Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Commonwealth v. Whitson | 151 N.E.3d 455 (2020) | 97 Mass.App.Ct. 798, 2020 WL 3635941 (2020) | This case involves an appeal of an animal cruelty conviction after defendant repeatedly stabbed a dog named Smokey, a three-year old pit bull. The incident in question occurred on a street outside of defendant's barber shop. Smokey was on-leash walking with his owner when an unleashed smaller dog ran at Smokey and began biting his ankles. Smokey responded playfully, not aggressively. The defendant responded to calls of assistance from the smaller dog's owner and helped separate the dogs. After this, the defendant returned briefly to his barbershop and came back with a knife that he used to repeatedly stab Smokey with while he restrained the dog with his other arm. The police eventually responded and defendant was taken to the hospital for a laceration on his hand where he yelled, "I'm glad I killed the [expletive] dog." Smokey survived the attack and defendant was charged and convicted. On appeal, defendant raised several arguments challenging the verdict. In particular, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that he stabbed Smokey repeatedly to release the dog from biting his hand. The appellate court found that no defense witnesses testified that Smokey bit defendant and the no medical records corroborated defendant's version of events. Defendant also argued that the judged erred in denying his motion in limine regarding Smokey prior and subsequent "bad acts," which, defendant claimed, were relevant to the issue of Smokey as the initial aggressor. This court found that the proffered evidence of bad acts was inadmissible hearsay and the acts subsequent to Smokey's stabbing occurred too remotely to have any probative value. Finally, the court found no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where the judge failed to give a sua sponte necessity defense. The judgment was affirmed. | Case |
| MN - Dangerous - Minnesota Dangerous Dog Definitions, Dog Bites, & Rabies Treatments | M. S. A. § 35.67 - 35.69; M.S.A. § 346.51; M.S.A. § 347.50 | MN ST § 35.67 - 35.69; MN ST § 346.51; MN ST § 347.50 | This Minnesota set of laws outlines the procedure for a town establishing a rabies proclamation and prevents the running at large of unmuzzled dogs in such localities. It also provides that an owner or custodian of a dog which does not have an appropriate antirabies vaccination and which bites or otherwise exposes a person to rabies virus may be penalized under section 346.53.& The statute also defines "dangerous dog" and "potentially dangerous dog." | Statute |
| AR - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | A.C.A. § 20-19-101 to 408; § 2-40-110; § 15-41-113; § 15-42-303; § 5-54-126 | AR ST §§ 20-19-101 to 408; § 2-40-110; § 15-41-113; § 15-42-303; § 5-54-126 | These Arkansas statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions including licensing laws, rabies control, and mandatory sterilization laws. Also contained is the state's Wolf-Hybrid statutory section. | Statute |
| MO - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | V.A.M.S. 253.185; 270.010; 272.050; 273.010 - 405; 77.510; 80.090; 322.010 - 080; 10.112 - 113 | MO ST 253.185; 270.010; 272.050; 273.010 - 405; 77.510; 80.090; 322.010 - 080; 10.112 - 113 | These Missouri statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include laws for impounding loose dogs, licensing, rabies control, and the Animal Care Facilities Act, which regulates commercial breeders/pet shops. | Statute |
| OH - Dog - Chapter 955. Dogs (Consolidated dog laws) | RC §§ 955.01 - 99; § 9.62; § 1533.19 - 221 | This is the Ohio statute that regulates dogs in general, outlining rules and regulations for dog owners. The state leash requirement appears limited to rabies quarantines (Sec. 955.26). It also gives the definition of what is considered a dangerous or vicious dog, the rules and regulations for owners of these dogs, and penalization for breaking these rules. | Statute | |
| Rabon v. City of Seattle | 957 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1998) | 135 Wash.2d 278 (1998) |
Petitioner dog owner sought an injunction against a Seattle ordinance that allowed the city to destroy a vicious dog once the owner has been found guilty of owning a vicious dog (two lhasa apsos) . The majority held that the state statute regulating dogs did not preempt field of regulating dangerous dogs and the city ordinance did not irreconcilably conflict with state statute. Notably, Justice Sanders filed a strong dissent, pointing out that these dogs are the primary companions for the elderly petitioner. While the state law regulating dangerous dogs allows cities to regulate "potentially dangerous dogs," the Seattle ordinance in question fails to make a distinction between the two types of dogs. Justice Sanders wrote: "As Mr. Rabon notes, if the City were correct, dog owners and defense attorneys would find themselves arguing the bite was so vicious that the dog qualifies as "dangerous" in order to spare the dog's life." Thus, the ordinance "eviscerates" the dual definition and violates the overriding state law on dangerous dogs. |
Case |
| Morehead v. Deitrich | 932 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind.App.,2010) | 2010 WL 3430525 |
Postal carrier sued landlord for negligence after tenant's dog bit her. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendant, holding that landlord did not have a duty to keep dog from biting postal carrier absent control over the property. |
Case |
| CA - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | West's Ann.Cal.Food & Agric.Code § 30501 - 31683; West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 3508; 3960 - 3961; West's Ann. Cal. Gov. Code § 38792; West's Ann. Cal. Gov. Code § 25803; West's Ann. Cal. Civ. Code § 3340 - 3342.5 | These statutes represent California's dog laws. Included are provisions on county control of dogs, licensing, killing and seizure of dogs, and laws regarding dangerous or vicious dogs. | Statute | |
| Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes | 800 N.W.2d 663 (Minn.App.,2011) | 2011 WL 2982992 (Minn.App.,2011) |
The city council ordered the destruction of a dog after finding it to be a dangerous animal and the owner appealed. The Court of Appeals held that procedural due process required that the owner should have been given a meaningful opportunity to contest the declaration of the dog as a “potentially dangerous animal” before it was declared a “dangerous animal” under the city ordinance. |
Case |
| Lowry v. City of San Diego | 818 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2016) | 2016 WL 1273183 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2016) | Plaintiff in this case filed suit against the City of San Diego after she was attacked and bit by one of the police dogs. Lowry alleged that the City’s policy of training its police dogs to “bite and hold” individuals resulted in a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures. The court remanded the case back to the lower court, holding that a reasonable jury could find that the use of the police dog against Lowry was an intrusion on her Fourth Amendment rights. The court maintained that the officers had reason to believe that letting the dog into Lowry’s office “off-lead” had the potential of creating severe harm. The court also noted that Lowry was not attempting to evade or resist arrest and therefore letting the dog “off-lead” may not have been reasonable. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. | Case |