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Titlesort ascending Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Weigel v. Maryland 950 F.Supp.2d 811 (D.Md 2013) 2013 WL 3157517 (D.Md 2013)
Following the Tracey v. Solesky opinion, a nonprofit, nonstock cooperative housing corporation issued a rule that banned pit bulls on its premises.  Members and leaseholders who owned dogs believed to be pit bulls sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the corporation and the state of Maryland in an amended complaint. Although the district court found the plaintiffs had adequately demonstrated standing and ripeness in their claims, the court also found that some of the leaseholders and members' charges were barred by 11th Amendment immunity and by absolute judicial immunity. Additionally, the district court found that the leaseholders and members' amended complaint failed to plead plausible void-for-vagueness, substantive due process and takings claims. The district court, therefore, granted the state's motion to dismiss and held all other motions pending before the court to be denied as moot.
Case
Webber v. Patton 558 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1976) 221 Kan. 79 (1976)

Veterinary costs and consequential losses are also allowed in determining damages, according this Kansas case. It should be noted that the animal at issue here was a domestic pig versus a companion animal, and the award of damages was secured by a statute that allows recovery for all damages for attacks on domestic animals by dogs.

Case
Webb v. Avon [2017] EWHC 3311 This case addressed the power of the court to make a contingent destruction order under Section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (as amended). These orders allow dangerous dogs to be released and kept under strict conditions. The court held that the 19991 Act is not clear as to the breadth of who these conditions apply to, but considered that dangerous dogs may only be released to their owners or other persons properly identified as being in charge. The case was remitted to the Crown Court for further determination. The court also addressed other aspects of the 1991 Act along with the Dangerous Dogs Exemption Schemes (England and Wales) Order 2015. Case
Watson v. State of Texas 369 S.W.3d 865 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012) 2012 WL 2401752 (Tex.Crim.App.)

Defendants were convicted of attack by dog resulting in death (Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.005(a)(1)) after a 7-year-old was killed by several of defendants' pit bull dogs. On this appeal, appellants contend that the statute fails to define the terms “attack” and “unprovoked,” and that it fails to specify what conduct is prohibited, resulting in arbitrary enforcement. Thus, jurors could have determined different definitions of the elements of the offense, violating the unanimous jury guarantees of the Texas and United States Constitutions. The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed, finding, "[t]he statute contains objective criteria for determining what conduct is prohibited and therefore does not permit arbitrary enforcement." The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Court of Appeals decision stating that the Dog Attack statute did not violate Due Process and that the defendants' convictions did not violate the unanimous jury guarantees of the Texas or the U.S. constitution.

Case
Waters v. Powell 232 P.3d 1086 (Utah Ct. App., 2010) 655 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 2010 UT App 105, 2010 WL 1710797 (Utah Ct. App.)

In this Utah case, defendant Powell took his dog to a kennel managed by plaintiff Waters to be boarded for a few days. Waters took the dog to a play area to be introduced to the other dogs where the dog bit Waters. Waters filed a complaint against Powell alleging that he was strictly liable for the injury the dog inflicted. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Waters was a "keeper" of the dog for purposes of the state's dog bite statute (sec. 18-1-1). Waters essentially conceded on appeal that if she is a keeper then she is precluded from asserting a strict liability claim against Powell. Thus, the district court's denial of summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded with instructions that Powell's summary judgment motion be granted.

Case
Ward v. Hartley 895 A.2d 1111 (Md.App., 2006) 2006 WL 902553 (Md.App.), 168 Md.App. 209

In this Maryland case, a dog bite victim filed a negligence and strict liability action against the dog owners and their landlords.  In plaintiff's appeal of the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment, the appellate court held that the landlords had no control over the premises where the "dangerous or defective condition" existed and thus had no duty to inspect.  The court found that first, no statute, principle of common law, or provision in the lease imposed upon the landlord the duty to inspect the leased premises to see if a vicious animal was being kept.  Second, there was no evidence presented that, at the time the lease was signed by the landlord, he knew, or would have had any way of knowing, that a vicious animal was to be kept on the premises.

Case
Warboys v. Proulx 303 F.Supp.2d 111 (D. Conn. 2004) 2004 WL 234395 (D. Conn. 2004)

Pitbull owner filed suit seeking compensatory damages arising from the shotting and killing of his dog by police.  Defendants removed the action based on federal question jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment, and the dog owner moved to amend the complaint.  Motions granted.

Case
Wade v. Rich 618 N.E.2d 1314 (Ill.App. 5 Dist.,1993) 249 Ill.App.3d 581 (Ill.App. 5 Dist.,1993)

Plaintiff sued dog owners for injuries from a dog attack.  The jury ruled in favor of plaintiff for medical expenses, and plaintiff sought a new trial as to damages only.  The court held that a new trial on damages was appropriate because the jury's failure to award damages for pain and suffering was against the manifest weight of evidence as defendant's liability was established by the viciousness of the dog repeatedly biting plaintiff about the head and face, which was out of proportion to the unintentional act of plaintiff falling onto the sleeping dog.  Unintentional or accidental acts can
constitute provocation, but not if the dog responds with a vicious attack, as it did here, that is out of all proportion to the unintentional acts involved.

Case
WA - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws West's RCWA 4.24.410; 9.08.010 - 90; 9A.76.200; 9.91.170 - 175; 16.10.010 - 40; 16.54.010 - 40; 16.70.010 - 60; 36.49.020 - 070; 77.12.077; 77.15.240, 245, 440; 77.32.525; 77.32.540 WA ST 4.24.410; 9.08.010 - 90; WA ST 9A.76.200; WA ST 9.91.170 - 175; 16.10.010 - 40; 16.54.010 - 40; 16.70.010 - 60; 36.49.020 - 070; 77.12.077; 77.15.240, 245, 440; 77.32.525; 77.32.540 These Washington statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include vaccination requirements, dog control zones in municipalities, dangerous dog laws, and provisions concerning hunting with dogs. Statute
WA - Dangerous Dog - 16.08.090. Dangerous dogs--Requirements for restraint West's RCWA 16.08.090 WA ST 16.08.090 This Washington statute outlines the state and local provisions related to dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs. It first provides that it is unlawful for an owner of a dangerous dog to permit the dog to be outside the proper enclosure unless the dog is muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash and under physical restraint of a responsible person. Potentially dangerous dogs shall be regulated only by local, municipal, and county ordinances and nothing in this section limits restrictions local jurisdictions may place on owners of potentially dangerous dogs. Statute

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