Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rowlette v. Paul | 466 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. 1995) | 219 Ga.App. 597 (Ga. 1995) | This Georgia case involved a dog bite to a person who went to went to the Pauls' house in order to verify and update information for the Oglethorpe County Tax Assessor's Office. The court held that in the absence of any evidence showing that the owners of a dog had knowledge, prior to a mauling incident, that their dog had ever bitten another human being, the owners of the dog were not liable to the victim even though the dog's presence on the premises where the incident occurred was in violation of the county leash law. In order to support an action for damages under OCGA § 51-2-7, it is necessary to show that the dog was vicious or dangerous and that the owner had knowledge of this fact. | Case |
| State v. Hanson | 89 P.3d 544 (Kansas, 2004) | 2004 WL 1077319 (Kansas), 277 Kan. 855 (2004) |
Defendant's dogs were released by owner, resulting in their attack of a neighbor's dog and its subsequent death. On appeal, the conviction was reversed for failure to show owner had knowledge of vicious propensity. |
Case |
| Coballes v. Spokane County | 274 P.3d 1102 (Wash.App. Div. 3) | 2012 WL 1448220 (Wash.App. Div. 3); 167 Wash.App. 857 (2012) |
In this case, the Washington Court of Appeals determined the appellant had a statutory right to appeal a county board’s dangerous dog declaration because the board had acted within its ordinary and usual duties. The availability of the right to appeal, however, foreclosed a statutory and constitutional writ of review/writ of certiorari. Furthermore, given the court’s finding that a prior proceeding constituted an appeal as of right, the appellant’s dangerous dog declaration could only be appealed under a discretionary review. The court therefore granted the appellant leave to file a motion for discretionary review. |
Case |
| Folkers v. City of Waterloo, Iowa | 582 F.Supp.2d 1141 (N.D.Iowa,2008) | 2008 WL 4703392 |
Plaintiff brought civil rights action against the City of Waterloo, Iowa (City) alleging procedural and substantive due process violations after Animal Control Officers seized Plaintiff’s dog and detained the dog for one hundred days while an appeal was pending. On Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, the United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division, found that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause did not apply to Plaintiff’s claim, the Animal Control Officers were acting under color of state law, and that the one hundred day detention of Plaintiff’s dog was a meaningful interference with Plaintiff’s possessory interest in his dog. The Court also found that Plaintiff’s right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment was satisfied by the post-deprivation hearing provided Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s claim that the decision to detain Plaintiff’s dog was unreasonable or arbitrary, implicated the “unreasonable seizure” provisions of the Fourth Amendment, rather than the substantive due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that even if the substantive due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment were otherwise applicable, Plaintiff would not have been entitled to relief under the substantive due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
Case |
| Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch, L.L.C. v. Lange | 326 S.W.3d 549 (Mo.App. E.D., 2010) | 2010 WL 4751676 (Mo.App. E.D.) |
A Missouri statute places liability on a dog owner where such dog kills or maims a sheep or "other domestic animal" of another. On December 10, 2006, three dogs of Defendant Glendon Lange entered Oak Creek’s deer breeding farm and killed 21 of Oak Creek's "breeder deer." The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, disagreed with the trial court, finding that "domestic" should have been interpreted by the "plain meaning" of the word, which therefore includes Oak Creek’s breeder deer. |
Case |
| KS - Leawood - Breed - Pit Bull Ordinance §§ 2-101, 2-109 - 2-110 | LEAWOOD, KS., CITY CODE §§ 2-101, 2-109 - 2-110 (2000) |
In Leawood, Kansas, it is unlawful to own, keep or harbor any dangerous animal (including pit bulls), with exceptions made for holders of a special permit. Entities such as zoos, circuses, veterinary hospitals, etc, may obtain a permit for display or exhibition purposes, but no person may keep any dangerous animal as a pet. Any dangerous animal not in compliance may be seized and impounded, or even killed. The owner will be responsible for any expenses incurred, in addition to any fine that might be imposed for violating the ordinance. |
Local Ordinance | |
| CITY OF TOLEDO, Appellant, v. Paul TELLINGS, Appellee |
This Reply Brief of Appellant City of Toledo was filed for the Supreme Court case of Toledo v. Tellings (871 N.E.2d 1152 (2007)). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, finding that the state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls. |
Pleading | ||
| CA - Rabies - Chapter 1. Rabies Control. | West's Ann. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 121575 - 121710 | CA HLTH & S § 121575 - § 121710 | This chapter of California laws deals with rabies control. | Statute |
| Wyno v. Lowndes County | 331 Ga. App. 541, 771 S.E.2d 207 (2015), cert. denied (June 15, 2015) | 2015 WL 1318263 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) | Victim was attacked and killed by her neighbor's dog. Victim's husband, acting individually and as administrator of his wife's estate, brought action against dog owners and several government defendants, whom he alleged failed to respond to earlier complaints about the dog. The trial court dismissed the action against the government for failure to state a claim, concluding that sovereign and official immunity or, alternatively, the Responsible Dog Ownership Law (OCGA § 4–8–30), barred action against the government defendants. Husband appealed. The appeals court held the trial court did not err in dismissing the action against the county and its employees in their official capacities. The former version of OCGA § 4–8–30, effective at the time of the attack, provided immunity to local governments and their employees from liability for all injuries inflicted by dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs. The appeals court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the action against the employees in their individual capacities based on official immunity, however. By applying the former OCGA § 4–8–30 (2012) to dismiss the action against the employees in their individual capacities, the trial court implicitly rejected the husband’s constitutional challenge to the statute. Judgment was therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court to enter a ruling specifically and directly passing on the husband’s constitutional challenge. | Case |
| Katsaris v. Cook | 225 Cal.Rptr. 531 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., 1986) |
Plaintiff's neighbor, a livestock rancher, shot plaintiff's sheepdogs after they escaped and trespassed on his property. As a matter of first impression, the court construed the California Food and Agricultural Code provision that allows one to kill a dog that enters an enclosed or unenclosed livestock confinement area with threat of civil or criminal penalty. The court affirmed defendant's motion with regard to the code provision, finding it gave them a privilege to kill the trespassing dogs. Further, the court found defendants owed no duty to plaintiff thereby denying the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of negligence in supervising the ranchhand who killed the dogs. With regard to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, plaintiffs cite the manner in which the dogs were killed and then dumped in a ditch and the fact defendant denied knowing the fate of the dogs. Relying on the "extreme and outrageous conduct" test, the court held that the defendant's conduct did not fall within the statutory privilege and remanded the issue to the trial court for consideration. |
Case |