Results
Displaying 6611 - 6620 of 6649
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN - Exotic Pets - Article 9. Fish and Wildlife. Rule 3. Mammals. 312 IAC 9-3-18.5 Exotic mammals. | 312 IN ADC 9-3-18.5 | 312 IAC 9-3-18.5 | This regulation lists certain exotic mammals that may not be taken (harmed, harassed, or killed) and establishes restrictions on the possession and sale of those exotic mammals. | Administrative | |
| IL - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | 510 ILCS 5/1 - 35; 510 ILCS 92/1 - 999; 510 ILCS 72/1 - 180; 55 I.L.C.S. 5/5-1071 - 1071.1; 60 I.L.C.S. 1/30-110; 520 I.L.C.S. 20/15 and 20/19; 520 I.L.C.S. 5/2.34; 65 I.L.C.S. 5/11-20-9 | 520 I.L.C.S. 5/1.2y; 520 I.L.C.S. 5/1.2z; 520 I.L.C.S. 5/3.26 | These statutes comprise Illinois' dog laws. Among the provisions include the Animal Control Act, which regulates the licensing and control of dogs, the Diseased Animal Act, and the Humane Euthanasia in Animal Shelters Act. | Statute | |
| In re: JAMES JOSEPH HICKEY, JR., d/b/a S & H SUPPLY CO., AND JERRY R. BRANTON | 53 Agric. Dec. 1087 (1994) | 1994 WL 657129 (U.S.D.A.) | Respondents' failure to file timely answer, or deny allegations of complaint, constituted admission of complaint allegations and waiver of hearing, irrespective of respondents' contention that they were justified in not filing answer because ALJ did not rule on respondents' motions to sever, strike and make more definite and certain, since Department's rules of practice do not alter time for filing answer when such motions are filed. | Case | |
| Carroll v. County of Monroe | 712 F.3d 649 (2nd Cir. 2013) | Upon executing a no-knock warrant by using a battering ram to break through the front door of the plaintiff’s home, police encountered the plaintiff’s dog. An officer claimed the dog was growling, barking, and quickly and aggressively approaching him. He then fired one shot from his shotgun, striking the dog and killing him. Prior to the execution of the warrant, the officers were aware that a dog would be present and did not discuss a plan for controlling the dog or neutralizing the dog by any non-lethal means. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the police officers and municipality, alleging violations of her Fourth Amendment rights. The court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgement and held that the issue of whether the officer acted reasonably was a question for the jury. | Case | ||
| FL - Fish and Wildlife Conservation - Part V. Law Enforcement | West's F. S. A. § 379.33 - 379.343 | FL ST § 379.33 - 379.343 | This set of laws describes the scope and methods of enforcement of the state's fish and wildlife laws. | Statute | |
| Scheele v. Dustin | 998 A.2d 697 (Vt.,2010) | 2010 VT 45 |
A dog that wandered onto defendant’s property was shot and killed by defendant. The dog’s owners sued under an intentional tort theory and a claim for loss of companionship. The Supreme Court upheld the award of economic damages for the intentional destruction of property. It also held that the owners could not recover noneconomic damages for emotional distress under Vermont common law. |
Case | |
| Green v. Animal Protection League of Mercer Cty. | 51 N.E.3d 718 (Ohio,2016) | 2016 WL 1730535 (Ohio,2016) | Carl Green III, owned a dog, which was seized by the Mercer County Dog Warden in Ohio because it was running at large and was not wearing a current registration tag. The Animal Protection League of Mercer County (“APL”), purchased the dog from the Mercer County Dog Warden and placed the dog up for adoption. Appellant, Lori Winner adopted the dog. Green then filed a complaint in the Municipal Court, Celina County, asserting claims for replevin and conversion. The municipal court granted replevin and ordered Winner to return the dog to Green. Winner appealed this decision in the instant action arguing that (1) Green's ownership interest was terminated by operation of law; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to find that the Mercer County Dog Warden Was an Indispensable Party to the Litigation. The Court of Appeals agreed with Winner on the first assignment of error, finding that, because replevin is a statutory remedy in Ohio, the trial court's conclusion that the dog should be returned to Green is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court exercised its equitable powers to award possession to Green, and that it was "in the best interest of the dog" to return it to Green. The Court of Appeals found that the statute does not provide for this type of remedy. As to the second error, this Court overruled Winner's claim, finding that there was no claim raised that the Mercer County Dog Warden wrongfully sold the dog to the APL. Thus, the dog warden had no interest in the action and the trial court did not err by failing to join the warden as a party. The judgment was reversed and remanded. | Case | |
| CO - Lien, veterinary - Part 1. Lien on Personal Property. | C.R.S.A. § 38-20-102, 103 | CO ST § 38-20-102, 103 | These Colorado laws concern liens on pet animals for persons who are entrusted with caring for the animals. Under 38-20-102, any feeder, veterinarian, or other person entrusted with the pet for feeding, keeping, boarding, or medical shall have a lien for the amount of costs incurred in the care of the animal. Any contracts (or copies thereof) made by the owner of the pet animal with the person caring for the animals may be filed with the county clerk where the owner resides (or where the contract was made for non-residents). The filing of this contract constitutes notice to the contents of the contract and the legal effect of the filing. | Statute | |
| Argentina - Farm animals - Ley 3.959, 1900 | LEY 3.959 | This is the law of the Police for Animal Health. The purpose of this law is to set the parameters to ensure the protection of livestock against contagious exotic diseases. This law regulates topics such as importation and exportation of livestock, prohibiting the importation or exportation of animals infected with contagious diseases or suspected of being infected. | Statute | ||
| KS - Wildlife Possession - Chapter 32. Wildlife, Parks and Recreation. | K. S. A. 32-1005 | KS ST § 32-1005 | Knowingly capturing, killing, or possessing for profit, or selling, bartering, purchasing or offering to do so as well as the shipping or transportation of wildlife constitutes the commercialization of wildlife. The possession of listed wildlife for commercial purposes is considered a "nonperson" misdemeanor or felony depending on whether the aggregate value is greater than $1000. Commerce in protected wildlife (including eagles) incurs at least the minimum fine and may also result in the confiscation of equipment, license sanctions, and restitution. | Statute |