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Displaying 61 - 70 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN - Animal Sacrifice - THE KERALA ANIMALS AND BIRDS SACRIFICES PROHIBITION ACT, 1968 | 20 of 1968 | This law, specific to the state of Kerala, prohibits the sacrifice of animals and birds within the precincts of temples. No persons may officiate at, perform, or participate in an animal sacrifice - it is a criminal offence. | Statute | |
| Tranchita v. Dep't of Nat. Res. | 158 N.E.3d 1230 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2020) | 2020 IL App (1st) 191251 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2020) | Plaintiff Tomi Tranchita alleged that she cared for four abused and abandoned coyotes for 13 years. The coyotes were housed within a fully fenced-in backyard, ate appropriate food, and received medical care from a veterinarian. The Plaintiff possessed a United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Class C exhibitor’s license which imposed restrictions on the licensee such as unannounced annual inspections by a veterinarian or specially trained animal expert. Plaintiff alleged that she had never been cited for any USDA violations and had passed all inspections. Plaintiff also held an Illinois state permit as a fur-bearing mammal breeder from 2011 to 2016, however, this permit lapsed after Plaintiff failed to pay the annual fee. On April 24, 2019, Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) executed a search warrant on Plaintiff’s premises. The coyotes were seized during this raid. Plaintiff was told that if she did not sign a relinquishment form that the coyotes would be euthanized or confined to a small space that would end up killing them. IDNR cited Plaintiff for lacking proper permits and for several criminal violations of the Wildlife code. Three of the four coyotes ended up dying from what was believed to be distemper. Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Plaintiff also filed an emergency motion for preliminary injunctive relief arguing that the coyote’s lives were at risk if they were not returned. Plaintiff alleged that she had a protected property interest in the coyotes pursuant to her federal exhibitor license. The trial court found that Plaintiff did not have a protected property interest in the coyotes because she did not possess the proper Illinois permit at the time of the seizure. The trial court subsequently denied her motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff then appealed. The Court looked to state law to determine whether Plaintiff had a property interest in the coyotes. Under the Illinois Wildlife Code, a fur-bearing mammal breeder permit is necessary in order to possess or raise a coyote. Plaintiff was in violation of Illinois law the moment her permit lapsed in 2016. This made the coyotes contraband since they were possessed in violation of Illinois’ Wildlife Code. No person is permitted to assert legal ownership or a right to possession of property that is contraband. Plaintiff argued that her federal exhibitor’s license recognized a right of property in her coyotes, however, the Court found that the mere possession of a federal exhibitor’s license does not automatically vest a property right in the permit holder. The Court ultimately affirmed the judgement of the trial court. | Case |
| Carter v. Ide | 188 S.E.2d 275 (Ga.App. 1972) | 125 Ga.App. 557 (Ga.App. 1972) |
This Georgia case involves an action for injuries received by a boy after he was attacked by the defendant's dog. The lower court granted summary judgment to the defendant and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals held that where there was no showing that the dog ever so much as growled at a human being before the attack, the owner of dog was not liable for injuries. Evidence that the dog previously chased a cat and had engaged in a fight with another dog was insufficient to show the owner's knowledge of the dog's vicious tendencies toward humans to create liability for the owner.
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Case |
| AR - Initiatives - Constitutional Amendment 1 (right to hunt) | Constitutional Amendment 1 (2010) | This resolution proposes to amend the Arkansas Constitution to provide for a constitutional right for citizens of the state of Arkansas to hunt, fish, trap, and harvest wildlife. The resolution states that the right would be limited only by the regulations consistent with Amendment 35 of the Arkansas Constitution. It was passed in 2010 by 82.8% of voters. | Statute | |
| WI - Breed - 95.13. Misrepresenting breed of domestic animal | W. S. A. 95.13 | WI ST 95.13 | Under this Wisconsin statute, no person may sell any domestic animal or represent that such domestic animal is a pure bred animal, if the animal is not registered or entitled to be registered, in any pure breed registry for that breed. | Statute |
| UK - Farming - UK General Welfare of Farmed Animals Regs. 2000 | Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 1870 |
For historical purposes only. Law has been repealed and/or replaced. The UK's general animal welfare legislation affecting any animal (including fish, reptiles or amphibians) bred or kept for the production of food, wool, skin or fur or for other farming purposes. |
Statute | |
| UNITED STATES of America v. Robert J. v. STEVENS, Appellant |
The Third Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 48, the federal law that criminalizes depictions of animal cruelty, is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. This brief supports the United States' petition for certiorari. Cert. was granted in April of 2009 by the U.S. Supreme Court. |
Pleading | ||
| Liddle v. Clark | 107 N.E.3d 478 (Ind. Ct. App.), transfer denied, 113 N.E.3d 627 (Ind. 2018) | In November of 2005 DNR issued an emergency rule that authorized park managers to permit individuals to trap racoons during Indiana’s official trapping season which it reissued on an annual basis from 2007 to 2013. Harry Bloom, a security officer at Versailles State Park (VSP) began installing his own lethal traps with the authorization from the park’s manager. The park manager did not keep track of where the traps were placed nor did Bloom post any signs to warn people of the traps due to fear of theft. As a result, Melodie Liddle’s dog, Copper, died in a concealed animal trap in the park. Liddle filed suit against several state officials and asked the court to declare the state-issued emergency rules governing trapping in state parks invalid. The trial court awarded damages to Liddle for the loss of her dog. Liddle appealed the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment limiting the calculation of damages and denying her request for declaratory judgment. On appeal, Liddle claimed that the trial court erred in ruling in favor of DNR for declaratory judgment on the emergency trapping rules and in excluding sentimental value from Liddle’s calculation of damages. The Court concluded that Liddle’s claim for declaratory relief was moot because the 2012 and 2013 versions of the emergency rule were expired and no longer in effect. The Court also concluded that recovery of a pet is limited to fair market-value since animals are considered personal property under Indiana law. The Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s ruling. | Case | |
| Com. v. Linhares | 957 N.E.2d 243 (Mass.App.Ct., 2011) | 80 Mass.App.Ct. 819 (2011); 2011 WL 5517133 (Mass.App.Ct.) |
Defendant intentionally hit a duck with his car and was convicted of cruelty to animals. The conviction was upheld by the Appeals Court because all that must be shown is that the defendant intentionally and knowingly did acts which were plainly of a nature to inflict unnecessary pain. Specific intent to cause harm is not required to support a conviction of cruelty to animals. |
Case |
| Humane Society of the United States v. Kempthorne | 579 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2008) | 68 ERC 1146 (2008) |
Environmental and wildlife organizations brought challenge under the Endangered Species Act [ESA] against a final rule promulgated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [FWS] designating the Western Great Lakes distinct population segment of gray wolves and simultaneously delisting it from the ESA. The court vacated and remanded the Rule to the Fish and Wildlife Service because the ESA was ambiguous about whether it authorized the FWS to simultaneously designate and delist a distinct population segment. There was no Chevron deference due. |
Case |