Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jefferson v. Mirando | 719 N.E.2d 1074 (Ohio Co.,1999) | 101 Ohio Misc.2d 1 (1999) |
In this Ohio case, the defendant was charged with violating ordinance setting maximum number of dogs or cats that a person could "harbor" per family dwelling unit. The court first observed that the village of Jefferson's ordinance benefits from a strong presumption of constitutionality, and defendant Mirando bears the burden of demonstrating unconstitutionality of this ordinance beyond any remaining fair debate on the issue. The court held that ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague and did not conflict with state statutes regulating kennels. |
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| U.S. v. Santillan | 243 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) |
Santillan was prosecuted under the Lacey Act for bringing ten baby parrots across the border from Tijuana. His appeal raises, among other issues, a significant question about the mens rea needed under the Lacey Act. The court held that the Lacey Act does not require knowledge of the particular law violated by the possession or predicate act, as long as the defendant knows of its unlawfulness. |
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| Drinkhouse v. Van Ness | 260 P. 869 (1935) | 202 Cal. 359 (1935) |
Plaintiffs sued defendants to recover value of a horse that was wrongfully taken from them. The Court held that evidence was admissible to establish the value of the horse at the time of the wrongful taking to fix the damages amount. The peculiar value of the horse as a sire was established by evidence as to the horse’s racing history and to its progeny’s character and racing ability. Owners were entitled to recover damages for the reasonable value of the horse’s use during the period they were wrongfully deprived of it. |
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| Derecho Animal Volume 11 Núm 3 |
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| COMPASSION IN WORLD FARMING LIMITED v.THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS |
Plaintiff organization suggest that the UK government has not adopted adequate regulations for the protection of broiler chickens, under the obligations of EEC Directives or under UK law. |
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| VA - Restaurants, animals - 2 VAC 5-585-3310. Prohibiting animals. | 2 VA ADC 5-585-3310 | 2 VAC 5-585-3310 | This Virginia regulation states that dogs may be allowed in outdoor dining areas if: (1) the outdoor dining area is not enclosed with floor-to-ceiling walls; (2) there is a separate entrance; (3) there is a sign at the main entrance stating that dogs are allowed in the outdoor dining area that is easily observable by the public; (3) food and water provided to dogs is served using equipment not used for human food service or is put in single-use receptacles; (4) dogs are not allowed to sit on chairs, benches, seats, or tables; (5) dogs are kept on a leash or within a pet carrier and under the control of adults at all times; (6) the establishment provides a means for picking up dog messes; and (7) there is a sign outlining some of these requirements observable to the public. | Administrative | |||||||
| Holt v. City of Sauk Rapids | 559 N.W.2d 444 | 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 203 | Sauk Rapids, Minnesota passed a city ordinance limiting the number of dogs that could be kept in a residential home. The appellants were dog owners, breeders, and Ms. Holt, who also rescued Newfoundland dogs help find new homes for them. The lower court held that the ordinances were unconstitutional, but the city appealed and on appeal the court reversed the finding. Minnesota law granted the municipality the authority to regulate public and private property, including regulating the keeping of dogs on residential property. City Hall received many complaints concerning dogs, so the Sauk Rapids ordinance was introduced by the mayor to address issues with dog odor and noise. Because limiting the number of dogs can reduce odor and noise, the court found that there was a rational relationship between the ordinance and reducing the problems associated with the dogs. The dog owners failed to show that the ordinance was unreasonable. The constitutionality was upheld because the ordinance was rationally related to the health, safety, and general welfare of the community as affected by dogs. | Case | |||||||
| Mansbridge v Nichols | [2004] VSC 530 |
The appellant was convicted of seven offences under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic) related to the appellant's treatment of merino sheep in her care. The appellant was successful in overturning three of the charges on the basis that they were latently duplicitous or ambiguous. The appellant was unsuccessful in arguing that the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons. |
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| Dias v. City and County of Denver | 567 F.3d 1169 (C.A.10 (Colo.),2009) | 2009 WL 1490359 (C.A.10 (Colo.)) |
The Tenth Circuit took up a challenge to Denver's breed-specific ban against pitbull dogs. The plaintiffs, former residents of Denver, contended the ban is unconstitutionally vague on its face and deprives them of substantive due process. The district court dismissed both claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) before plaintiffs presented evidence to support their claims. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by prematurely dismissing the case at the 12(b)(6) stage. The Tenth Circuit agreed in part, finding that while the plaintiffs lack standing to seek prospective relief for either claim because they have not shown a credible threat of future prosecution, taking the factual allegations in the complaint as true the plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the pit bull ban is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. |
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| U.S. v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, Inc. | 45 F.Supp.2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999) |
Defendant on appeal contends that its conduct of electrocuting migratory birds does not fall within the ambit of either the MBTA or the BGEPA because each statute is directed at the more traditional "physical" takings of migratory birds through hunting and poaching. The court disagrees, finding the plain language of the statute and legislative history demonstrate an intent to include electrocutions. The court further delineates the differences in intent under each statute, finding that while the MBTA is a strict liability crime, the BGEPA is not. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
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