Results
Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
SC - Dogfighting - Chapter 27. Animal Fighting and Baiting Act. | Code 1976 § 16-27-10 to 80 | SC ST § 16-27-10 to 80 | This South Carolina section comprises the state's Animal Fighting and Baiting Act. Under the Act, any person who owns an animal for the purpose of fighting or baiting, is a party to any fighting or baiting of any animal, or obtains the use of any structure for the purpose of fighting or baiting any animal is guilty of a felony and upon conviction must be punished by a fine of $5000 or 5 years imprisonment or both. The section also provides for seizure and forfeiture of animals used in fighting operations. | Statute |
Julie Marie Grizzel v. James William Hickey d/b/a S & S Farms; Ron Lee Omara and S & S Farms, Inc. aka S.S. Farms Linn County, I |
The plaintiff in this Oregon case brought an action alleging negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the defendant, who was a licensed animal dealer. Plaintiff owned “My Girl,” a purebred cocker spaniel, whom plaintiff cared for and enclosed in a secure, fenced backyard. While My Girl was secure in her backyard, two other individuals seized her and transported her to defendant Hickey (who was known to be engaged in the business of selling animals to research laboratories). |
Pleading | ||
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Evans | 232 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2002) |
Plaintiffs, various environmental organizations and a concerned individual, sought a preliminary injunction against federal officials to prevent the United States Navy's peacetime use of a low frequency sonar system for training, testing and routine operations. The defendants temporarily enjoined from deploying Low Frequency Active Sonar until a carefully tailored preliminary injunction can be issued which would permit the use of Low Frequency Active Sonar for testing and training in a variety of ocean conditions, but would provide additional safeguards to reduce the risk to marine mammals and endangered species. |
Case | |
Animal Law Index Volume 21, Part 2 |
Animal Law Index Volume 21, Part 2ARTICLESTHE KENTUCKY HORSE: THE REALITY VS. THE MYTH AND WHAT COULD BE DONE TO CLOSE THE GAP |
Policy | ||
WA - Rehabilitation - 77.15.800. Engaging in wildlife rehabilitation without a permit--Penalty | West's RCWA 77.15.800 | This Washington law provides that a person is guilty of guilty of engaging in wildlife rehabilitation without a permit if the person captures, transports, treats, feeds, houses, conditions, or trains injured, diseased, oiled, or abandoned wildlife without department authority for temporary actions or a wildlife rehabilitation permit issued by the department. A violation of this section is a misdemeanor. | Statute | |
VA - Ordinances - § 3.2-6539. Ordinance requiring dogs to be kept on leash | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6539 | VA ST § 3.2-6539 | This Virginia statute provides that the governing body of any city may adopt regulations or ordinances requiring that dogs to be kept on a leash or otherwise restrained and may request the court to order a referendum as to whether any such ordinance so adopted shall become effective in the city. The results of the referendum shall not be binding upon the governing body of any such city but may be used in ascertaining the sense of the voters. | Statute |
OH - Exotic - Chapter 935. Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes | R.C. § 935.01 - .99 | OH ST § 935.01 - .99 | On June 5, 2012, Ohio governor Kasich signed the "Dangerous Wild Animal Act" into law. Under this new section, no person shall possess a dangerous wild animal on or after January 1, 2014 unless he or she is authorized under an unexpired wildlife shelter/propagation permit or other exception. Dangerous wild animals include big cats, some smaller exotic cats, bears, elephants, hyenas, gray wolves, alligators, crocodiles and nonhuman primates other than lemurs. Except as provided, no person shall acquire, buy, sell, trade, or transfer possession or ownership of a dangerous wild animal on or after the effective date of this section. | Statute |
Drake v. Dean | 15 Cal. App. 4th 915 (Cal.App.3.Dist. 1993) | 15 Cal.App.4th 915 (Cal.App.3.Dist. 1993) |
Plaintiff, engaged in religious solicitations, was knocked down by dog owner's pit bull on the defendant's driveway. She argued that the superior court should have instructed on negligence in addition to strict liability. The court agreed, finding that a negligence cause of action arises whenever there is insufficient control of a dog in a context in which it could be reasonably expected that injury could occur and injury did proximately result from the negligence. Thus, the court reversed the decision for defendant dog owners. |
Case |
MO - Springfield - Breed - Prohibition of pit bull dogs. | SPRINGFIELD, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 18-95 - 18-98 (2011) |
In Springfield, Missouri, it is unlawful to own, possess, keep, exercise control over, maintain, harbor, transport, or sell any pit bull, with exceptions made for animal shelters, dog shows, dog groomers, and registered dogs. The owner must sterilize the dog, keep it properly confined, and post “Pit Bull Dog” signs. Failure to comply could result in impoundment and destruction of the dog. |
Local Ordinance | |
State v. Mallory | 83 S.W. 955 (Ark. 1904) | 67 L.R.A. 773, 73 Ark. 236, 3 Am.Ann.Cas. 852 |
Defendant was charged with a violation of Arkansas law when he hunted squirrels and took fish from a pond on his own land. The trial court found defendant not guilty. On appeal, the court held that the acquittal was justified. The court rejected the state's argument that it had a proprietary right to all of the wild life in the state. The court found that a property owner had a special property right to take fish and hunt wild game upon his own land, which inured to him by reason of his ownership of the soil. However, the court noted that such a right must yield to the state's ownership and title of the fish and game in the state, which it held for the purposes of regulation and preservation for the public use. The court found that those two rights did not conflict. Therefore, the court held that defendant should have had the same right to hunt and fish on his own land that resident owners of property in the state had to hunt and fish on their own lands. Since the Act differentiated between residents and nonresidents, the court held it was violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
Case |