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Displaying 531 - 540 of 582
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | I.C. 15-17-6-1 - 14; 25-38.1-4-8 ; 15-20-2-1 - 7; 15-17-21-1; 6-9-39-1 - 9; 35-46-3-15; 15-20-3-1 - 4; 14-22-11-1; 14-8-2-89 | IN ST 15-17-6-1 - 14; 25-38.1-4-8 ; 15-20-2-1 - 7; 6-9-39-1 - 9; 35-46-3-15; 15-20-3-1 - 4 ; 14-22-11-1; 14-8-2-89; 15-17-21-1 | These Indiana statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Included are provisions on rabies, liability of owners for dog bites or damage to livestock, and taxation and registration laws, among others. | Statute |
| Allanson v. Toncich | 2002 WL 1897936 (Austrailia) | 2002 WASCA 216 |
Appeal uphold the judgement against the dog owner for damages, but recalculates damages upward. |
Case |
| DE - Ordinances - Local ordinances (dogs) | 7 Del.C. § 1740 - Repealed by 77 Laws 2010, ch. 428, § 5, eff. July 1, 2010 | DE ST TI 7 § 1740 | [Repealed in 20210]. This Delaware statutes provides that nothing shall prevent a local municipality from enacting measures or a program for the control of dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs. | Statute |
| Zelman v. Cosentino | 22 A.D.3d 486 (N.Y. 2005) | 803 N.Y.S.2d 652 (2005) |
A repairman was knocked over by a dog while working on a telephone line in the neighbor's yard. The repairman brought claims against the dog's owner under under theories of strict liability and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the dog's owner and the Court of Appeals affirmed. |
Case |
| Gibson v. Rezvanpour | 601 S.E.2d 848 (Ga. 2004) | 268 Ga. App. 377 (Ga. 2004) |
The prospective buyer of a home was bitten by the homeowner's dog. The prospective buyer filed a claim against the homeowners, real estate agents, real estate brokers and the real estate agency. The State Court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. |
Case |
| State v. Johnson | 628 P.2d 789 (Or. 1981) | 52 Or.App. 651 (Or. 1981) |
A defendant was convicted in district court of violating a city ordinance by keeping a vicious dog. The Court of Appeals held that the word "trespasser" in the city ordinance was to be used in its ordinary context, that a child who rode his bicycle onto the defendant's driveway was a trespasser, that there were no issues of consent involved, and that the trespasser exception applied even to areas on the defendant's property where the dog was not under the owner's control. |
Case |
| Town of Ogden v. Lavilla | 185 A.D.3d 1414, 126 N.Y.S.3d 832 (2020) | No. 19-02157, 492, N.Y. Slip Op. 04032, 2020 WL 4034223 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept., July 17, 2020) | This matter involves an appeal of an order for euthanasia of respondent's dog. The Justice Court of the Town of Ogden found respondent's dog to be dangerous under Agriculture and Markets Law § 123 and ordered the dog to be euthanized. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department agreed with respondent that the lower court misapprehended and misapplied the law. The court found the power to apply the most drastic measure (euthanasia) under Section 123 is reserved for aggravating circumstances, namely a serious disfigurement. The court noted that emotional trauma is not a factor in determining whether a victim has been disfigured. In addition, the language of the law is permissive, not mandatory; even with aggravating circumstances, a court may direct other measures to keep the dog contained. The court noted that the lower court repeatedly misstated the law, saying it only had two options, euthanasia or permanent confinement. As a result, this court modified the by vacating that part affirming the order of the Justice Court insofar as it directed that respondent's dog be euthanized, and remitting to the Justice Court for a determination whether petitioner established the existence of an aggravating circumstance and for the imposition of remedial measures as permitted by statute. | Case |
| ID - Dangerous - § 25-2806. Liability for livestock and poultry killed by dogs | I.C. § 25-2806 | ID ST § 25-2806 | This Idaho statute provides that any owner whose dog that kills, worries, or wounds any livestock and poultry is liable to the owner of the same for the damages and costs of suit, to be recovered before any court of competent jurisdiction. Further, any person, on finding any dog, not on the premises of its owner or possessor, worrying, wounding, or killing any livestock or poultry may, at the time of so finding said dog, kill the same, without liability for damages. | Statute |
| White v Diocese of Buffalo, N.Y | 138 A.D.3d 1470 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | 2016 WL 1710974 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | Plaintiff, Rosemary White brought action against the Defendant, Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she was bitten by a priests’ dog, at premises owned by the church. White brought the action claiming negligent supervision and retention of the priest who owned dog. The church moved to dismiss, and White moved for summary judgment. The New York Supreme Court, Erie County, granted the church's motion for dismissal, and denied White’s motion. White appealed and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the church was not liable for negligent supervision or retention of the priest. The Appellate Division, reasoned that the Supreme Court, Erie County, properly granted the church’s motion to dismiss White’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The Court stated that to the extent White alleged a theory of negligent supervision and retention of the priest in her bill of particulars, the “purpose of the bill of particulars is to amplify the pleadings . . . , and [it] may not be used to supply allegations essential to a cause of action that was not pleaded in the complaint.” Therefore, the order from the Supreme Court was affirmed. | Case |
| NV - Dangerous Dog - Chapter 202. Crimes Against Public Health and Safety. | N. R. S. 202.500 | NV ST 202.500 | This Nevada statute defines a "dangerous dog," as a dog, that without provocation, on two separate occasions within 18 months, behaved menacingly to a degree that would lead a reasonable person to defend him or herself against substantial bodily harm, when the dog is either off the premises of its owner or keeper or not confined in a cage or pen. A dog then becomes "vicious" when, without being provoked, it killed or inflicted substantial bodily harm upon a human being. If substantial bodily harm results from an attack by a dog known to be vicious, its owner or keeper is guilty of a category D felony. Under the statute, a dog may not be declared dangerous if it attacks as a defensive act against a person who was committing or attempting to commit a crime or who provoked the dog. | Statute |