Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| People v. Gordon | 85 N.Y.S.3d 725, (N.Y.Crim.Ct. Oct. 4, 2018) | 61 Misc.3d 966, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 28306, 2018 WL 4837574 (N.Y.Crim.Ct. Oct. 4, 2018) | This New York case reflects Defendant's motion to dismiss the "accusatory instrument" in the interests of justice (essentially asking the complaint to be dismissed) for violating Agricultural and Markets Law (AML) § 353, Overdriving, Torturing and Injuring Animals or Failure to Provide Proper Sustenance for Animals. Defendant's primary argument is that she is not the owner of the dog nor is she responsible for care of the dog. The dog belongs to her "abusive and estranged" husband. The husband left the dog in the care of their daughter, who lives on the second floor above defendant. When the husband left for Florida, he placed the dog in the backyard attached to his and defendant's ground floor apartment. The dog did not have proper food, water, or shelter, and slowly began to starve resulting in emaciation. While defendant asserts she has been a victim of domestic violence who has no criminal record, the People counter that defendant was aware of the dog's presence at her residence and allowed the dog to needlessly suffer. This court noted that defendant's motion is time-barred and must be denied. Further, despite the time bar, defendant did not meet her burden to dismiss in the interests of justice. The court noted that, even viewing animals as property, failure to provide sustenance of the dog caused it to suffer needlessly. In fact, the court quoted from in Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery (in which denied a writ of habeas corpus for two chimpanzees) where the court said "there is not doubt that [a chimpanzee] is not merely a thing." This buttressed the court's decision with regard to the dog here because "he Court finds that their protection from abuse and neglect are very important considerations in the present case." Defendant's motion to dismiss in the interest of justice was denied. | Case |
| MI - Cruelty - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code. The Michigan Penal Code. | M.C.L.A. 750.50b | MI ST 750.50b | This is the felony animal cruelty law in Michigan. Under the law, a person is guilty of killing or torturing animals if they: (a) knowingly kill, torture, mutilate, maim, or disfigure an animal; (b) commit a reckless act knowing or having reason to know that the act will cause an animal to be killed, tortured, mutilated, maimed, or disfigured; (c) knowingly administer poison to an animal, or knowingly expose an animal to any poisonous substance, with the intent that the substance be taken or swallowed by the animal; or (d) violate or threaten to violate subdivision (a) or (c) with the intent to cause mental suffering or distress to a person or to exert control over a person. Whether the offense becomes a first, second, or third degree felony depends on listed factors, including whether the animal is a companion animal (as defined in the law). A first degree felony conviction results in imprisonment up to 10 years, a fine of not more than $5,000, and/or community service for not more than 500 hours. As a part of the sentence, the court may order the defendant to pay the costs of the prosecution and the costs of the care, housing, and veterinary medical care for the animal victim, and the court may order the defendant to not own or possess an animal for ANY period of time including permanent relinquishment. Lawful killing of animals including fishing, hunting, pest control, and scientific research are excluded. | Statute |
| VA - Impound - § 3.2-6547. Acceptance of animals for research or experimentation; prohibition | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6547 | VA ST § 3.2-6547 | This Virginia statute provides that no animal bearing a tag, license or tattooed identification shall be used or accepted by any person for the purpose of medical research or experimentation, unless the individual who owns such animal consents in writing. | Statute |
| People v. Chung | 185 Cal. App. 4th 247 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.), 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 253 (2010), as modified on denial of reh'g (July 1, 2010) | 2010 WL 2198201 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.), 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6881, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8189 |
Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence in an animal cruelty case. Defendant claimed officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his residence without a warrant or consent to aid a dog in distress. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied because officers reasonably believed immediate entry was necessary to aid a dog that was being mistreated. |
Case |
| OH - Humane Slaughter - Chapter 945. Humane Slaughter of Livestock. | R.C. § 945.01 - 99 | OH ST § 945.01 - 99 | These laws comprise Ohio's humane slaughter provisions. After July 1, 1967, no method of slaughtering livestock or handling in connection with the commercial slaughtering of livestock shall be utilized unless it is humane. Humane methods are defined as those that render animals insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical, or other means that is rapid and effective. Slaughter in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain is also allowed. Violation of the act results in a fine of not more than one hundred dollars. | Statute |
| Miller v. Peraino | 626 A.2d 637 (Pa.Super., 1993) | 426 Pa.Super. 189 (1993) |
The incident generating this dispute after two veterinary assistants claimed that Miller viciously beat plaintiff's dog Nera to death because he was having difficulty getting the dog from the basement recovery room to the waiting area upstairs where the dog would be picked up. The sole issue on this appeal is the dismissal of plaintiff's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from both the dog's death and the veterinarian's behavior during plaintiff's picketing of his business. Relying on both the Restatement (Second) of Torts and a prior decision inDaughen v. Fox, the court held that intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot legally be founded upon a veterinarian's behavior toward an animal. |
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| Conservation Force v. Salazar | 715 F.Supp.2d 99 (D.D.C., 2010) | 2010 WL 2244122 (D.D.C.) |
Plaintiffs to this suit — organizations and individuals that support sustainable hunting of the Canadian Wood Bison — alleged that the Secretary of the Department of Interior violated several provisions of the ESA in his treatment of that species. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the Secretary failed to: (1) make a twelve-month finding as to the status of the Canadian Wood Bison upon petition and (2) process Plaintiffs’ applications to import bison hunting trophies. In granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss, the court found that Plaintiffs’ intent to sue letter did not specify to the Secretary that they intended to challenge his subsequent failure to issue a twelve-month finding. Since Plaintiffs gave the Secretary inadequate opportunity to review his actions and take corrective measures, the claim was dismissed. Plaintiffs — four individuals who each successfully hunted a Wood Bison in Canada — sought declaratory judgment against the Service under the ESA for failure to process their applications to import bison trophies. The court also held that the request for declaratory judgment was moot where Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they ever intended to again apply for import permits. |
Case |
| Argentina - Cruelty - Ley 14346, 1954 | LEY DJA: S-0410 | This law seeks to protect animals against mIstreatment and cruel acts. Mistreatment are cruel acts and considered criminal offenses, which can be punished from 15 days to 1 year in prison. Article 2 of this law establishes the acts considered mistreatment, which includes not feeding domestic and captive animals with food in enough quantity and quality. Also included are the acts of forcing animals to work excessive hours without providing adequate rest according to the weather and stimulating them with drugs without pursuing therapeutic purposes, among others. Article 3 defines acts that are considered cruel. These acts include practicing vivisection for purposes that are not scientifically demonstrable, or in places or by people who are not authorized to operate on animals without anesthesia and without the title of doctor or veterinarian, except in cases of emergency. In addition, cruelty includes: mutilating any part of the body of an animal unless the action has purposes of improvement; marking of the respective animal species unless performed for reasons of mercy; performing public or private acts of animal fights, bullfights and parodies where animals are killed, injured or harassed; and other listed acts. | Statute | |
| KY - Impound - Chapter 258. Animal Control and Protection. | KRS § 258.265 | KY ST § 258.265 | This Kentucky statute provides that an owner shall exercise proper care and control of his dog to prevent the dog from violating any local government nuisance ordinance. Any peace officer or animal control officer may seize or destroy any dog found running at large between the hours of sunset and sunrise and unaccompanied and not under the control of its owner or handler. A peace officer or animal control officer shall be under a duty to make a fair and reasonable effort to determine whether any dog found at large between sunset and sunrise is a hound or other hunting dog which has become lost temporarily. | Statute |
| Oceana, Inc. v. Gutierrez | 488 F.3d 1020 (C.A.D.C., 2007) | 2007 WL 1574607 (C.A.D.C.) |
This federal appeal concerns regulations issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service in 2004 for leatherback sea turtles. The leatherbacks experience mortality due to long-line fishing in the pelagic ocean after they become entangled or hooked on the lines. In 2001, the Service issued an RFA - reasonable and prudent alternative - to long-line fishing operations in the pelagic ocean off the coast of New Jersey where operators could replace the industry-wide standard J-hook with circle hooks which would reduce mortality. Oceana claim is that the Fisheries Service acted arbitrarily when it predicted that the measures it was putting in place would result in a 13.1 percent mortality rate by 2007 for leatherbacks caught in longlines. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that the Service's judgment was not arbitrary or capricious when it predicted that fishing operators could achieve a 13.1 post-release mortality rate. |
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