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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
PA - Ecoterrorism - § 3311. Ecoterrorism 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309 - 3311; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8319 PS ST 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309 - 3311; PS ST 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8319 This collective set of laws comprises Pennsylvania's ecoterrorim and agroterrorism provisions. The state has an agricultural vandalism law (misdemeanor or felony, depending on pecuniary loss) and law prohibiting the destruction of agricultural crops (felony). A person is guilty of ecoterrorism if the person commits a specified offense against property by: intimidating or coercing a person participating in an activity involving animals, plants, or natural resources; or preventing or obstructing a person involved in such an activity. The law has a provision that states a person who is on public property, or on private property with permission, and is peaceable exercising his or her constitutional rights is immune from prosecution and from civil liability under Pa.C.S. Sec. 8319. Statute
ID - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 70. Trespass and Malicious Injuries to Property. I.C. § 18-7015, 7037, 7040, 7041, 7042 ID ST § 18-7015, 7037, 7040, 7041, 7042 These laws comprise Idaho's animal enterprise interference/"ecoterrorism" laws. The state has a provision specific to trespass into enclosures for fur-bearing animals such as foxes. Additionally, § 18-7037 prohibits the unauthorized release of an animal, a bird, or an aquatic species which has been lawfully confined for agriculture, science, research, commerce, public propagation, protective custody, or education. This offense is a misdemeanor and the actor is liable for restitution that includes replacement costs, property damage, and even costs of repeating an experiment. Section § 18-7040 defines the crime of interference with agricultural research where a person knowingly damages property, obtains property with the intent of hinder the research; obtains access to the facility by misrepresentation to perform acts to damage or hinder the research; enters the facility with the intent to damage, alter, or duplicate data or records; or the release of an animal or injury to an animal at the facility. Violation is a felony with punishment of up to 20 years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $10,000. The state also has a separate section on damage to aquaculture operations. Statute
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Vaught 8 F.4th 714 (8th Cir. 2021) Several animal advocacy organizations filed a complaint against the Vaughts and Peco Foods, Inc. seeking an order that would prevent defendants from bringing a civil suit under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-113 (colloquially known as Arkansas' "ag gag" law). The statute at issue provides a civil cause of action for unauthorized access to protected properties described under the law. Plaintiffs claim that the statute violates their right to free speech under the First Amendment by chilling them from engaging in activities protected under the First Amendment. In particular, the plaintiffs have "specific and definite plans" to investigate the defendants' chicken slaughterhouses and pig farms by sending undercover investigators to seek employment with defendants and collect information in an effort to support their mission to "reform[] animal agriculture." The district court found that plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing to sue, finding that the injury at hand was too speculative. On appeal here, the court noted found that plaintiffs established the three primary elements of standing from the Lujan case ("(1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that a favorable decision will likely redress the injury."). First, but for the statute, plaintiffs allege that they would engage in the protected constitutional conduct. Second, the plaintiffs adequately outlined their intention to engage in a course of conduct that is proscribed by the statute. Finally, the court found a credible threat of enforcement that was objectively reasonable. This is bolstered by the fact plaintiffs have successfully engaged in the conduct at other facilities in the past. While defendants contend that there is no credible threat that they would enforce the statute because these organizations would not find entry to their facilities worthwhile. However, plaintiffs presented allegations that indeed they would be interested in documenting the plaintiffs' operations because of the conditions of pigs in "nearly immovable quarters" and the use of controversial methods of slaughter. The court was equally unpersuaded by defendants' claims that there is no injury in fact since plaintiffs are not poised to publish any information gathered from their facilities. Additionally, plaintiffs sent letters to defendants asking them to waive their rights to sue and neither defendant responded. Thus, the complaint sufficiently established a case or controversy. The lower court judgment was reversed and the case was remanded. Case
TN - Ecoterrorism - Part 8. Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection T. C. A. § 39-14-801 - 806 TN ST § 39-14-801 - 806 This chapter comprises the Tennessee Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act. A person commits an offense if, without consent, the person exercises control over an animal facility, an animal from an animal facility, or other property from an animal facility with the intent to deprive the owner of the facility, animal, or property and to disrupt the enterprise conducted at the animal facility. Other offenses include destruction of property, including freeing of animals located there, or entering an animal facility with the intent to disrupt or damage the enterprise or its property. A violation is a Class C felony if the person exercises control over the facility or the damage is $500 or more. A violation is a Class B misdemeanor if the damage is less than $500 or the person illegally enters the facility with intent to damage it. Any person who has been damaged by reason of a violation of this part may recover all actual and consequential damages, punitive damages, and court costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, from the person causing the damage. Statute
IL - Ecoterrorism - 5/48-2. Animal research and production facilities protection 720 I.L.C.S. 5/48-2 IL ST CH 720 § 5/48-2 This new law replaces the Illinois' Animal Research and Production Facilities Protection Act, which was repealed in 2013. Under the new law, it is unlawful for any person to release, steal, or injure an animal held at a facility; to damage or vandalize any property; to obtain access to an animal facility by false pretenses for the purpose of performing unauthorized acts; to enter into an animal facility with an intent to destroy, alter, duplicate, or obtain unauthorized possession of records; or to enter or remain on an animal facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act. Violation of any of these acts is a felony, with classification based on the amount of property damage. Statute
NH - Ecoterrorism - 644:8-e Willful Interference With Organizations or Projects Involving Animals N.H. Rev. Stat. § 644:8-e NH ST § 644:8-e This law is New Hampshire's eco/agroterrorism law. The law states that whoever willfully causes bodily injury or willfully interferes with any property, including animals or records, used by any organization or project involving animals, or with any animal facility shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Whoever in the course of a violation of paragraph I causes serious bodily injury to another individual or economic loss in excess of $10,000 shall be guilty of a class B felony. Statute
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds 591 F. Supp. 3d 397 (S.D. Iowa 2022), rev'd and remanded, 89 F.4th 1065 (8th Cir. 2024) 2022 WL 777231 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 14, 2022) Plaintiffs, five non-profit organizations dedicated to animal protection, food safety, and other advocacy issues, filed suit challenging Iowa Code § 717.3B, which they contend infringes on their constitutional rights. Specifically, these organizations contend that Iowa's new "ag-gag" law criminalizes their actions in gathering information through undercover investigations at animal production facilities. These organizations must misrepresent or conceal their identities to gather gather evidence of animal abuse and other alleged illegal conduct in day-to-day activities at facilities where they suspect wrongdoing occurs. Iowa Code § 717A.3B is the second in a series of laws passed by the Iowa legislature aimed at criminalizing undercover investigations such as the ones conducted by Plaintiffs. The previous law was challenged by these same plaintiffs and a permanent injunction was passed by the United States District Court. The defendants challenged the injunction in the Eighth Circuit, but before that was decided, the Iowa legislature passed the new section (§ 717A.3B). Here, both parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs contend that the new law violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because it discriminates based on content and viewpoint and cannot survive strict scrutiny. Defendants argue that the law does not regulate protected speech under the First Amendment or, if it does regulate protected speech, it is content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral and passes intermediate scrutiny. The court first noted that the issue with § 717A.3B, and other laws aimed at prohibiting trespassers at agricultural facilities, is the law seeks to single out specific individuals for punishment based on their viewpoint regarding such facilities. This law operates in a viewpoint discriminatory fashion because it prohibits the deceptive trespasser who gains access or obtain employment at an agricultural facility with the intent to cause “economic harm ... to the agricultural production facility's ... business interest" as opposed to trespassers with an intent to benefit the facility. Thus, Section 717A.3B does not focus solely on the right to exclude, the legally cognizable harm of trespass, but only on the right to exclude those with particular viewpoints. While the court noted that a state legislature may determine whether specific facilities—such as agricultural facilities, nuclear power plants, military bases, or other sensitive buildings—are entitled to special legal protections, the First Amendment does not allow those protections to be based on a violator's viewpoint. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and Defendant's was denied. Case
UT - Ecoterrorism - § 76-6-110. Offenses committed against animal enterprises--Definitions--Enhanced penalties U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-203.16 (Formerly cited as UT ST § 76-6-110) UT ST § 76-3-203.16 This section comprises Utah's animal enterprise interference law. A person who commits any criminal offense with the intent to halt, impede, obstruct, or interfere with the lawful operation of an animal enterprise or to damage, take, or cause the loss of any property owned by, used by, or in the possession of a lawful animal enterprise, is subject to an enhanced penalty. These penalties enhancements raise the level of the crime one degree (e.g., a class C misdemeanor becomes a class B misdemeanor and a class A misdemeanor becomes a third degree felony). Statute
KY - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 437. Offenses Against Public Peace KRS § 437.410 - 429 KY ST § 437.410 - 429 This chapter concerns the protection of animal enterprise facilities in Kentucky. Prohibited acts include exercising control over a facility or its property without consent of the owner, disruption or destruction of property of a facility, entering a facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act, and entering a facility with the intent to disrupt or damage the enterprise and then remaining on the grounds knowing that entry is forbidden. Any person who violates any provision of KRS 437.410 to 437.420 shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not less than 6 months but not more than 1 year, or both, for each violation. Statute
U.S. v. Fullmer 584 F.3d 132 (C.A.3 (N.J.), 2009) 2009 WL 3273955 (C.A.3 (N.J.))

In an issue of first impression, this Court considered whether the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) was unconstitutional either on its face or as-applied to defendants. The defendants in this case were an animal rights organization ("SHAC") and six associated individuals. The defendants engaged in direct action ranging from electronic civil disobedience to destroying property at the homes of individuals associated with Huntingdon Life Sciences (a research corporation that performs animal testing for other companies). Defendants argued that the statute has a chilling effect on speech because protestors will refrain from all speech, even protected speech, due to the ambiguity of what the statute proscribes. Thus the Court found that the government provided sufficient evidence to prove that the defendants conspired to violate the AEPA.

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