Results
Displaying 61 - 70 of 88
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Thompson v. Dover Downs, Inc. | 887 A.2d 458 (Del.Supr.,2005) | 31 NDLR P 135 (Del.Supr.,2005) |
Vernon Thompson appeals from a Superior Court order reversing a decision and order of the Delaware Human Relations Commission (DHRC) after Thompson was denied access to defendant's casino because Thompson insisted that his dog accompany him, but refused to answer the officials' inquiries about what his alleged support animal had been trained to perform. The DHRC determined that by denying access, Dover Downs had unlawfully discriminated against Thompson in violation of the Delaware Equal Accommodations Law. The Supreme Court here agreed with the Superior Court in reversing the DHRC. It found that Dover Downs' personnel were entitled to ask Thompson about his dog's training. Since Thompson refused to answer these questions, there is no rational basis to conclude that Dover Downs' refusal to admit Thompson accompanied was pretextual. |
Case |
| People v. Johnson | 889 N.W.2d 513 (2016), appeal denied, 500 Mich. 951, 891 N.W.2d 231 (2017) | 315 Mich. App. 163, 2016 WL 1576933 (Mich. App. Apr. 19, 2016) | This case involves challenges to the courtroom procedure of allowing a witness to be accompanied on the witness stand by a support animal. Defendant Johnson appealed his convictions of criminal sexual assault after he was convicted of assaulting his six-year-old niece. During Defendant's trial, a black Labrador retriever was permitted, to accompany the six-year-old victim to the witness stand. On appeal, the Defendant first argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use of a support animal because MCL 600.2163a(4) only allows a support person. The Court of Appeals of Michigan stated that the trial court had the inherent authority to utilize support animals. Secondly, the Defendant argued that trial counsel should have objected to the notice of a support person on the basis that allowing the witnesses to testify accompanied by the support animal violated his constitutional right to due process. The Court of Appeals stated that there is no indication that the support dog used was visible to the jury, or that he barked, growled, or otherwise interrupted the proceedings. Therefore, the objection was meritless. Next, the Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request various procedural protections if the support animal was used. The Court of Appeals stated that the use of a support dog did not implicate the Confrontation Clause; the presence of the dog did not affect the witnesses' competency to testify or affect the oath given to the witnesses; the witnesses were still subject to cross-examination; and the trier of fact was still afforded the unfettered opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor. Finally, the Defendant argued that a limiting instruction should have been provided to the jury when the support animal was utilized and this rendered his counsel ineffective. The Court of Appeals stated, that there are no Michigan jury instructions addressing the use of a support animal. Counsel was then not ineffective in failing to ask for an instruction that does not yet exist in Michigan. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence and remanded. | Case |
| State v. Devon D. | 90 A.3d 383 (Conn.App, 2014) | 150 Conn.App. 514 (2014) | The defendant, Devon D., appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of eleven offenses, in three separate files with three different docket numbers, pursuant to three separate informations, involving three different victims. Devon asserted that the prosecution as to the charges concerning C1 should have been separated from the charges as to C2 and C3, and that the evidence from C1’s case should not have been cross-admissible as to C2 and C3, an argument the Connecticut Appellate Court accepted as justifying reversal. Devon also argued on appeal that “the court improperly permitted the state to have a dog sit near C1 while she testified to provide comfort and support to her.” The appellate court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting the use of the dog to comfort and emotionally support C1 while she testified without requiring the state to prove that this special procedure was necessary for this witness. At trial, defense counsel specifically told the trial court he was not making a confrontation clause claim as to the presence of the dog, and the appellate court therefore considered such a claim waived. Despite the absence of statutory authority for permitting a facility dog, the appellate court did conclude that the trial court had “inherent general discretionary authority” to permit such a dog, but also determined that this discretion was abused under the facts of the case. The judgments are reversed and the cases are remanded for new trials. | Case |
| Berardelli v. Allied Services Institute of Rehabilitation Medicine | 900 F.3d 104 (3d Cir., 2018) | 2018 WL 3849363 (3d Cir. Aug. 14, 2018) | This case presents an issue of first impression in the Court of Appeals: whether regulations on service animals, which technically apply only to reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), require that individuals with disabilities be allowed to be accompanied by their service animals under the Rehabilitation Act (RA). The facts involve an elementary student with dyslexia and epilepsy who sought to be accompanied by her service dog to school. The dog was trained to respond to her epileptic seizures and was recommended by her pediatric neurologist. The student was attending a new school after having attended a different school with her service animal who recently died. After receiving a new service animal (after being placed on a waiting list), the principal of the new school refused access for the service animal, asserting for the first time that the dog was "too much of a distraction." As a consequence of the denial, the student missed school when her seizures were too severe. After more than a year of disrupted attendance, the student's mother sought to have the seizure alert dog accompany the child to fifth grade, and the principal said he would "look into" it. Frustrated with the equivocation, the mother attempted to bring the service animal with the child and the principal prevented entrance, now saying another child had an allergy to dogs. Eventually, the dog was allowed to accompany the child with a "therapeutic shirt designed to decrease allergens," but the shirt interfered with the service animal's performance of disability-related tasks. In the end, the mother withdrew the child from this particular school. The child's parent subsequently sued the school, arguing that the school had failed to accommodate the child under Section 504 of the RA. The school moved for summary judgment on all claims. Important to the claim of discrimination under the RA, the District Court instructed the jury that on a claim for failure to accommodate, the plaintiff needed to prove that that the requested accommodations were reasonable and necessary to avoid discrimination based on disability. The jury was confused at the instructions and the child's attorney urged the court to instruct the jury on ADA service animal regulations. The Court refused saying it had “g[iven] them the law that relates to this case” and would not “go look for some new law to tell them about or some different law or something that’s not been already submitted or given to them.” The jury subsequently returned a verdict for the school. On appeal here, appellants argue that, because the subjective standards for liability under the RA and ADA are the same, the service animal regulations of the ADA should apply to the RA. The Court of Appeals first examined the history and relationship of the ADA and its precursor, the RA. Based on the overarching goal of both laws - to ensure equal opportunity and inclusion - the requirements of reasonable accommodations and reasonable modifications are inextricably intertwined. Regardless of the differing entities the statutes cover, they both impose the same liability standard based on this concept of "reasonableness." The Court also found this echoed in case law dealing with a failure to accommodate under both laws. As to the service animal regulations under the ADA, the Court held that, logically, the service animal regulations are relevant to the RA even though they technically interpret the ADA. This is supported by agency guidance in other contexts from HUD, the Dept. of Justice, and the Dept. of Labor. The Court found the school's counter arguments unpersuasive especially considering the legal principle that an anti-discrimination statute like the RA must be interpreted broadly to carry out its broad remedial purpose. In essence, the Court now holds that a covered actor must accommodate the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability under the RA just as it must do under the ADA. While the "reasonableness" of that accommodation will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, the request to be accompanied by a service animal is per se reasonable. Applying that holding to these facts, the Court found that the District Court did not correctly instruct the jury on the relevant law. The error was not harmless, and, despite the school's claim, there was not a high probability that the jury would have ruled in its favor if properly instructed. The judgment was vacated on the RA claim, reversed on the dismissal of the state discrimination claim, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. | Case |
| Velzen v. Grand Valley State University | 902 F.Supp.2d 1038(W.D. Mich. 2012) | On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff and the Fair Housing Center of West Michigan (“FHCWM”) brought suit against Defendants, a university, alleging unlawful discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), Federal Rehabilitation Act, and Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”), for denying Plaintiff’s request to keep an emotional support animal in on-campus housing. All claims brought against the individual defendants were brought against them in their official capacities as university administrators. Plaintiffs sought both injunctive and compensatory relief. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The District Court decided the following would be dismissed: (1) all claims under the PWDCRA against all defendants; (2) all claims for compensatory damages under the FHA brought against all defendants; (3) all claims for injunctive relief under the FHA brought against the institutional defendants; (4) all claims for relief under the Rehabilitation Act by the FHCWM; and (5) all claims for relief under the Rehabilitation Act by Plaintiff that depended on disparate treatment. The following claims remained: (1) Plaintiff and the FHCWM's claims under the FHA seeking injunctive relief from the individual defendants; and (2) Plaintiff's claims against all defendants for compensatory damages and injunctive relief under the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to the failure to accommodate theory. | Case | |
| Cordoves v. Miami-Dade Cnty | 92 F. Supp. 3d 1221 (S.D. Fla. 2015) | 2015 WL 1131684 (S.D. Fla. 2015) | This case arises out of an incident at the Dadeland Mall, during which plaintiff had a confrontation with security personnel that ended with her arrest. The incident was precipitated by the presence of a small dog plaintiff was toting in a stroller while shopping with her mother and daughter. Plaintiff alleged discrimination in public accommodations under the ADA, and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983. Defendants moved for summary judgment.The District Court denied the motion in part and granted the motion in part, finding that an issue of material fact existed as to whether the dog was a service animal; that the patron was precluded from bringing negligence claim premised on intentional torts; that officer's use of force in arresting patron was de minimis; and that the right to be free from officer's application of force was not clearly established. | Case |
| Wilkison v. City of Arapahoe | 926 N.W.2d 441 (Neb.,2019) | 302 Neb. 968 (2019) | Brooke Wilkison (Brooke) got an American Staffordshire Terrier (pit bull) in 2015. In 2016, the city of Arapahoe passed an ordinance regarding dangerous dogs which contained a restriction on owning a Rottweiler or an American Staffordshire Terrier within city limits. The ordinance allowed for dogs licensed prior to January 1, 2017 to be grandfathered in as acceptable. Brooke did not have his dog licensed prior to the that date. Law enforcement told Brooke he could not keep the dog. Brooke filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent Arapahoe from implementing and enforcing the ordinance. The trial court found for Brooke and Arapahoe appealed. Arapahoe's first assignment of error is that the court erred by applying the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to the ordinance. The Court found that Arapahoe was not exempt from the strictures of the FHA. Arapahoe's second assignment of error was that the Court erred by enjoining enforcement of the ordinance against Brooke because Brooke's accommodation is not reasonable and necessary. The Court found that Brooke failed to meet his burden of proof that his requested accommodation is necessary for him to receive the same enjoyment from his home as a non-disabled person would receive. Brooke already owned another dog and the ordinance only covered certain dog breeds. Brooke's other claims for relief were remanded to the district court. In conclusion, the district court erred in entering a declaratory judgment and enjoining Arapahoe from enforcing the ordinance as applied to Brooke. | Case |
| United States v. Univ. of Neb. at Kearney | 940 F. Supp. 2d 974, 975 (D. Neb. 2013). | This case considers whether student housing at the University of Nebraska–Kearney (UNK) is a “dwelling” within the meaning of the FHA. The plaintiff had a service dog (or therapy dog as the court describes it) trained to respond to her anxiety attacks. When she enrolled and signed a lease for student housing (an apartment-style residence about a mile off-campus), her requests to have her service dog were denied, citing UNK's "no pets" policy for student housing. The United States, on behalf of plaintiff, filed this suit alleging that UNK's actions violated the FHA. UNK brought a motion for summary judgment alleging that UNK's student housing is not a "dwelling" covered by the FHA. Specifically, UNK argues that students are "transient visitors" and the student housing is not residential like other temporary housing (migrant housing, halfway houses, etc.) and more akin to jail. However, this court was not convinced, finding that "UNK's student housing facilities are clearly 'dwellings' within the meaning of the FHA." | Case | |
| Cohen v. Clark | 945 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 2020) | 2020 WL 3524851 (Iowa June 30, 2020) | Karen Cohen possessed a severe allergy to pet dander which was medically documented. Cohen was even more severely allergic when exposed to cat dander which required her to carry an EpiPen with her. Initially her allergy to cats was the same as her allergy to dogs, however, with repeated exposure, her allergy to cats became worse. Cohen feared that her allergy to dogs would similarly progress if she were repeatedly exposed to dogs. As a result, Cohen entered into a lease agreement with 2800-1 LLC to rent an apartment relying on the fact that the apartment complex had a no pet policy. Two months into her lease, David Clark entered into a lease agreement with 2800-1 LLC to rent an apartment down the hall from Cohen. Shortly after moving in, Clark presented 2800-1 LLC with a letter from his psychiatrist explaining that due to Clark’s chronic mental illness a dog would benefit his mental health. Clark request a reasonable accommodation to have an emotional support animal (“ESA”) on the apartment premises. Jeffrey Clark, the leasing and property manager, notified the other tenants in the building of the request to accommodate the ESA and asked if any tenants had allergies to dogs. Cohen responded to Jeffrey detailing the allergies that she had to dogs and cats. Jeffrey subsequently contacted the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (“ICRC”) and requested a review or a formal agency determination. A staff member of the ICRC informed Jeffrey that he had to reasonably accommodate both Cohen’s allergies and Clark’s ESA request. There was no formal finding that this would constitute a reasonable accommodation. 2800-1 LLC allowed Clark to have a dog as his ESA while at the same time trying to mitigate Cohen’s allergies by having Cohen and Clark use separate stairwells and purchasing an air purifier for Cohen’s apartment. Despite the attempts to accommodate both tenants, Cohen still suffered allergic reactions and she had to limit the amount of time she spent in her apartment building. On September 27, 2017, Cohen brought a small claims action against 2800-1 LLC seeking one month’s rent as damages and alleging that 2800-1 LLC breached the express covenant of her lease that provided for no pets. Cohen also alleged that both Clark and 2800-1 LLC breached her implied warranty of quiet enjoyment. The small claims court dismissed Cohen’s claims. Cohen filed a notice of appeal three days later to the district court. The District Court concluded that 2800-1 LLC made sufficient efforts that would have justified denying Clark’s request for accommodation or asking him to move to another apartment building, however, because Iowa law was not sufficiently clear, they also dismissed the claims against 2800-1 LLC and Clark. Cohen filed an application for discretionary review to which 2800-1 LLC consented. The Supreme Court of Iowa granted the parties’ request for discretionary review. The Supreme Court noted that there is no law in Iowa or any other jurisdiction that clearly establishes how landlords should handle reasonable accommodation questions with ESAs. The Court ultimately found that Clark’s ESA was not a reasonable accommodation and that the 2800-1 LLC breached its promise to Cohen that the apartment would have no pets other than reasonable accommodations. 2800-1 LLC had other apartments available in other buildings that allowed pets. Cohen also had priority in time since she signed her lease first. The Court ultimately reversed and remanded the district court’s dismissal of Cohen’s case. | Case |
| Guenther v. Walnut Grove Hillside Condominium Regime No. 3, Inc. | 961 N.W.2d 825 (Neb., 2021) | 309 Neb. 655 (Neb., 2021) | Plaintiff Christine Guenther appeals her dismissal of her complaint for declaratory judgment against her condominium complex. Guenther contended that Walnut Grove refused to make a reasonable accommodation under the federal Fair Housing Act and the Nebraska Fair Housing Act (collectively FHA), by denying her request to secure her daughter's emotional support dogs through construction of a fence in a common area. In 2018, Guenther made a request to Walnut Grove to construct a fence through part of the common area behind her condominium so that her dogs can safely spend time outside. Guenther stated that she made this request because she witnessed (via sounds) her first emotional support animal killed by either another dog or a car shortly after she moved in. However, Walnut Grove denied Guenther's request, contending that it lacked the authority to divide or partition the "common elements" of the property. As a result, Guenther filed a complaint in the district court for Douglas County seeking a declaration that Walnut Grove refused a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. A trial was held and the lower court dismissed Guenther's complaint, holding that Guenther's daughter did not suffer from a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of her major life activities and that therefore, Guenther failed to show that N.G. is a handicapped person. Additionally, the court held that Guenther failed to prove that her requested accommodation is necessary to afford the daughter an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the home. On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, the court found the case boiled down to whether Guenther "carried her burden of proving her request to build a fence in Walnut Grove's common area (1) is reasonable and (2) necessary (3) to afford a handicapped person the equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." As to the factors, the court found that while it is undisputed that the daughter suffered from mental health disorders that were benefited by the interaction with the family dogs, there was insufficient proof that a fence was necessary. In fact, testimony revealed that the daughter freely enjoyed the use of the animals while at Walnut Grove. The fence was not a necessary part of Guenther's ability to use and enjoy the dwelling. Further, Guenther failed to prove that the alternatives proposed by Walnut Grove would not have been effective. Because Guenther failed to meet her burden to prove that construction of the fence is necessary, her claim for refusal of a reasonable accommodation under the FHA failed the judgment was affirmed. | Case |