Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MN - Humane Slaughter - Chapter 31. Food. Slaughter of Livestock | M.S.A. § 31.59 - 31.592 | MN ST § 31.59 - 31.592 | This section comprises Minnesota's humane slaughter laws. The law requires humane slaughter of livestock, defined as any method of slaughtering livestock which normally causes animals to be rendered insensible to pain by a single blow of a mechanical instrument or shot of a firearm or by chemical, or other means that are rapid and effective; or by methods of preparation necessary to Halal ritual slaughter, Jewish ritual slaughter and of slaughtering required by the ritual of the Islamic or Jewish faith. "Livestock" under this act is limited to cattle, horses, swine, sheep and goats. | Statute | |
| HI - Therapy animals - [§ 323-51]. Animal therapy | H R S § 323-51 | HI ST § 323-51 | This Hawaii law allows common household pets to be brought into long term health care facilities for the purpose of visiting patients. The institution can determine the rules for visitation. It also may require the animal owner o produce written documentation from a veterinarian attesting to the animal's good health. | Statute | |
| Tighe v. North Shore Animal League | 142 A.D.3d 607, 36 N.Y.S.3d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | 36 N.Y.S.3d 500, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05807 | In May 2012, Tighe adopted a dog from the North Shore Animal League after having been warned that the dog was possessive regarding food. After taking the dog home, Tighe noticed that the dog exhibited aggressive behavior, such as jumping at the backyard fence and growling at her when she attempted to feed the dog. In July of 2012, the dog bit Tighe’s hand when she tried to pick up a cookie off of the floor. As a result, Tighe spent three days in the hospital due to severe blood loss and swelling. Additionally, in September of 2012, the dog bit Tighe in the face causing severe injuries. After the incident in September, Tighe filed suit against the North Shore Animal League to recover damages for negligence, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court dismissed the claim of emotional distress but granted summary judgment in favor of Tighe with regard to the other claims of negligence. The North Shore Animal League appealed the lower court’s decision. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New York overturned the lower court’s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the North Shore Animal League on all claims. The court found that the North Shore Animal League was not a proximate cause to Tighe’s injuries for failing to adequately warn her about the dog’s aggreesive behavior because Tighe learned of the dog’s aggressive behavior three months prior to the incident that caused Tighe’s injuries. According to the court, once Tighe learned of the dog’s aggressive tendencies, she was in the best position to take “precautionary measures to prevent harm to herself.” So, even if the North Shore Animal League had failed to warn Tighe of the dog’s aggressive tendencies prior to the adoption, Tighe “independently” learned of the dog’s aggressive behavior prior to the incident which eliminated the North Shore Animal League as being a proximate cause of her injuries. | Case | |
| Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Common Council of City of Albany | 56 A.D.3d 32, 865 N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.,2008) | 2008 WL 4500223 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.), 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 07703 |
An Organization dedicated to the protection of the Karner Blue Butterfly and other species that live in an area of land used as a nature preserve brought challenge against the City Common Council’s; (“Council”) approval of a Developer’s rezoning application for the land. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York, held that the Organization had standing to bring suit, because the Organization showed the existence of an actual injury different from that of the general public, due to the Organization’s regular use of the preserve, at least one member’s nearby residency to the preserve, and the Organization’s historic involvement in the protection and preservation of the preserve. (2010 - Order Reversed by Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Common Council of City of Albany, 13 N.Y.3d 297, 918 N.E.2d 917, 890 N.Y.S.2d 405, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 07667 (N.Y. Oct 27, 2009) (NO. 134)). |
Case | |
| MA - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | M.G.L.A. 90 § 14A; M.G.L.A. 129 § 1, 39C, 39D, 39F, 43; M.G.L.A. 272 § 98A; M.G.L.A. 272 § 85B; M.G.L.A. 140 § 139 | MA ST 90 § 14A; MA ST 129 § 1, 39C, 39D, 39F, 43; MA ST 272 § 98A; MA ST 272 § 85B; MA ST 140 § 139 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and service dog laws. | Statute | |
| Night monkey poking out of a soiled hideout | Slideshow Images | ||||
| US - Eagles - Eagle Transportation Permits for American Indians and Public Institutions | 1999 WL 719395 (F.R.) |
This final rule revises the general eagle permit restrictions applicable to American Indians and public institutions. This final regulation provides for the issuance of eagle permits for transportation of lawfully possessed eagle parts into or out of the United States only when the eagle parts have a religious purpose, or when a public institution transports eagle parts for scientific or exhibition purposes. In these cases, we will require that the eagle parts be returned to the country of origin. We make this revision to address concerns expressed by American Indians and public institutions who have sought our permission to allow international travel of lawfully possessed eagle parts or items containing eagle parts. We have carefully considered the needs of science and education, the religious protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and the recommendations made by those responding to the proposed rule providing for Eagle Transportation Permits for American Indians and Public Institutions published Thursday, June 16, 1994 (Federal Register (59 FR 30892)). |
Administrative | ||
| Hayes v. State | 518 S.W.3d 585 (Tex. App. 2017) | 2017 WL 1193845 (Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2017) | Defendant appeals an order with the Henderson County Sheriff's Office to destroy his dogs under Chapter 822 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. More specifically, defendant claims reversible error after he was denied a jury trial. Defendant's three dogs were seized after they attacked an individual riding a bicycle in front of defendant's residence. After a hearing, the dogs were found to be dangerous pursuant to Section 822.041 related to dogs causing serious bodily injury to a person. The judge then ordered the dogs to be humanely destroyed. Hayes appealed the order and requested a jury trial, which was objected to by the Henderson County Attorney's Office and sustained by the court. The dogs were found to be dangerous at a bench trial and ordered humanely euthanized, while defendant was ordered to pay $2,780 to the county. On appeal, defendant argues the county court erred in removing his case from the jury trial docket. The court now considers two questions: "(1) whether the owner of a dog ordered to be humanely destroyed by a justice, county, or municipal court judge, pursuant to Chapter 822, subchapter A, of the Texas Health and Safety Code, has the right to appeal such order; and (2) if an appeal is allowed, whether a jury can be requested to hear the de novo appeal." The court here declined to adopt the state's interpretation that the statute's silence as to a right of appeal indicates that the legislature eliminated that right. In fact, the court observed Subchapter A of Chapter 822 dealing with less serious "dangerous dogs," allows a party to appeal a dangerous dog finding. The court found it would be inconsistent that the more severe Subchapter D denies an appeal of right where the less severe subchapter grants it, especially where a forfeiture of property occurs (i.e., dogs). As to the right to jury trial, the court found Chapter 822 silent on that issue. However, the court found the order for seizure and destruction of defendant's "special personal property" guaranteed him a trial by jury under Article I of the Texas Constitution. The trial court's Final Order was reversed and the case was remanded to county court. | Case | |
| IE - Cruelty - Protection of Animals, 1911 | Protection of Animals Act, 1911 | This Ireland law makes it illegal for a person to cause any animal “unnecessary suffering.” The act outlines all of the ways a person can be guilty of causing an animal harm including: beating, kicking, over-loading, torturing, and poisoning. If a person is found guilty under the act, the court has the power to take ownership of the animal and order the guilty party to pay any damages that resulted from the harm. | Statute | ||
| Ladnier v. Norwood | 781 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1986). |
Plaintiff horse owner sought review of a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which found in favor of defendants, veterinarian and insurer, in an action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's horse. The court affirmed the judgment that found defendants, veterinarian and insurer, not negligent in the death of a horse belonging to plaintiff horse owner because they met the statutorily required standard of care. Defendants did not breach a duty to warn because the risk of a fatal reaction to the drug they gave to the horse was common and was considered by equine specialists to be insubstantial. |
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