Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| In re Marriage of Berger and Ognibene-Berger | (Decisions Without Published Opinions) 834 N.W.2d 82 (Table) (2013) | (unpublished) 2013 WL 1749799 | Joe Berger appeals from the provisions of the decree of divorce from Cira Berger, including the court’s grant of Max, the family golden retriever, to Cira. He argues that it would be more equitable to grant him ownership of Max because Cira already owns another dog, Sophie, and the parties’ son, who lives with Joe, is very attached to Max. The district court made their decision based on which party would be more available to care for the dog. This court affirms that decision, citing evidence that Max is licensed to Cira, only Cira’s name is in the dog’s ‘GEO tracker’ device, and Cira got Max medical attention even when Max was in Joe’s care. The court specified that they need not determine a pet's best interests when deciding custody. | Case |
| WV - Equine Activity Liability - Article 4. Equestrian Activities Responsibility Act. | W. Va. Code, § 20-4-1 to 7 | WV ST § 20-4-1 to 7 | This West Virginia section expressly recognizes the value of equestrian activities to the state. Thus, in order to limit liability to those who provide equine services, the duties of both the horsemen who provide such services and the participants who engage in such activities are stated. Each participant in an equestrian activity expressly assumes the risk of and legal responsibility for any injury, loss or damage to person or property which results from participation in an equestrian activity. Horsemen are required to ensure the safety of the participants and the equipment provided. | Statute |
| People of the State of New York v. Mary Dawn Sitors | This action is an appeal from dismissal of criminal charges against a woman accused of acts of cruelty on her horses. The Town Court dismissed the criminal charges, finding that since the Catskill Animal Sanctuary's petition seeking the posting of security to care for the horses was dismissed (which had a lower standard of proof than in a criminal action), this necessarily meant it would be impossible to obtain a criminal conviction under the higher standard. Essentially, the Town Court's decision reflected a determination that one cannot violate New York's state cruelty law unless the animal dies due to lack of sustenance or care. The County Court found this reasoning erroneous; a violation under the law occurs when one fails to provide necessary sustenance, not only those acts or omissions that result in an animal's death. The criminal actions were thus, reinstated against defendant. | Pleading | ||
| Barnard v. Evans | [1925] 2 KB 794 |
The expression "cruelly ill-treat"" in s 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Animals Act 1911 means to "cause unnecessary suffering" and "applies to a case where a person wilfully causes pain to an animal without justification for so doing". It is sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the animal was caused to suffer unnecessarily, and the prosecution does not have to prove that the defendant knew that his actions were unnecessary. |
Case | |
| Northern Ireland - Farm animal - Welfare of Farmed Animals Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2012 | 2012 No. 156 | Regulations placing duties on persons responsible for farmed animals, to include: the conditions under which animals are kept; and specific conditions for laying hens, reared meat chickens, caves, cattle, pigs and rabbits. | Statute | |
| NY - Research animals - § 239-b. Research dogs and cats | McKinney's Education Law § 239-b | NY EDUC § 239-b | This New York law, effective in 2016, provides that a publicly-funded higher education research facility must assess the health of the dog or cat and determine whether it is suitable for adoption after the research and testing on the animal is completed. That research facility must then make reasonable efforts to offer for adoption the dog or cat determined to be suitable for adoption, either through private placement or through an animal rescue/organization. | Statute |
| VA - Equine - Chapter 62. Equine Activity Liability/Chapter 63. Ox Activity Liability | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6200 - 6302 | VA ST § 3.2-6200 - 6302 | This Virginia section provides that an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person shall not be liable for an injury to or death of a participant resulting from the intrinsic dangers of equine activities. Liability is not limited where the equine professional intentionally injures the participant, commits an act or omission that constitutes negligence for the safety of the participant, or knowingly provides faulty equipment or tack that causes injury. The statute seems to imply that a waiver should be executed when a participant engages in equine activities to adequately insulate the equine professional. | Statute |
| MI - Newaygo - Breed - Sec. 6-9. Vicious dogs. (Pit Bull Ordinance) | NEWAYGO, MI., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-9 |
In Newaygo, Michigan, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own, or possess any pit bull dog or other vicious dog. Dogs registered as of the effective date of the ordinance may remain if the owner complies with certain requirements, such as posting a "Beware of Dog" sign, taking photographs for identification purposes, and keeping the dog on a leash and using a muzzle. A violation may result in a fine or imprisonment. The dog may also be impounded, confined to the premises of the owner, removed from the city, or killed. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Beckwith v. Weber | 277 P.3d 713 (Wyo. 2012) | 2012 WL 1415598 (Wyo. 2012); 2012 WY 62 |
While on vacation at a ranch in Wyoming, plaintiff was thrown or fell from a horse that stepped in a large badger hole. Allegedly, the trail guide left the plaintiff and her husband at the scene in order to get help. Worried about potential wildlife attacks, the plaintiff and her husband walked to a nearby residence for assistance. The plaintiff later brought a negligence suit against the ranch for injuries she had sustained during the fall. At trial, the jury verdict stated the plaintiff had assumed the risk and the plaintiff was therefore not entitled to damages. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged a jury instruction and asserted the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded costs to the ranch. The plaintiff did not prevail on either claim. |
Case |
| Coe v. Lewsader | 64 N.E.3d 817, appeal denied, 77 N.E.3d 81 (Ill. 2017) | 2016 IL App (4th) 150841, 2016 WL 5679604 | In this case, Ryan and Hillary Coe filed suit against Eric and Trish Lewsader for damages resulting from an accident involving the Lewsader’s dog. Ryan Coe was driving his motorcycle while intoxicated on a public highway when he hit the Lewsader’s dog that was lying in the middle of the street. Coe suffered severe injuries as a result of the accident and filed suit against the Lewsader’s according to Section 16 of the Illinois Animal Attacks or Injuries statute. According to the Act, “if a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks, attempts to attack, or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself or herself in any place where he or she may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in civil damages.” In order to be awarded damages under the Act, the Coe’s needed to establish “some overt act” of the Lewsader’s dog . As a result, the question before the court was whether or not the Lewsader’s dog was acting overtly when it was lying in the middle of the street at the time of the accident. Ultimately, the court held that the dog was not acting overtly by lying in the middle of the street. Also, the court rejected the Coe’s argument that the dog had acted overtly when it walked into the street before lying down. The court rejected this argument because the overt act needed to take place at the time of the injury, not before. As a result, the court found that the Lewsader’s were not liable for civil damages under the Act because the dog had not acted overtly at the time of accident and therefore the Act did not apply in this situation. | Case |