Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CT - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | C. G. S. A. § 14-226; § 22-327 - 367a; § 26-39; § 26-49; § 26-51; § 26-107 | CT ST § 14-226; § 22-327 - § 22-367a; CT ST § 26-39; § 26-49; § 26-51; § 26-107 |
These Connecticut statutes comprise the state's dog law. Among the provisions include licensing, kennel, and rabies regulations. With regard to damage by dogs, the law provides a form of strict liability that states if any dog does any damage to either the body or property of any person, the owner or keeper shall be liable for such damage, except when such damage has been occasioned to the body or property of a person who, at the time such damage was sustained, was committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog. The law also contains a unique "dogs on highway" provision that provides that any person owning or having the custody of any dog which habitually goes out on any highway and growls, bites, or snaps at, or otherwise annoys, any person or domestic animal lawfully using such highway or chases or interferes with any motor vehicle so using such highway, shall be guilty of a class D misdemeanor. Further, among the nuisance provisions, the law states that no person shall own or harbor a dog which is a nuisance by reason of vicious disposition or excessive barking or other disturbance. These laws also contain provisions on reporting neglected or cruelly treated animals. Finally, Connecticut has an anti-ear cropping measures that prohibits cropping by anyone who is not a registered veterinary surgeon, and who performs the operation when the dog is under an anesthetic. |
Statute |
| Pete Mansour v. King County, a municipal corporation; King County Animal Control; King County Licensing and Regulatory Services | In this Washington case, Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals reversed a King County Animal Control decision declaring a dog vicious and ordering her removed from the county. This decision overrides the practice of a dog being presumed guilty until proven innocent in that county. The court found that for Mansour or any other pet owner to prove effectively present his or her case and rebut the evidence against him or her, due process requires that he or she be able to subpoena witnesses and present records. Mr. Mansour was prejudiced in his case because he was not allowed to do so and was not given sufficient notice for the hearing. | Pleading | ||
| Franciscus v. Sevdik | 2016 PA Super 52 (Feb. 29, 2016) | 2016 WL 787905 | Five-year-old Femina asked the dog walker, Ms. Dailey, if she could pet Julius, the pit bull. When she bent over to do so, the dog jumped up and bit her on the chin. The Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Franciscus commenced this negligence action to recover damages for injuries sustained by their daughter, Femina. They filed the action against Mr. Sevdik, the owner of the dog, Ms. Dailey, the dog walker, and Mr. Steigerwald, the individual owner and operator of Fetch Pet Care of West Hills/South Hills. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of Ms. Dailey and Fetch Pet Care was improper. The Court reasoned that the dog was entrusted to these Defendants by Mr. Sevdik and the dog was in their control when the injury occurred. Since the Defendants knew the dog jumped on people, was to be muzzled when walked, and was not to be walked along routes where there were people, specifically children and other dogs, they had a duty to use reasonable care to protect others from harm while the dog was in their control. While the court stated it did not need to reach the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing refusing to take judicial notice of dangerous propensities of pit bulls, it noted that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a presumption that pit bulls as a breed are dangerous or have dangerous propensities. The order was vacated and the case was remanded. | Case |
| AR - Ordinances - § 14-54-1102. Dogs running astray. | A.C.A. § 14-54-1102 | AR ST § 14-54-1102 | This Arkansas statute provides that municipal corporations have the power to prevent the running at large of dogs and the injuries and annoyances associated with them. Further, this statute allows municipalities to authorize the destruction or impoundment of dogs if found in violation of ordinance. However, prior to destroying the dog, the municipality shall give the dog's owner at least five (5) days' notice of the date of the proposed destruction of the dog by certified mail if the dog carries the owner's address. | Statute |
| Williams v. Galofaro | 79 So.3d 1068 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/9/11) | 2011-0487 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/9/11); 2011 WL 5402984 (La.App. 1 Cir.) |
Housekeeper tripped over the family dog, sustaining injuries. She and her husband sued homeowners and their insurer for damages. The Court of Appeal found for defendants, holding that the dog did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm because plaintiffs did not show that the risk of injury resulting from puppy-like behavior multiplied by the gravity of the harm threatened outweighed the utility of keeping the dog as a pet. |
Case |
| KY - Dog Laws (also includes cats & ferrets) - Kentucky Consolidated Dog Laws (License, Impound, Bite, etc.) | KRS § 39F.040; KRS § 258.005 - 991; 150.390 | KY ST § 258.005 - 991; 150.390 | These Kentucky statutes comprise the state's Dog Laws, which were amended significantly in 2005. Included are all vaccination, licensing, animal control provisions, and the relevant dog bite statutes. Under Section 258.235, any person may kill or seize any dog which he sees in the act of pursuing or wounding any livestock, or wounding or killing poultry, or attacking human beings, whether or not such dog bears the license tag required by the provisions of this chapter. There shall be no liability on such person in damages or otherwise for killing, injuring from an attempt to kill, or for seizing the dog. That same section also comprises the state's new strict liability law for dog bites. Under Sec. 235(4), any owner whose dog is found to have caused damage to a person, livestock, or other property shall be responsible for that damage. | Statute |
| Webb v. Avon | [2017] EWHC 3311 | This case addressed the power of the court to make a contingent destruction order under Section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (as amended). These orders allow dangerous dogs to be released and kept under strict conditions. The court held that the 19991 Act is not clear as to the breadth of who these conditions apply to, but considered that dangerous dogs may only be released to their owners or other persons properly identified as being in charge. The case was remitted to the Crown Court for further determination. The court also addressed other aspects of the 1991 Act along with the Dangerous Dogs Exemption Schemes (England and Wales) Order 2015. | Case | |
| Dillon v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Correction | 211 N.E.3d 746 (Ohio App. 10 Dist., 2023) | 2023-Ohio-942 | Plaintiff-Appellant, Anna Dillon, a certified “senior dog handler” through a rehabilitation program for inmates in Ohio, was attacked by a dog named Roosevelt, a German Shepherd/Husky mix owned by an Ohio Reformatory for Woman (ORW) corrections officer. Dillon had previously interacted with Roosevelt without incident on multiple occasions, but in March 2018, Roosevelt attacked her, causing 16 puncture wounds. On March 19, 2018, while attempting to put on Roosevelt's leash and collar, he displayed signs of anxiety and suddenly attacked Ms. Dillon, biting her multiple times. After the incident, Roosevelt was removed from the program. In August 2018, Ms. Dillon requested records pertaining to Roosevelt but was unable to obtain his handler folder. The dog’s handler folder included the dog’s training history, breed, eating habits, type of collar, preferences, personality, demeanor, and incidents of aggression, and was retained by the handler assigned to that dog. Ms. Dillon filed a civil action against ODRC in 2020, alleging negligence and spoliation of evidence. The trial court found in favor of ODRC in a decision issued in September 2021. Ms. Dillon appealed that decision, asserting several assignments of error. In her first and second assignments of error, Ms. Dillon argues that the trial court's findings in favor of ODRC on her negligence claim were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court evaluated whether there was sufficient evidence to support the determination that Roosevelt was not a vicious dog prior to the incident. The court referred to Ohio's statutory definition of a vicious dog, which states that it is a dog that has killed or caused serious injury to a person without provocation. The court found that none of Roosevelt's previous behaviors, such as mouthing, baring teeth, or lunging, met the definition of serious injury as defined by the statute. The trial court concludes that Ms. Dillon failed to prove that Roosevelt met either standard before the incident. The court noted that no evidence or testimony showed that Roosevelt had attacked or seriously injured anyone before March 2018 and Ms. Dillon's reliance on the case of Pickett, which dealt with a traditional negligence claim - a claim that she had abandoned in this case - was not relevant. In her second assignment of error, Ms. Dillon challenged the trial court's finding regarding the negligent keeping of Roosevelt, but since the first assignment of error has been resolved, the second assignment is also overruled. The trial court did not make any findings regarding ODRC's knowledge or negligent keeping of Roosevelt because it found him not to be a vicious dog. As to the spoliation of evidence claim, Ms. Dillon alleged that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) willfully destroyed evidence, specifically the handler folder of a dog named Roosevelt, to disrupt her case. The court outlined the elements of intentional spoliation of evidence, which include pending litigation, knowledge of litigation by the defendant, willful destruction of evidence, disruption of the plaintiff's case, and damages caused by the defendant's actions. The court found that Ms. Dillon failed to prove the willful destruction of the handler folder or that her case was disrupted by its disposal. It was determined that the inmate-secretaries involved in the program managed the handler folders, and there was no evidence that ODRC employees reviewed or accessed them. A failure to follow records retention schedules is separate from a spoliation claim. The court concluded that the plaintiff did not provide evidence to support her claim of willful destruction or disruption of her case and that the trial court's findings were supported by credible evidence. The judgment was affirmed. | Case |
| Crisman v. Hallows | 999 P.2d 1249 (Utah App.,2000) | 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2000 UT App 104 (2000) |
Plaintiff dog owners appeal the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant Ted Hallows. Hallows. a Division of Wildlife Resources employee, shot the dogs after they got loose from plaintiffs' backyard. While the factual accounts of the shooting differed, Hallows asserted that he shot the dogs within the scope of his employment and was therefore protected under the Governmental Immunity Act. On appeal, the court first found that plaintiffs may maintain an action against Hallows for conduct outside the scope of his employment and this claim was not barred by their admitted failure to comply with the Immunity Act's notice of claim and statute of limitations requirements. Further, as to plaintiffs' claims that Hallows was not acting within his scope of employment when the shooting occurred, there was sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. |
Case |
| FL - Miami-Dade County - Chapter 5 - ANIMALS AND FOWL. | Sec. 5-1 - 5-25 |
This comprises Miami-Dade County, Florida's animal-related ordinances. Among the ordinances of note include a voluntary registration program for cats, minimum standards of care for kennels and pet dealers, and requirements for the humane trapping of dogs and cats. Most importantly, the county has a controversial breed specific ban on pit bull dogs that has been in place since 1990. Veterinary offices, kennels, commercial breeders, commercial animal establishments, pet shops, and dog grooming businesses are required to post conspicuous signs that inform residents of the ban. |
Local Ordinance |