Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hollendale Apartments & Health Club, LLC v. Bonesteel | --- N.Y.S.3d ---- , 2019 WL 2031263 (N.Y. App. Div., 2019) | 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 03718 | The Plaintiff owns and operates an apartment complex with a policy that prohibits defendants from keeping a dog on the premises. The Defendant, Bonesteel, began renting an apartment at Plaintiff's complex in 2011 under a one-year lease. Defendant continued to renew his one-year lease for additional one-year terms until 2014. Defendant's therapist sent a letter to the Plaintiff requesting an exception to the no dog policy so that the Defendant could have an emotional support animal. The Plaintiff denied the request but stated that it would allow a bird or cat or an early termination of Defendant's lease. The Plaintiff filed an action seeking a judgment declaring that the Plaintiff's refusal to permit the Defendant to have an emotional support dog was not in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Human Rights Law (HRL). The Plaintiff subsequently reduced the Defendant's lease renewal term to three months. The Defendant filed counterclaims on grounds of discrimination. The Supreme Court of New York also granted a motion allowing the Attorney General to intervene. The Attorney General asserted counterclaims on similar grounds to those raised by the Defendant. After a nonjury trial, the trial court issued a judgment that the Plaintiff's actions did not violate the FHA and the HRL. The Defendant then appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Plaintiff's claims were justiciable even though the matter was not raised by the parties. Since the Plaintiff had already denied the Defendant's request for an exception to the policy when it filed the action and no harm to the Plaintiff occurred or was impending, it was essentially asking the Court to issue an advisory opinion which is not an exercise of judicial function. Therefore, the Court dismissed the Plaintiff's declaratory judgment. The Court then considered the Defendant's counterclaims since concrete injuries were alleged. The only two arguments addressed were whether the Defendant actually had a qualifying disability within the meaning of the FHA and the HRL and whether the accommodation requested was necessary to afford the Defendant an equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling. The Court concluded that the Defendant met his burden to establish that he is disabled within the meaning of the FHA and HRL. The Court also found that the Defendant "offered sufficient evidence that having an emotional support dog would affirmatively enhance his quality of life by ameliorating the effects of his disability, and thus demonstrated necessity within the meaning of the FHA and the HRL." Lastly, the Court found that the Plaintiff retaliated against the Defendant by reducing his lease renewal terms to three months. Accordingly, Defendant was entitled to judgment in his favor on the retaliation counterclaims. | Case |
| US - Housing - Fair Housing. Subchapter I. Generally. Section 3602. Definitions. | 42 U.S.C.A. 3601 - 3604 | The following sections of the Fair Housing Act relate to "reasonable accommodations" for persons with a handicap or disability. In Section 3602, the definition of "handicap" includes a person with: (1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities; (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. Section 3604 is the operative part of the law that makes it unlawful to discriminate because of a handicap in the sale or rental of a dwelling. Under subsection (3)(B), the law states that discrimination includes the refusal to make "reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." | Statute | |
| U.S. v. Lee | 937 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1991) |
Fishermen who took part in importing salmon that they knew or should have known had been taken in violation of Taiwanese regulation, could be subjected to criminal penalties for violation of the Lacey Act, despite the fact not all fishermen who were involved actually violated the Taiwanese regulation. The fishermen argue that the term "any foreign law" encompasses only foreign statutes, not foreign regulations; however, the court previously ruled that a Taiwanese regulation prohibiting the export of salmon without a permit constituted a "foreign law" under section 3372(a)(2)(A) and thereby supported an Act violation. |
Case | |
| AR - Pet Sales - Chapter 97. Retail Pet Stores. | A.C.A. §§ 4-97-101 to 109 | AR ST §§ 4-97-101 to 109 | This statutory section comprises the Arkansas Retail Pet Store Consumer Protection Act of 1991. The purpose of the act is to ensure that purchasers receive consumer animals that are physically and temperamentally sound, healthy, and fit as companions. The Act also provides a means by which the acquisition and care of those animals can be monitored. | Statute |
| WV - Leash - § 5A-4-4. Unlawful to kill or molest animals, birds or fowls upon grounds of capitol; | W. Va. Code, § 5A-4-4 | WV ST § 5A-4-4 | This West Virginia statute aims at protecting the state capitol grounds and governor's mansion from disturbance. In doing so, it makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly allow a dog owned by him or her to be upon the grounds of the capitol buildings or governor's mansion unless such dog is under control by leash. Any person who knowingly allows a dog owned by him to be upon the grounds of the capitol buildings or governor's mansion while not under control by leash shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not less than twenty-five nor more than one hundred dollars. Other interesting provisions are included in this law. | Statute |
| Jones v. Butz | 374 F.Supp. 1284 (D.C.N.Y. 1974) |
This action involves a challenge, under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, to the Humane Slaughter Act and in particular to the provisions relating to ritual slaughter as defined in the Act and which plaintiffs suggest involve the Government in the dietary preferences of a particular religious (e.g., Orthodox Jews) group. The court held that there is no violation of Establishment Clause because no excessive governmental entanglement and by making it possible for those who wish to eat ritually acceptable meat to slaughter the animal in accordance with the tenets of their faith, Congress neither established the tenets of that faith nor interfered with the exercise of any other. |
Case | |
| Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar | 691 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2012) | 2012 WL 3538236 (D.C. Cir. 2012) |
In 1985, after scientists had found only 10 living squirrels, the Virginia northern flying squirrel was listed as endangered under the ESA. In 2006, after scientists had captured 1,063 squirrels, the FWS went through the procedure to delist the squirrel. Friends of Blackwater filed a complaint against the Secretary of Interior in district court, challenging the Secretary's rule to delist the squirrel. Subsequently, the Secretary of Interior appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The D.C. circuit court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that the Secretary's determination the West Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel was no longer endangered was neither arbitrary and capricious nor in violation of the Act. |
Case |
| Animal Law Index Volume 4 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 4 (1998)
INTRODUCTIONTHE CONFLICT BETWEEN SPECIES IN AN EVER MORE CROWDED WORLD |
Policy | ||
| The Equine Identification (England) Regulations 2018 | The Equine Identification (England) Regulations 2018 | Owners have two years to ensure all equines born before 30th June 2009 are chipped. Some wild and semi-wild equids are exempt. Non-compliant owners risk being fined. | Statute | |
| CA - Trusts - § 15212. Trusts for care of animals; duration; requirements; accountings; beneficiaries | West's Ann. Cal. Prob. Code § 15212 | CA PROBATE § 15212 | This California statute provides that a person can create a trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal for the life of the animal. The duration will only be for the life of the pet, even if the trust instrument contemplates a longer duration. Note that the statute uses the singular form of "animal" and the term "domestic" or "pet" is used. | Statute |