Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TN - Disaster - Part 8. Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act of 2007 | T. C. A. § 58-2-801 - 813 | TN ST § 58-2-801 - 813 | The Tennessee Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act applies to registered volunteer health practitioners who provide health services for a host entity during an emergency. Volunteer health practitioners are not liable for their acts or omissions in providing health services. Health services means treatment, care, advice, guidance, or provision of supplies related to the health or death of an animal or to animal populations. | Statute | |
| The Future of Veterinary Malpractice Liability in the Care of Companion Animals | Christopher Green | 10 Animal L. 163 (2004) |
This comment investigates the factual bases of arguments from the veterinary community and of those that support increasing the malpractice liability of veterinarians. Combining law and economics theory with basic mathematics to evaluate the validity of these positions, it then suggests specific measures for legislatively addressing those parties' concerns. |
Article | |
| Table of Veterinary Reporting Requirement and Immunity Laws | Rebecca F. Wisch | Animal Legal & Historical Center |
This table lists the state laws and administrative regulations related to the reporting of animal cruelty by veterinarians. Some states have laws that require reporting by veterinary professionals, while other states make it a duty in their veterinary rules of professional responsibility. |
Topic Table | |
| Table of Veterinary Lien Laws | Rebecca F. Wisch | Animal Legal & Historical Center | This comparative table explores veterinary and possessory lien laws. A lien is a right in property to secure payment on a debt. Since animals are considered the personal property of their owners, they can be the subject of liens. Many states have laws on liens for animal care. These range from boarding liens to veterinary liens. | Topic Table | |
| Stephanski v. Wimpy | Complaint against a vet. for malpractice. Plaintiff's dog died after it was neutered. Plaintiff sought non-economic damages. | Pleading | |||
| State v. Avella | --- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 2552529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2019) | The Defendant was charged with practicing veterinary medicine without a license and for cruelty to animals. The Defendant made a homemade device attempting to treat his dog for a problem because he did not have the money to take his dog to the vet. The home treatment ended up injuring the dog and he took the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. The veterinarian stated that the dog needed to be taken to an advanced care veterinary facility, however, the Defendant could not do so due to lack of funds. The trial court dismissed the charges brought against the Defendant and the State of Florida appealed. Florida law forbids a person from practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The Defendant was not a veterinarian. The Defendant relied upon statutory exemptions in Florida’s statue that permit a person to care for his or her own animals and claims that he was just trying to help his dog, Thor. The Defendant also argued that the purpose of the statute was to prevent unlicensed veterinary care provided to the public rather than to criminalize the care an owner provides to his or her animals. The Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I for unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine given the stated purpose of the statute and the statutory exemptions. As for Count II, animal cruelty, the State argued that the Defendant’s conduct in using a homemade tool to remove bone fragments from the dog’s rectum and then failing to take the dog to an advanced care clinic fits under the Florida animal cruelty statute. Although the Defendant argued that he had no intention of inflicting pain upon his dog and was only trying to help him, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that “the statute does not require a specific intent to cause pain but punishes an intentional act that results in the excessive infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.” Ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Count II and remanded for further proceedings on the animal cruelty charge. | Case | ||
| Southall v. Gabel | 293 N.E.2d 891 (Ohio, Mun.,1972) | 33 Ohio Misc. 194 (1972) |
This action was brought by plaintiff as owner of a 3 year old thoroughbred race horse, named Pribal, against defendant, a veterinarian, charging defendant so mishandled the horse that it sustained physical injuries and emotional trauma; that the emotional stability of the horse worsened until finally it was exterminated. The court held that the evidence failed to show any proximate cause between the surgery that was performed on the horse and the subsequent care and transport of the horse by the veterinarian. As the court stated, what caused Pribal to become mean and a "killer" is speculative; the O.S.U. Veterinary Clinic records in evidence did not indicate any causal relationship between the handling of Pribal by the defendant and the subsequent personality change resulting in Pribal becoming a "killer horse." |
Case | |
| Southall v. Gabel | 277 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio App. 1971) | 28 Ohio App.2d 295 (1971) |
This case resulted from the alleged negligent transport of a horse that resulted in a drastic change in the horse's temperament (to a "killer horse"), which ultimately led to its destruction by its owner. Before trial, defendant demurred to plaintiff's petition on the ground that the action was barred under R.C. s 2305.11, the act being 'malpractice' and therefore required to be brought within one year after the termination of treatment. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's decision overruling the demurrer to plaintiff's petition was correct, 'the petitioner is based on negligence for the transporting rather than malpractice.' Further, the Court held that until the Supreme Court speaks, veterinarians are not included in the definition of malpractice (reversed and remanded - See , 293 N.E.2d 891 (Ohio, Mun.,1972). |
Case | |
| Sherman v. Kissinger | 195 P.3d 539 (Wash.,2008) | 146 Wash.App. 855 (2008) |
A dog owner sued a veterinarian and a veterinary hospital after her dog died. The Court of Appeals held that the medical malpractice act did not apply to veterinarians, and thus, did not bar claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, trespass to chattels, and breach of bailment contract; the three-part analysis in McCurdy controlled the measure of damages and the burden of proof for damages; genuine issues of material fact about the market value of the dog, whether it could be replaced, and whether owner was entitled to present evidence of the dog’s intrinsic value, precluded summary judgment limiting owner's damages; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking expert’s testimony about the loss of the human-animal bond because owner was not entitled to emotional distress damages; and defendants were not entitled to attorney fees under the small claims statute. |
Case | |
| Shera v. N.C. State University Veterinary Teaching Hosp. | 723 S.E.2d 352 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) | 2012 WL 539989 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) |
After an animal hospital caused the death of a dog due to an improperly placed feeding tube, the dog owners sued for veterinary malpractice under the Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals held that the replacement value of the dog was the appropriate measure of damages, and not the intrinsic value. Owners’ emotional bond with the dog was not compensable under North Carolina law. |
Case |