Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GA - Banks County - Chapter 14 (Article 3: Domestic Animals) & Appendix A: Zoning | The Code of Banks County, Georgia §§ 14-33, 14-34, 301, 501-503, 601-603, 701(A)-703(A), 701(B)-703(B) |
In Banks County, Georgia, the number of dogs a person may own depends on the zone in which the person's property is located. The following ordinances indicate the zones and the numbers, as well as provide additional restrictions on dogs located within certain zones.
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Local Ordinance | ||
| Farm Sanctuary v. United States Dep't of Agric. | 664 F. Supp. 3d 334 (W.D.N.Y. 2023) | Several non-profit organizations, including Farm Sanctuary and Animal Legal Defense Fund, filed a lawsuit against the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) challenging their actions related to the slaughtering of pigs under the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs alleged three causes of action related to the humane treatment, handling, and disposition of downed pigs, violation of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, and arbitrary and capricious denial of a Petition for Rulemaking. The plaintiffs in this case filed two causes of action against the defendants. The first cause of action claimed a violation of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for failing to investigate and report on downed pigs to Congress. Specifically, the plaintiffs submitted a petition to ban the slaughter of non-ambulatory pigs, which was denied by the defendants who claimed that their existing regulations and inspection procedures are sufficient in ensuring humane treatment and preventing diseased animals from entering the food supply. The plaintiffs requested the court to issue a declaration finding the violation and to compel the defendants to conduct an investigation and report to Congress. The second cause of action alleged a violation of the HMSA and APA for failing to assess the need for regulations regarding the humane treatment of downed pigs and to promulgate such regulations. The plaintiffs requested similar relief as in the first cause of action. The Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Complete the Administrative Record, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice, granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. On appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated standing at the summary judgment stage, despite a previous ruling during the motion to dismiss stage. Article III standing requires plaintiffs to show (1) an injury-in-fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's actions, and (3) the likelihood that the injury can be remedied. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue both causes of action because they had not been injured by the defendants' alleged failures, and any relief ordered by the court would not redress their injuries. Regarding the informational injury, the court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that it was sufficiently concrete to meet the requirements of Article III. The court also stated that seeking to ensure compliance with regulatory law was not sufficient grounds for standing. The potential availability of a report through the Freedom of Information Act was considered too attenuated to establish a concrete informational injury. Regarding the organizational injury, the court referred to a recent Second Circuit decision that rejected an expansive concept of organizational injury for standing purposes. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been forced to spend resources investigating and reporting on downed pigs, which they argue was the responsibility of the USDA. However, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had voluntarily chosen to engage in these activities and had not been required to do so by the USDA. The court explained that an organization must show an involuntary material burden on its established core activities, and the challenged law or regulation must impose a cost that adversely affects the organization's regular activities pursued in its organizational mission. Expenditures or activities undertaken by the organization's own initiative, without being reasonably necessary to continue established core activities, were insufficient to establish injury for standing purposes. The court found that the plaintiffs had not shown a perceptible impairment to their activities caused by the defendants' actions, and the expenditures incurred by the plaintiffs were not reasonably necessary to continue their established core activities. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not establish an injury in fact for standing purposes based on organizational injury. Even assuming the plaintiffs had standing, they failed to establish that defendants violated the HMSA and the APA by failing to investigate and report to Congress on downed pigs. The defendants argue that they complied with Congress's mandates and that some obligations are not judicially reviewable, to which the court agreed. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that the defendants violated the FMSA by failing to investigate and report on downed pigs as required by Section 1907(a). However, the court found that Section 1907 does not mandate that the Secretary investigate each and every species of livestock, and the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence supporting that reading of the statute. The court also found that the plaintiffs' challenge to the sufficiency of the reports was not enough to succeed on an APA claim because they did not establish that the defendants failed to take a discrete agency action that they were required to take. As a result, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the first cause of action. Additionally, defendants argued that they are entitled to summary judgment because the relevant statute does not require them to regulate the slaughter of downed pigs, and therefore, the decision is discretionary. The plaintiffs did not provide a response to this argument, and their failure to advocate for their second cause of action is likely due to the absence of any statutory requirement that Defendants ban the slaughter of downed pigs. The court examined the relevant statute, which provides that the Secretary shall promulgate regulations to provide for the humane treatment of non-ambulatory livestock if necessary. The court concluded that the statute grants discretion to the Secretary to determine whether to promulgate such regulations and that agency decisions not to take enforcement action are unreviewable. Thus, the court concluded that the defendants' actions were not arbitrary or capricious. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Complete the Administrative Record was granted; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judicial Notice and their Motion for Summary Judgment were denied; and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was granted. | Case | ||
| Matter of Ricco v Corbisiero | 565 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1991) | 165 A.D.2d 3 (1991) |
Petitioner harness race-horse driver was suspended by the New York State Racing and Wagering Board, Harness Racing Division for 15 days for failing to drive his horse to the finish. The driver argued that whipping the horse had not improved his performance. Considering that the horse had equaled his best time, and had lost by only two feet, and that it would have been a violation of the New York anti-cruelty law (Agriculture and Markets Law ( § 353) to overdrive the horse, the court overturned the suspension. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Lundquist | 932 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Or. 1996) |
Defendant, a non-Native American practitioner of Native American religion, challenged his conviction as a religious exercise violation where there was no evidence that defendant was trafficking in eagle parts. Employing a RFRA analysis, the court found that while the limitation under the BGEPA to members of federally-recognized Indian tribes did substantially burden defendant's exercise of religion, the government asserted a compelling interest in protecting a rare species and maintaining Indian culture that was administered through the least restrictive means (e.g., the permit process). For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by non-Native Americans, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act . |
Case | ||
| Rowley v. Murphy | [1964] 2 QB 43 | [1963] 3 WLR 1061; [1964] 1 All ER 50; 128 JP 88; 107 SJ 982 |
A deer being hunted with a pack of hounds jumped onto a road and fell under a stationery vehicle. Members of the hunt dragged the deer from under the vehicle to a nearby enclosure, where the Master of the hunt slit the deer's throat and killed it. The Divisional Court held that the Master could not be convicted of an offence of cruelty under the 1911 Act because, for the purposes of that Act, which protects only captive and domestic animals, a mere temporary inability to escape did not amount to a state of captivity. |
Case | |
| Canada - Ontario - Ontario Statutes - Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act | R.S.O. 1990, c. O.36, s. 1 - 19 |
This set of laws comprises Ontario, Canada's Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. The object of the Society is to facilitate and provide for the prevention of cruelty to animals and their protection and relief therefrom. The laws outline the requirements for formation and operation of the Society as well as the guidelines under which members can assist animals in distress. Section 15 provides the standards of care for keeping cats or dogs for breeding or sale. 2015 amendments include the prohibition on the sale, purchase, and breeding of orcas. |
Statute | ||
| CA - Animal Control - Chapter 20.5. Animal Control Officer Standards Act. | West's Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code § 26220 - 26230 | This comprises the Animal Control Officer Standards Act. The law requires the Board of Directors of the California Animal Welfare Association to develop and maintain standards for various classes of CACOs. The standards for education, training, and certification shall be adopted by administrative rule of the board, and shall not be less rigorous than those described in this chapter. The board shall maintain a registry of each application for a certificate of registration under this chapter. | Statute | ||
| US - Marine Mammals - Public Display of Marine Mammals | 1994 WL 540866 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 94-24787 (1994) |
NMFS is announcing that the American Zoo and Aquarium Association (AZA) and the Alliance of Marine Mammal Parks and Aquariums Alliance) have submitted, for reference purposes, the professionally accepted standards on which their members base their education and conservation programs. The MMPA was amended substantially on April 30, 1994. These 1994 Amendments require that persons holding marine mammals for purposes of public display, or requesting issuance of a permit to capture or import a marine mammal for purposes of public display, must offer a program for education or conservation purposes that is based on professionally recognized standards of the public display community. |
Administrative | |
| Zimmerman v. Robertson | 854 P.2d 338 (Mont. 1993) |
Plaintiff horse owner sought review of a judgment by the District Court of Yellowstone County, Thirteenth Judicial District (Montana), which entered a directed verdict in favor of defendant veterinarian on the owner's claims of professional negligence. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the owner was required to prove the veterinarian's negligence by expert testimony, and that he failed to do so. In addition, the court The court found that the "defendant's admissions" exception to the expert testimony requirement did not apply because the veterinarian did not admit that he deviated from the standard of care. |
Case | ||
| US - Marine Mammals - Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Tuna Purse Seine Vessels in the East | FR Doc. 04-19869 | I.D. 082404B |
This Notice announces that on August 9, 2004, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order which set aside the final finding made on December 31, 2002, by the Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, NMFS, (Assistant Administrator). Under the terms of this Order, the labeling standard for ``dolphin-safe'' tuna shall be governed by the provisions of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act. Under that provision, tuna are deemed dolphin safe if ``no tuna were caught on the trip in which such tuna were harvested using a purse seine net intentionally deployed on or to encircle dolphins, and no dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets in which the tuna were caught.'' |
Administrative |