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Displaying 6131 - 6140 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IA - Veterinary - Veterinary Practice Code | I. C. A. § 169.1 - 56 | IA ST § 169.1 - 56 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| Nutt v. Florio | 914 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. Ct. App., 2009) | 75 Mass.App.Ct. 482 (2009) |
This Massachusetts case involves an appeal of a summary judgment in favor of the landlord-defendant concerning an unprovoked dog attack. The dog, described as a pit bull terrier, was kept by a tenant of Florio's. The court found that, while the defendants cannot be held strictly liable by virtue the dog's breed, "knowledge of that breed and its propensities may properly be a factor to be considered in determining whether the defendants were negligent under common-law principles." Reviewing the record de novo, the court held that this question and the defendant's knowledge of the dog's propensities, created a genuine issue of material fact. The order of summary judgment for defendant was reversed and the case was remanded. |
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| In re: JACK D. STOWERS, DOING BUSINESS AS SUGAR CREEK KENNELS | 56 Agric. Dec. 279 (1996) | 1996 WL 881664 (U.S.D.A.) | Willfulness is not required for cease and desist orders or for monetary fines; it is only required for license revocation if agency has not given respondent written notice of violations and opportunity to come into compliance with regulations. (Chief Administrative Law Judge Victor W. Palmer imposed a civil penalty of $15,000.00, issued a cease and desist order, and revoked Respondent's license after finding that Respondent: failed to allow department officials to inspect its facility; failed to maintain complete and accurate records of the acquisition, disposition, and identification of dogs; failed to properly identify dogs; failed to hold dogs for the required period of time; offered dogs for transportation in enclosures that did not conform to structural strength and space requirements; failed to construct and maintain primary enclosures for dogs that protect the dogs from injury; failed to deliver health certificates for dogs transported interstate; failed to provide adequate veterinary care; and obtained random source dogs from individuals who had not bred and raised the dogs on their own premises.) | Case | |
| UT - Hunting, Internet - § 23A-5-307. Use of a computer or other device to remotely hunt wildlife prohibited | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-5-307 | UT ST § 23A-5-307 | This Utah law states that a person may not use a computer or other device to remotely control the aiming and discharge of a firearm or other weapon for hunting an animal. Violation is a class A misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| Becker v. Elfreich | 821 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 2754023 (7th Cir.,2016) | Appellant, Officer Zachary Elfreich, went to the home of Appellee Jamie Becker in order to execute an arrest warrant. When Becker did not surrender right away, Officer Elfreich allowed his police dog to find and attack Becker. Upon seeing Becker, Officer Elfreich pulled him down three steps of the home staircase, and placed his knee on Becker’s back while allowing the dog to continue to bite him. Becker sued the city of Evansville and Officer Elfreich under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officer used excessive force in arresting him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied Officer Elfreich's motion for summary judgment and the officer appealed. The Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, held that: first, under the totality of the circumstances, the force used by the officer post-surrender of Becker was not reasonable. Second, a police dog's use of the “bite and hold” technique is not per se deadly force. Third, Becker, was a nonresisting (or at most passively resisting) suspect when Officer Elfreich saw him near the bottom of the staircase and the officer should not have used significant force on him. Based on these factors, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity and a reasonable jury could find such force was excessive. The lower court decision to deny Officer Elfreich's motion for summary judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| NE - Lien, veterinary - Article 7. Veterinarian's Lien. | Neb. Rev. St. § 52-701 - 702 | Neb. Rev. St. § 52-701 - 702 | These Nebraska laws provide the state's veterinary lien provisions, which concern only liens on livestock animals. Under Section 52-701, a licensed veterinarian who is contracted or hired to treat or in any way take care of any kind of livestock has a lien on that livestock for the reasonable value of services and medicines provided. This lien is treated as an agricultural lien under the UCC and may be enforced in the manner of other secured transactions in article 9 of the UCC. The lien must be perfected as provided under article 9 with the information outlined in this law. | Statute | |
| US - Apes - Great Apes Conservation Act of 2000 | 16 USC 6301 - 6305 | The law assists in the conservation of great apes by supporting and providing financial resources for the conservation programs of countries within the range of great apes. Under the law, Great apes include the chimpanzee, gorilla, bonobo, orangutan, and gibbon. The law authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, to award grants to entities that will promote the conservation of great apes in the wild. The authorization for appropriations is $5 million per year through 2005 with 3% or $80,000, whichever is greater, expended to administer the grants program. | Statute | ||
| COLUMBUS R. CO. v. WOOLFOLK | 58 S.E. 152 (Ga.1907) | 128 Ga. 631, 10 L.R.A.N.S. 1136, 119 Am.St.Rep. 404 (1907) |
In this Georgia case, Woolfolk brought a suit to recover the value of a dog that he alleged was willfully and wantonly killed by the running of a street car on defendant's line of road. The defendant demurred specially to the paragraph that alleged the value of the dog to be $200. Defendant argued that the measure of damages could not be based on the value of the dog because dogs have no market value. The court disagreed, first noting that, by the common law a dog is property, for an injury to which an action will lie and the modern trend is to value dogs in the same way other domestic animals are valued. Further, the court found a "better rule" for ascertaining the measure of damages: “The value of a dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown. Judgment affirmed.
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| National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Davis | 312 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 2002) | 2 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,826 |
This order accompanies the Ninth Circuit's decision in National Audubon v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002). |
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| Wolf time blah blah |
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