Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AR - Veterinary - Veterinary Practice Code | A.C.A. § 17-101-101 - 320 | AR ST § 17-101-101 to 320 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc. | 604 F.Supp.2d 288 (D.Mass.,2009) | 2009 WL 678744 (D.Mass.) |
The plaintiff brought this action against Defendants Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc. and Wyeth Corporation, seeking economic damages suffered from the purchase and injection of her dog with ProHeart® 6 to prevent heartworm. The complaint alleged products liability/failure to warn, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of state deceptive business practices, among others. In 2004, defendants recalled ProHeart® 6 in response to a request by FDA due to reported adverse reactions. This Court found that Massachusetts law follows the traditional “economic loss rule,” where such losses are not recoverable in in tort and strict liability actions where there has been no personal injury or property damage. Here, the plaintiff was barred from recovering because she has not alleged any personal injury or property damage under her products liability claim. Further, plaintiff failed to show that defendants' deceptive act caused some injury and compsensable loss. Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. |
Case |
| Greives v. Greenwood | 550 N.E.2d 334 (Ind.App. 4 Dist.,1990) |
Cattle breeders sued veterinarian who negligently vaccinated two cows leading to slaughter of one and quarantine of the herd was quarantined. The Court of Appeals held that breeders: (1) could not recover lost profits from unborn and future unborn calves; (2) could not recover damages for injury to business reputation; (3) could not recover for default in payment of financial obligations or collection procedures brought against them; (4) were properly allowed to present evidence as to the loss of net profits as result of cancellation of spring production sale and subsequent delay in selling animals; and (5) interest expense was not a variable cost for purposes of action. |
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| KY - Lien, veterinary - 376.470 Veterinarian's lien | KRS § 376.470 | KY ST § 376.470 | This Kentucky law states that any licensed veterinarian who performs professional services for an animal, by contract with, or by the written consent of, the owner or authorized agent shall have a lien on the animal to secure the cost of the service provided. The priority for the liens filed under this law is based upon when the first lien was filed. | Statute |
| State v. Avella | --- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 2552529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2019) | The Defendant was charged with practicing veterinary medicine without a license and for cruelty to animals. The Defendant made a homemade device attempting to treat his dog for a problem because he did not have the money to take his dog to the vet. The home treatment ended up injuring the dog and he took the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. The veterinarian stated that the dog needed to be taken to an advanced care veterinary facility, however, the Defendant could not do so due to lack of funds. The trial court dismissed the charges brought against the Defendant and the State of Florida appealed. Florida law forbids a person from practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The Defendant was not a veterinarian. The Defendant relied upon statutory exemptions in Florida’s statue that permit a person to care for his or her own animals and claims that he was just trying to help his dog, Thor. The Defendant also argued that the purpose of the statute was to prevent unlicensed veterinary care provided to the public rather than to criminalize the care an owner provides to his or her animals. The Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I for unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine given the stated purpose of the statute and the statutory exemptions. As for Count II, animal cruelty, the State argued that the Defendant’s conduct in using a homemade tool to remove bone fragments from the dog’s rectum and then failing to take the dog to an advanced care clinic fits under the Florida animal cruelty statute. Although the Defendant argued that he had no intention of inflicting pain upon his dog and was only trying to help him, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that “the statute does not require a specific intent to cause pain but punishes an intentional act that results in the excessive infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.” Ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Count II and remanded for further proceedings on the animal cruelty charge. | Case | |
| Hoaward Stein, Susan Stein, Steven Glasser, Gail Glasser, Joel Hodes, Netiva Caftori, Eric Cooper, Norman Cooper v. Dr. Todd Pri | This Illinois action brings forth the claims of four sets of plaintiffs for various claims against defendant-veterinarian. While the specific facts concerning the alleged wrongdoings are not provided, it appears that defendant was a veterinarian who operated a medical center and animal boarding facility. Plaintiffs all raise four counts against defendant (breach of contract, negligence, malpractice, and bailment) for the deaths of their dogs. From each set of facts, the various plaintiffs allege that their dogs were in good health prior to boarding their dogs at defendant’s facility, and each dog subsequently died in its cage. In the negligence and malpractice counts, the plaintiffs note that defendants failed to provide an adequate environment to ensure the dogs’ safety, failed to provide adequate ventilation, failed to sterilize the boarding area after sick animals had been housed there, and then failed to properly preserve the companion animals to ensure accurate necropsies, among other things. All plaintiffs sought both actual damages for the loss of their companions as well as damages related to their “reasonable sentimental value.” | Pleading | ||
| NH - Veterinary - Chapter 332-B. New Hampshire Veterinary Practice Act. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 332-B:1 - 332-B:20 | NH ST § 332-B:1 - 332-B:20 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| NC - Malpractice - Chapter 90. Medicine and Allied Occupations. | N.C.G.S.A. § 90-21.12 | NC ST § 90-21.12 | This North Carolina statute provides the standard of health care in actions for damages for personal injury or death arising out of medical-based malpractice. Under the statute, the plaintiff must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the health care provider’s actions fell below the standards of practice of other health care professionals similarly trained and situated in the same or similar communities. | Statute |
| Hewitt v. Palmer Veterinary Clinic, PC | 35 N.Y.3d 541, 159 N.E.3d 228 (2020) | No. 28, 134 N.Y.S.3d 312, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 05975, 2020 WL 6163313 (N.Y., Oct. 22, 2020) | This is an action for negligence and premises-liability brought by a plaintiff, who was attacked by another patron's dog in the waiting room of defendant veterinary clinic. Plaintiff alleges defendant had a duty to provide a safe waiting area, which was breached by allowing the aggressive dog to attack her. Defendants allege that it had no knowledge of the dog's prior aggressive tendencies, and moved for summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted defendants motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. The court found that a lack of notice of the dog's vicious propensities does not alleviate defendant's liability to provide a safe waiting area, and modified the lower court's granting of summary judgment. | Case |
| Hitchcock v. Conklin | 669 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) | 107 Ohio App.3d 850 (1995) |
Appellant dog owners sought review of the decision from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (Ohio), which granted the motion to dismiss filed by appellee veterinarian on the basis that the breach of contract and negligence action filed against the veterinarian was barred by the one-year statute of limitations on malpractice claims under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.11(A). On appeal, the court reversed and held that § 2305.11(A) applied only to physicians, attorneys, and other professional specifically delineated in the statute, not veterinarians. The court reversed the dismissal of the owners' breach of contract and negligence action filed against the veterinarian and remanded for further proceedings. |
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