terms (including those suggested by plaintiff) and conduct the FOIA search again. However, the court found that plaintiff's additional contentions that: (1) the search terms were too vague; (2) the database and software needed to be identified; and (3) BLM needed to also include phone records in its search to be without merit. The parties' motions for summary judgment were granted in part and denied in part. | Case | |
| LA - Domestic Violence - Chapter 28. Protection from Family Violence Act. | LSA-R.S. 46:2135 | This Louisiana law allows a court to enter a temporary restraining order, without bond, as it deems necessary to protect from abuse the petitioner. Among the provisions is subsection (A)(7) that allows the court to grant ". . . to the petitioner the exclusive care, possession, or control of any pets belonging to or under the care of the petitioner or minor children residing in the residence or household of either party, and directing the defendant to refrain from harassing, interfering with, abusing or injuring any pet, without legal justification, known to be owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either party." In 2015, the state allowed the court shall consider any and all past history of abuse, or threats thereof, in determining the existence of an immediate and present danger of abuse. | Statute | ||
| DE - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | 16 Del.C. § 3041F - 3059F; 7 Del.C. § 570; 7 Del.C. § 1701 - 1708; 22 Del.C. § 116; 29 Del.C. § 327 | These statutes comprise Delaware's dog laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning hunting field trials, and the dangerous dog subchapter. | Statute |