Results
Displaying 31 - 40 of 69
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MT - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 30. Protection of Farm Animals and Research Facilities | MCA 81-30-101 to 81-30- 105 | MT ST 81-30-101 to 81-30- 105 | This chapter comprises Montana's Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act." Unlawful acts include exercising control over a facility without consent, damaging or destroying the property of an animal facility, entering an animal facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act, entering an animal facility to take pictures by photograph, video camera, or other means with the intent to commit criminal defamation, and entering an animal facility if the person knows entry is forbidden. A person who has been damaged by reason of a violation of 81-30-103 may bring against the person who caused the damage an action in the district court to recover an amount equal to three times all actual and consequential damages; and court costs and reasonable attorney fees. | Statute |
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Vaught | 8 F.4th 714 (8th Cir. 2021) | Several animal advocacy organizations filed a complaint against the Vaughts and Peco Foods, Inc. seeking an order that would prevent defendants from bringing a civil suit under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-113 (colloquially known as Arkansas' "ag gag" law). The statute at issue provides a civil cause of action for unauthorized access to protected properties described under the law. Plaintiffs claim that the statute violates their right to free speech under the First Amendment by chilling them from engaging in activities protected under the First Amendment. In particular, the plaintiffs have "specific and definite plans" to investigate the defendants' chicken slaughterhouses and pig farms by sending undercover investigators to seek employment with defendants and collect information in an effort to support their mission to "reform[] animal agriculture." The district court found that plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing to sue, finding that the injury at hand was too speculative. On appeal here, the court noted found that plaintiffs established the three primary elements of standing from the Lujan case ("(1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that a favorable decision will likely redress the injury."). First, but for the statute, plaintiffs allege that they would engage in the protected constitutional conduct. Second, the plaintiffs adequately outlined their intention to engage in a course of conduct that is proscribed by the statute. Finally, the court found a credible threat of enforcement that was objectively reasonable. This is bolstered by the fact plaintiffs have successfully engaged in the conduct at other facilities in the past. While defendants contend that there is no credible threat that they would enforce the statute because these organizations would not find entry to their facilities worthwhile. However, plaintiffs presented allegations that indeed they would be interested in documenting the plaintiffs' operations because of the conditions of pigs in "nearly immovable quarters" and the use of controversial methods of slaughter. The court was equally unpersuaded by defendants' claims that there is no injury in fact since plaintiffs are not poised to publish any information gathered from their facilities. Additionally, plaintiffs sent letters to defendants asking them to waive their rights to sue and neither defendant responded. Thus, the complaint sufficiently established a case or controversy. The lower court judgment was reversed and the case was remanded. | Case | |
| Ouderkirk v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. | 2007 WL 1035093 (E.D.Mich.) (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 1035093 (E.D.Mich.)) | Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. |
The plaintiffs in this case own a chinchilla ranch in mid-Michigan. They filed a complaint alleging that PETA lied to them to gain access to their farm, took video footage of their farm operation, and then published an exposé on PETA's website that put the plaintiffs in an unfavorable false light. The court ultimately granted defendant-PETA's motion for summary judgment on all the issues. The court observed that the Ouderkirks gave permission for the taping in an email that makes no reference to any restriction on that consent. Further, the primary use made of the plaintiffs' likenesses by the defendant was to advocate against the chinchilla trade; thus, PETA had a right under the First Amendment to disseminate the information containing the plaintiffs' likenesses. |
Case |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert | This complaint launches the first legal challenge to any ag-gag law in the United States. In it, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Amy Meyer, and others argue that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-112 is unconstitutionally overbroad, constitutes content-based discrimination in violation of the First Amendment, is preempted by the federal False Claims Act, and violates animal protection groups’ equal protection and due process. | Pleading | ||
| ND - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 12.1-21.1. Animal Research Facility Damage | NDCC 12.1-21.1-01 to 05 | ND ST 12.1-21.1-01 to 05 | This chapter concerns unlawful interference with animal facilities. Under the section, a person may not intentionally damage or destroy an animal facility or the property or animals located therein; exercise control over the animals or property; enter an animal facility not open to the public with the intent on committing prohibited acts; enter a facility and remain concealed to commit prohibited acts; or intentionally release an animal at a facility. Violation is a class B felony if damage is $10,000 or more, a class C felony if the damage is at least $500 to under $10,000, and a class A misdemeanor if damage is less than $500. Entering an animal facility and using or attempting to use a camera, video recorder, or any other video or audio recording equipment is a class B misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds | 591 F. Supp. 3d 397 (S.D. Iowa 2022), rev'd and remanded, 89 F.4th 1065 (8th Cir. 2024) | 2022 WL 777231 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 14, 2022) | Plaintiffs, five non-profit organizations dedicated to animal protection, food safety, and other advocacy issues, filed suit challenging Iowa Code § 717.3B, which they contend infringes on their constitutional rights. Specifically, these organizations contend that Iowa's new "ag-gag" law criminalizes their actions in gathering information through undercover investigations at animal production facilities. These organizations must misrepresent or conceal their identities to gather gather evidence of animal abuse and other alleged illegal conduct in day-to-day activities at facilities where they suspect wrongdoing occurs. Iowa Code § 717A.3B is the second in a series of laws passed by the Iowa legislature aimed at criminalizing undercover investigations such as the ones conducted by Plaintiffs. The previous law was challenged by these same plaintiffs and a permanent injunction was passed by the United States District Court. The defendants challenged the injunction in the Eighth Circuit, but before that was decided, the Iowa legislature passed the new section (§ 717A.3B). Here, both parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs contend that the new law violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because it discriminates based on content and viewpoint and cannot survive strict scrutiny. Defendants argue that the law does not regulate protected speech under the First Amendment or, if it does regulate protected speech, it is content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral and passes intermediate scrutiny. The court first noted that the issue with § 717A.3B, and other laws aimed at prohibiting trespassers at agricultural facilities, is the law seeks to single out specific individuals for punishment based on their viewpoint regarding such facilities. This law operates in a viewpoint discriminatory fashion because it prohibits the deceptive trespasser who gains access or obtain employment at an agricultural facility with the intent to cause “economic harm ... to the agricultural production facility's ... business interest" as opposed to trespassers with an intent to benefit the facility. Thus, Section 717A.3B does not focus solely on the right to exclude, the legally cognizable harm of trespass, but only on the right to exclude those with particular viewpoints. While the court noted that a state legislature may determine whether specific facilities—such as agricultural facilities, nuclear power plants, military bases, or other sensitive buildings—are entitled to special legal protections, the First Amendment does not allow those protections to be based on a violator's viewpoint. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and Defendant's was denied. | Case |
| State v. Borowski | 231 Or.App. 511 (2009) | 220 P.3d 100 (Or.,2009) |
Defendants were convicted of interfering with agricultural operations under the anti-picketing provision of a criminal statute. The Court of Appeals held that the anti-picketing provision was not facially over-broad under the free speech or free assembly provision of State Constitution. The provision, which imposed criminal penalties on people engaged in picketing but created an exception for those involved in a labor protest, did not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the State Constitution, but it did violate equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution. The statutory presumption of severability did not apply in this case. |
Case |
| MD - Ecoterrorism - Title 6. Crimes Against Property. | MD Code, Criminal Law, § 6-208 | MD CRIM LAW § 6-208 | This law reflects Maryland's "ecoterrorism"/animal research interference law. A person may not break and enter a research facility without the permission of the research facility with the intent to: obtain unauthorized control over research property; alter or eradicate research property; damage or deface research property; move research property in a manner intended to cause harm to it; destroy or remove research property; or engage in conduct that results in the removal of research property. Violation of the law is a felony with imprisonment of up to 5 years or a fine of up to $5,000, or both. | Statute |
| MS - Ecoterrorism - Animal Research or Exhibiting Facilities Protection Act | Miss. Code Ann. § 69-29-301 to 69-29-315 | MS ST § 69-29-301 to 69-29-315 | This section comprises Mississippi's Animal Research or Exhibiting Facilities Protection Act. The act prohibits a person, without the effective consent of the owner, to acquire or otherwise exercise control over an animal facility with the intent to deprive the owner of the facility, animal or property and to disrupt or damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility. A person is also prohibited from entering and remaining concealed at a facility with the intent to damage or disrupt the facility. Violation for damaging a facility is a fine of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment for up to 3 years. Violation for illegal entry with an intent to damage or disrupt the facility results in a fine of up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment up to 1 year. | Statute |
| NC - Ecoterrorism - § 99A-1. Recovery of Damages for Exceeding the Scope of Authorized Access to Property | N.C.G.S.A. § 99A-1, 2 | NC ST § 99A-1, 2 | This law is known as North Carolina’s Property Protection Act and is what many consider to be a new variation of ag-gag law. § 99A-2 imposes a civil punishment for “exceeding the scope of authorized access to property.” A person exceeds access to authority by intentionally gaining access to the non-public areas of another’s premises and removing (and subsequently distributing) documents, recording images or sounds, placing a camera on the premises, conspiring in organized retail theft, or interfering with property. The punishment for violation of the Property Protection Act can result in equitable relief, compensatory damages, costs and fees, and exemplary damages of $5,000 per day that a defendant has acted in violation. The law is effective January 1, 2016. | Statute |