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Displaying 71 - 80 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE - Equine Activity Liability - § 8140. CHAPTER 81. PERSONAL ACTIONS. | 10 Del.C. § 8140 | DE ST TI 10 § 8140 | This Delaware statute provides that an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional or any other person shall not be liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities. Liability is not limited, however, when the equine professional knowingly used faulty tack, failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage in the activity, owns or otherwise is in lawful possession of the land upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a dangerous latent condition which was known, commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, or intentionally injures the participant. Equine professionals and sponsors are also required to post warning signs alerting the participants to the limitation of liability by law. | Statute | |
| Drinkhouse v. Van Ness | 260 P. 869 (1935) | 202 Cal. 359 (1935) |
Plaintiffs sued defendants to recover value of a horse that was wrongfully taken from them. The Court held that evidence was admissible to establish the value of the horse at the time of the wrongful taking to fix the damages amount. The peculiar value of the horse as a sire was established by evidence as to the horse’s racing history and to its progeny’s character and racing ability. Owners were entitled to recover damages for the reasonable value of the horse’s use during the period they were wrongfully deprived of it. |
Case | |
| Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. Ross | 6 F.4th 1021 (9th Cir. 2021), aff'd, 598 U.S. 356, 143 S. Ct. 1142, 215 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2023) | This case concerns a challenge to Proposition 12, a measure passed by California voters in 2018 that bans the sale of whole pork meat (no matter where produced) from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards. Proposition 12 amended sections 25990–25993 of the California Health and Safety Code to “prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm animal confinement." The National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (collectively referred to as “the Council”) filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The court noted that under its precedent, a state law violates the dormant Commerce Clause only in narrow circumstances. Here, the Council argues that Proposition 12 places an undue burden on interstate commerce and that Proposition 12 has an impermissible extraterritorial effect. The court disagreed, finding that Proposition 12 does not function as a price-control nor price-affirmation statute, as it neither dictates the price of for pork products nor does it tie the price of pork products sold in California to out-of-state prices. The Council also suggests that the law effectively violates the dormant Commerce Clause because of the interconnected nature of the pork industry. Pork producers would either have to produce all pork according to California standards or segregate California pork production to comply with the enhanced welfare standards. Again, the court found the argument unpersuasive based on precedent because a a state law is not impermissibly extraterritorial unless it directly regulates conduct that is wholly out of state. The "upstream" effects of Proposition 12 apply to both California and out-of-state entities equally, and a state is entitled to regulate commerce within its state. Finally, the court dismissed the argument that the dormant commerce clause is violated because it create inconsistent regulations where there is a need for "national uniformity in regulation." The court was unpersuaded that pork production rises to the level of need like taxation or interstate travel. The court held that the complaint here does not plausibly allege that such narrow circumstances apply to Proposition 12; thus, the court ruled that the district court did not err in dismissing the Council's complaint for failure to state a claim. | Case | ||
| U.S. v. Lopez (Abridged for Purposes of Eagle Topic Area) | 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995) |
Laws governing intrastate activities will be upheld if they substantially affect interstate commerce. Under the Eagle Act, the power to regulate eagles has been summarily upheld as a valid exercise of commerce power, as it protects the eagle as a species by preventing the creation of a legal commercial market for the animal. For further discussion of the Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion. |
Case | ||
| IA - Hunting, interference - 481A.125. Intentional interference with lawful hunting, fishing, or fur-harvesting | I. C. A. § 481A.125 | IA ST § 481A.125 | This law reflects Iowa's hunter harassment provision. Under the law, a person interferes with hunting, fish, or fur-harvesting activities when he or she: intentionally places him or herself in a location where his or her presence affects the behavior of the game thereby affecting the feasibility of taking the animal; intentionally creates a visual, aural, olfactory, or physical stimulus for the purpose of affecting the behavior of the animal to harass or obstruct the hunter; or alters the condition or placement of the hunter's personal property to obstruct that person. A first offense is a simple misdemeanor; a second or subsequent offense is a serious misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| People v. Land | 955 N.E.2d 538 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2011) | 2011 WL 2555826 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.); 2011 IL App (1st) 101048 (2011) |
In 2009, Jenell Land was found guilty by jury of aggravated cruelty to a companion animal, a Class 4 felony under Illinois’ Humane Care for Animals Act. Specifically, Land placed a towing chain around the neck of her pit bull, which caused a large, gaping hole to form in the dog’s neck (the dog was later euthanized). The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the defendant’s conviction and, in so doing, rejected each of Land’s four substantive arguments on appeal. Among the arguments raised, the appellate court found that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that the State had to prove a specific intent by Land to injure her dog did not rise to the level of "plain error." |
Case | |
| CA - Bullfights - § 597m. Bullfights prohibited; exceptions; penalty | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597m | CA PENAL § 597m | This statute makes it unlawful for any person to promote, advertise, stage, hold, manage, conduct, participate in, engage in, or carry on any bullfight, but does not prohibit rodeos or bloodless bullfights, contests, or exhibitions held in connection with religious celebrations or religious festivals. | Statute | |
| Queensland - Food Production - Agricultural Regulations | This Regulation implements the Agricultural Standards Act 1994 by providing specifications on the composition and labeling of fertilizers, the labeling and prohibited materials in seeds, labeling and other requirements for stock food,and on general labeling requirements in agriculture. | Statute | |||
| OK - Breeders - Commercial Pet Breeder Operations Guidelines | OK ADC 532:15-1-1 - 532:15-7-6 | OAC 532:15-1-1 - 532:15-7-6 | These regulations describe standards for pet breeders including sufficient food and water, regular exercise, veterinary care, adequate grooming, natural or artificial light during daylight hours, adequate space in living quarters, protection from the elements and extreme temperatures, and adequate resting time between breeding cycles, that ensures the general health and well-being of all pets the commercial pet breeder owns.“Commercial pet breeder” means any person that possesses or has possessed at any time in the last twelve months eleven or more adult intact female animals for use in breeding or dealing in animals for direct or indirect sale or for exchange in return for consideration. Household pets kept by breeders which the breeder has registered with the Board as not being used in breeding or dealing shall not be counted under this definition. Mandated record-keeping is outlined in Subchapter 7, which includes a required pet health history provided to purchasers. | Administrative | |
| AL - Facility dog - § 12-21-148. Use of certified facility dog in certain legal proceedings. | Ala.Code 1975 § 12-21-147 -148 | This Alabama law from 2017 covers use of both registered therapy dogs and registered facility dogs in certain legal proceedings. A "registered therapy dog" is defined as "[a] trained emotional support dog that has been tested and registered by a nonprofit therapy dog organization that sets standards and requirements for the health, welfare, task work, and oversight for therapy dogs and their handlers . . ." A "certified facility dog" is defined as "[a] trained working dog that is a graduate of an assistance dog organization, a nonprofit organization that sets standards of training for the health, welfare, task work, and oversight for assistance dogs and their handlers . . ." Both must meet minimum standards including minimum months/years of training, documentation showing graduation from an assistance dog organization, a current health certificate, and proof of at least $500,000 in liability insurance. During trial proceedings, all precautions should be taken to obscure the presence of the dog from the jury. | Statute |