Results
Displaying 11 - 20 of 88
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Borenstein v. Animal Foundation | Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2021 WL 3472190 (D.Nev., 2021) | No. 219CV00985APGDJA, | Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against several defendants for adopting his service animal out to new owners while he was hospitalized. The court dismissed several claims, including those against the hospital defendants, and determined that the Clark County Animal Ordinance governed the hold of the dog. Plaintiff argues that the court misapplied the law, overlooked facts, and that there was new evidence. The court claimed that the animal ordinance applied because the dog was impounded under the vehicle confinement provision, as the dog was found while she was contained in plaintiff's car. Plaintiff argues that the dog was left in the car with the air conditioning on, that the dog had not been left in the car unattended for more than 15-17 minutes, and that hospital staff were supervising the car while the dog was in it. Therefore, the dog was not in danger enough to trigger the vehicle containment provision of the animal ordinance. However, the court found that there was no error in applying the animal ordinance, since plaintiff would be checking into the hospital for an unforeseen amount of time. | Case |
| Peklun v. Tierra Del Mar Condominium Association, Inc. | Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 8029840 (S.D. Fla., 2015) | On cross-motions, Defendant Tierra Del Mar Condominium Association, Inc.'s (“TDM") and Plaintiffs, (Personal Representatives of the Estate of Sergey Peklun) seek Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs assert that denial of Sergey Peklun's request for a reasonable accommodation for his dog Julia "resulted in Peklun's increasingly despondent attitude, ultimately culminating in his decision to end his life." As such, plaintiffs’ claim Defendants are liable under theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the Florida and Federal Fair Housing Acts. This conflict over Julia first emerged in 2011 and lasted until Peklun's death in 2015. In 2011, Peklun first acquired Julia the dog, who he claimed was being trained as a cardiac service dog. While the training as a service dog was never substantiated, the Board did approve the dog as an emotional support animal for Peklun in 2011. The composition of the Board changed in coming years and the issue arose after another tenant, Frank Speciale, demanded the dog's removal due to stated allergies. TDM warned Peklun if he did not remove Julia within the period provided, it would initiate arbitration against him in accord. Julia was never removed and, on July 16, 2013, TDM commenced arbitration against Peklun with the Florida Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes. Speciale also moved for an injunction barring Peklun from keeping Julia on the premises, which was granted on March 11, 2014. During this time, the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners Office of Equal Opportunity organized an extensive investigation into TDM's purported discrimination and found "reasonable grounds to believe that [TDM] discriminated against [Peklun] on the basis of his disability.” Following this, on August 11, 2014, TDM approved Peklun's request for a reasonable accommodation as an emotional support animal. Despite this, Speciale continued to seek Julia's eviction, filing a motion in state court, seeking contempt and sanctions. Plaintiffs contended that this behavior reflected "a campaign of harassment." As to TDM instant motion for summary judgment, it claims the decision was reasonable because Peklun failed to provide TDM with the requested information necessary to verify his disability and that Julia was not a trained service animal. Also, TDM asserts Peklun was not a “qualified individual” under the FHA. The District Court found that while Peklun's various cardiac and organ problems did not constitute a "handicap" under the FHA, the submissions of Peklun's treating physicians are sufficient to establish that Peklun's sleep apnea interfered with a major life activity. As a result, there was sufficient evidence that Peklun was handicapped within the meaning of the FHA. Further, the absence of any certification or training did not permit TDM to immediately deny the request for Peklun's assistance animal. In fact, the court observed that Peklun was previously granted an accommodation for Julia on the basis that she was an “emotional support animal” in 2011; that knowledge of the 2011 accommodation was imputed to TDM's current board. The court did note that Section 3604(9) states there is no obligation to honor a request that would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other tenants. However, the court noted that determining this threat is a question of fact, not a question of law. The issue of Speciale's allergies "is contentious and the Court declines to grant judgment based on a hotly debated factual dispute." As a result, the cross motions for summary judgment by each party were denied. | Case | |
| Stamm v. New York City Transit Authority | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 2011 WL 1315935 (E.D.N.Y., 2011) | Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and New York State and New York City laws, alleging that the New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”) and the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (“MaBSTOA”) (collectively, “Defendants”) failed to ensure that their vehicles and facilities were accessible to her and other persons with disabilities who utilize service animals. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff (1) was not disabled, (2) was not entitled to use a “service animal,” (3) was seeking to bring dogs which do not qualify as “service animals” onto Defendants' vehicles; had not made out a Title II claim and (5) could not make out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted only with respect to that portion of the eleventh cause of action that alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. The parties were also directed to submit supplemental briefing. | Case | |
| CASO 02437-2013 JANE MARGARITA CÓSAR CAMACHO Y OTROS CONTRA RESOLUCION DE FOJAS 258 | CASO 02437-2013 | Plaintiff, a blind woman, brought a constitutional grievance against the decision issued by the Fifth Civil Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Lima on January 15, 2013. This decision denied the action of protection after Defendants denied entry of Plaintiff's guide dog at their supermarkets. The Constitutional Tribunal ordered that the blind were allow to enter to the supermarkets with their guide dogs. | Case | |
| Green v. Housing Authority of Clackamas County | 994 F.Supp. 1253 (D. Oregon, 1998) | Plaintiffs were tenants of a county housing authority and alleged that the housing authority violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, by failing to reasonably accommodate their request for a waiver of a "no pets" policy to allow for a hearing assistance animal in the rental unit to reasonably accommodate a hearing disability. The housing authority argued that the dog was not a reasonable accommodation for the tenant's specific disability because the dog was not certified as a hearing assistance animal. The court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding that the housing authority violated the federal statutes when it required proof from the tenants that the dog had received hearing assistance training. | Case | |
| Southeastern Community College v. Davis | 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979) |
Applicant to nursing program brought suit against the college alleging discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for denying her acceptance to the program based on her physical disability of being deaf. The college alleged that the applicant was not "otherwise qualified" under the statute because, even if provided accommodations for her hearing disability, she would be unable to safely participate in the clinical training program. The court held that "otherwise qualified" under the statute means that a person is qualified for the program "in spite of" the handicap, and that the applicant here was not otherwise qualified for the program. The court also held that a program authority is not required to ignore the disability of the applicant when determining eligibility for the program. Rather, the statute only requires that the disabled person not be denied the benefits of the program solely because of the disability. |
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| People v. Tohom | 969 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.,2013) | 109 A.D.3d 253; 2013 WL 3455673 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.); 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 05234 |
This case, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a trial court was authorized to allow a "therapeutic comfort dog" to be present on witness stand for a 15-year-old-girl who was the victim in a predatory sexual assault and child endangerment case. Prosecutors sought to allow a Golden Retriever named Rose to accompany the child on the witness stand while she testified at the defendant’s trial. Prosecutors cited Criminal Procedure Law provisions regarding special witnesses and pointed to Executive Law §642-a, which allows a person supportive of a special witness to be “present and accessible” during testimony by such a witness. On appeal, defendant again argued that the dog would prejudice the jury against the defendant and would convey to the jury that the witness was under stress as a result of testifying and that this stress resulted from telling the truth. In finding that the comfort dog did not violate defendant's right to a fair trial, the appellate court agreed that the trial court's interpretation of Executive Law § 642-a "special witness" provision was correct. Further, the defendant failed to show that the dog Rose's presence was inherently prejudicial. |
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| Riverbrook v. Fabode | 963 N.W.2d 415 (2020), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 981 N.W.2d 468 (Mich. 2022) | 333 Mich. App. 645, 2020 WL 5580152 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2020) | This Michigan case centers on the adequacy of the evidence supporting a request for an assistance animal. Antony Fabode lived in a mobile home on property that was leased to his sister by Riverbrook. In the spring of 2018, Antony obtained a puppy, King, which he claims is a Labrador Retriever mix, but was suspected by Riverbrook as being a banned pit bull type dog. Riverbrook consequently notified Antony's sister of the violation and ordered the dog removed from the premises. To that order, Antony first responded to Riverbrook with a certificate claiming that King was an emotional support animal (ESA) and, after that was rejected as insufficient, came back with a letter by limited license professional counselor, Anne Venet. After again denying the request, Riverbrook sought to enforce the consent judgment with an order of eviction. The district court granted the motion and ordered Antony's removal. Antony sought a stay of eviction on the grounds that he and his sister were authorized to possess King as an ESA. At the district court hearing, Venet testified in support of her letter explaining that she determined Antonuy's need for an ESA after a brief phone call. The court then declined to permit questioning by Riverbrook into the credibility of the determination that Antony was disabled and needed King as a therapeutic aid. Ultimately, the district court denied the writ for eviction. The circuit court affirmed that ruling based on the FHA and the caselaw that supports an unobtrusive line of questioning. The crux of this appeals centers on whether the lower court's order denying Riverbrook's writ of eviction was erroneous after the court disallowed Riverbrook's attorney from questioning the reliability of the evidence of disability and need for an assistance animal. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that "the district and circuit courts avoided their gatekeeper role under MRE 702 despite Riverbrook's repeated objections to the reliability and admissibility of the Fabodes’ evidence." This hampered Riverbrook's ability to discover whether the information presented was reliable and supported Antony's disability-related request and whether Riverbrook refused to make a reasonable accommodation for a tenant based on disability or handicap. The circuit court order was vacated the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. | Case |
| Guenther v. Walnut Grove Hillside Condominium Regime No. 3, Inc. | 961 N.W.2d 825 (Neb., 2021) | 309 Neb. 655 (Neb., 2021) | Plaintiff Christine Guenther appeals her dismissal of her complaint for declaratory judgment against her condominium complex. Guenther contended that Walnut Grove refused to make a reasonable accommodation under the federal Fair Housing Act and the Nebraska Fair Housing Act (collectively FHA), by denying her request to secure her daughter's emotional support dogs through construction of a fence in a common area. In 2018, Guenther made a request to Walnut Grove to construct a fence through part of the common area behind her condominium so that her dogs can safely spend time outside. Guenther stated that she made this request because she witnessed (via sounds) her first emotional support animal killed by either another dog or a car shortly after she moved in. However, Walnut Grove denied Guenther's request, contending that it lacked the authority to divide or partition the "common elements" of the property. As a result, Guenther filed a complaint in the district court for Douglas County seeking a declaration that Walnut Grove refused a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. A trial was held and the lower court dismissed Guenther's complaint, holding that Guenther's daughter did not suffer from a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of her major life activities and that therefore, Guenther failed to show that N.G. is a handicapped person. Additionally, the court held that Guenther failed to prove that her requested accommodation is necessary to afford the daughter an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the home. On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, the court found the case boiled down to whether Guenther "carried her burden of proving her request to build a fence in Walnut Grove's common area (1) is reasonable and (2) necessary (3) to afford a handicapped person the equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." As to the factors, the court found that while it is undisputed that the daughter suffered from mental health disorders that were benefited by the interaction with the family dogs, there was insufficient proof that a fence was necessary. In fact, testimony revealed that the daughter freely enjoyed the use of the animals while at Walnut Grove. The fence was not a necessary part of Guenther's ability to use and enjoy the dwelling. Further, Guenther failed to prove that the alternatives proposed by Walnut Grove would not have been effective. Because Guenther failed to meet her burden to prove that construction of the fence is necessary, her claim for refusal of a reasonable accommodation under the FHA failed the judgment was affirmed. | Case |
| Cohen v. Clark | 945 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 2020) | 2020 WL 3524851 (Iowa June 30, 2020) | Karen Cohen possessed a severe allergy to pet dander which was medically documented. Cohen was even more severely allergic when exposed to cat dander which required her to carry an EpiPen with her. Initially her allergy to cats was the same as her allergy to dogs, however, with repeated exposure, her allergy to cats became worse. Cohen feared that her allergy to dogs would similarly progress if she were repeatedly exposed to dogs. As a result, Cohen entered into a lease agreement with 2800-1 LLC to rent an apartment relying on the fact that the apartment complex had a no pet policy. Two months into her lease, David Clark entered into a lease agreement with 2800-1 LLC to rent an apartment down the hall from Cohen. Shortly after moving in, Clark presented 2800-1 LLC with a letter from his psychiatrist explaining that due to Clark’s chronic mental illness a dog would benefit his mental health. Clark request a reasonable accommodation to have an emotional support animal (“ESA”) on the apartment premises. Jeffrey Clark, the leasing and property manager, notified the other tenants in the building of the request to accommodate the ESA and asked if any tenants had allergies to dogs. Cohen responded to Jeffrey detailing the allergies that she had to dogs and cats. Jeffrey subsequently contacted the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (“ICRC”) and requested a review or a formal agency determination. A staff member of the ICRC informed Jeffrey that he had to reasonably accommodate both Cohen’s allergies and Clark’s ESA request. There was no formal finding that this would constitute a reasonable accommodation. 2800-1 LLC allowed Clark to have a dog as his ESA while at the same time trying to mitigate Cohen’s allergies by having Cohen and Clark use separate stairwells and purchasing an air purifier for Cohen’s apartment. Despite the attempts to accommodate both tenants, Cohen still suffered allergic reactions and she had to limit the amount of time she spent in her apartment building. On September 27, 2017, Cohen brought a small claims action against 2800-1 LLC seeking one month’s rent as damages and alleging that 2800-1 LLC breached the express covenant of her lease that provided for no pets. Cohen also alleged that both Clark and 2800-1 LLC breached her implied warranty of quiet enjoyment. The small claims court dismissed Cohen’s claims. Cohen filed a notice of appeal three days later to the district court. The District Court concluded that 2800-1 LLC made sufficient efforts that would have justified denying Clark’s request for accommodation or asking him to move to another apartment building, however, because Iowa law was not sufficiently clear, they also dismissed the claims against 2800-1 LLC and Clark. Cohen filed an application for discretionary review to which 2800-1 LLC consented. The Supreme Court of Iowa granted the parties’ request for discretionary review. The Supreme Court noted that there is no law in Iowa or any other jurisdiction that clearly establishes how landlords should handle reasonable accommodation questions with ESAs. The Court ultimately found that Clark’s ESA was not a reasonable accommodation and that the 2800-1 LLC breached its promise to Cohen that the apartment would have no pets other than reasonable accommodations. 2800-1 LLC had other apartments available in other buildings that allowed pets. Cohen also had priority in time since she signed her lease first. The Court ultimately reversed and remanded the district court’s dismissal of Cohen’s case. | Case |