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Displaying 3261 - 3270 of 6844
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LEGISLATION TO PROTECT THE WELFARE OF FISH | Kelly Levenda | 20 Animal L. 119 (2013) | This Article examines the marginalization of fish under current animal welfare laws and regulations, explores the treatment of farm-raised fish during transport and slaughter, and proposes legislation and regulations in these two areas. While evidence indicates that fish are capable of experiencing pain, fear, and suffering—the traditional considerations informing concepts of animal welfare—current pre-slaughter transport and slaughter practices are completely uninformed by notions of fish welfare. Comparing the cognitive and sensory capacities of fish to other animals currently receiving animal welfare recognition through official regulation, this Article argues that protections afforded to animals during transport and slaughter should similarly apply to fish. Using the World Organization for Animal Health’s Aquatic Animal Health Code as a model, this Article proposes model legislation for fish transport: the Humane Transport of Fish Act. This legislation would supplement regulations already in place at the state and federal level, which currently pertain only to regulating the aquaculture industry and food safety. This Article also proposes amending the “Humane Methods” section of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act to include the slaughter of fish, and proposes related regulations to ensure that fish are humanely slaughtered. The massive amount of fish farmed in the United States and globally each year speaks to the potential impact formal regulation could have on the improvement and protection of fish welfare. | Article | |
| Legro v. Robinson | 328 P.3d 238, aff'd but criticized (Colo.App., 2012) | 2012 COA 182, 2012 WL 5266059 (Colo.App., 2012) |
While participating in a bicycle race on Forest Service lands, plaintiff (Legro) was attacked seriously injured by defendants' (Robinsons') dogs. The Robinsons held a grazing permit from the Forest Service for the land where the injury occurred and the dogs were acting as predator control dogs there. On appeal, this court agreed with the lower court that the Robinsons were landowners for purposes of the Premises Liability Act (PLA) and this did in fact abrogate the plaintiffs' common law claims. However, as a matter of first impression, the court determined that the PLA does not abrogate the statutory dog bite claim. As to the predator control dog exception, the court found that while the dogs were working as predator control dogs, the issue is whether the dogs were on property "under the control of" the Robinsons at the time. Under these facts, a grazing permit, without more, does not establish control for the predator dog exception of the dog bite law. |
Case | |
| Lei Municipal N 13131 de 18 de maio de 2001 | Lei Municipal Nº 13.131, de 18 de maio de 2001 | Art. 1º É livre a criação, propriedade, posse, guarda, uso e transporte de cães e gatos de qualquer raça ou sem raça definida no Município de São Paulo, desde que obedecida a legislação municipal, estadual e federal vigente. | Local Ordinance | ||
| Leider v. Lewis | 2 Cal. 5th 1121, 394 P.3d 1055 (2017) | 2017 WL 2276526 (Cal. May 25, 2017) | The Plaintiffs, Residents of Los Angeles, brought a taxpayer action against the Defendants, the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Zoo, alleging elephant abuse in violation of various Penal Code provisions. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, granted the Defendants summary judgment. The Residents appealed. At trial, the Residents were awarded injunctive and declaratory relief. The Court of Appeals reversed. On remand, the trial court rejected many of the Resident’s claims, but issued limited injunctions prohibiting use of particular forms of discipline, requiring the elephants to have specific amounts of exercise time, and requiring the rototilling of soil in exhibit. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of California granted review and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the prior Court of Appeals decision was not law of the case as to the argument that the Residents was precluded from obtaining injunctive relief for conduct that violated Penal Code, and (2) the Residents' challenge to the city's treatment of elephants improperly sought injunctive relief for Penal Code violations. | Case | |
| Leider v. Lewis | 243 Cal. App. 4th 1078 (Cal. 2016) | 2016 WL 164343 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2016) | Plaintiffs, taxpayers Aaron Leider and the late Robert Culp, filed suit against the Los Angeles Zoo and Director Lewis to enjoin the continued operation of the elephant exhibit and to prevent construction of a new, expanded exhibit. Plaintiffs contend that the Zoo's conduct violates California animal cruelty laws and constitutes illegal expenditure of public funds and property. The case went to trial and the trial court issued limited injunctions relating to forms of discipline for the elephants, exercise time, and rototilling of the soil in the exhibit. On appeal by both sides, this court first took up whether a taxpayer action could be brought for Penal Code violations or to enforce injunctions. The Court held that the earlier Court of Appeals' decision was the law of the case as to the argument that the plaintiff-taxpayer was precluded from obtaining injunctive relief for conduct that violated the Penal Code. The Court found the issue was previously decided and "is not defeated by raising a new argument that is essentially a twist on an earlier unsuccessful argument." Further, refusing to apply this Civil Code section barring injunctions for Penal Code violations will not create a substantial injustice. The Court also found the order to rototill the soil was proper because it accords with the "spirit and letter" of Penal Code section 597t (a law concerning exercise time for confined animals). As to whether the exhibit constituted animal cruelty under state law, the Court found no abuse of discretion when the trial court declined to make such a finding. Finally, the Court upheld the lower court's ruling that declined further injunctive relief under section 526a (a law that concerns actions against state officers for injuries to public property) because the injury prong could not be satisfied. As stated by the Court, "We agree with the trial court that there is no standard by which to measure this type of harm in order to justify closing a multi-million dollar public exhibit." | Case | |
| Leigh v. State | 58 So. 3d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) | 36 Fla. L. Weekly D778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) | Philip Leigh (Defendant) appeals from an order summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic. Defendant claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to appear in a leg restraint and for failing to object to the presence of a dog. Apparently, the dog became disruptive on more than one occasion and was visible to the judge and jury. The Florida appellate court reversed and remanded, with a provision that the trial court could attach portions of the record that would refute the possibility that defense counsel’s failure to object to the dog’s presence indicated ineffective assistance of counsel. Since there was apparently no evidence of the dog’s presence in the record at all, the trial court was presumably obligated to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the matter. | Case | |
| Leith v. Frost | 899 N.E.2d 635 (Ill.App. 4 Dist.,2008) | 387 Ill.App.3d 430; 2008 WL 5473300 | In this Illinois case, plaintiffs, Mark and Mindy Leith, sued defendant, Andrew E. Frost, for tortious damage to their personal property, a dachshund named Molly. The trial court found in plaintiffs' favor with an award of $200, Molly's fair market value, rather than the $4,784 in veterinary expenses. While the court recognized fair market value is the traditional ceiling for damage to personal property, Illinois courts have held that certain items of personal property (heirlooms, photographs, pets, etc.) have no market value. Thus, the basis for assessing compensatory damages in such a case is to determine the actual value to the plaintiff beyond nominal damages. Adopting the rationale of the Kansas Court of Appeals in Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Industries, Inc., t his Court found that Mollly's worth to plaintiffs was established by the $4,784 plaintiffs paid for the dog's veterinary care. | Case | |
| Lesher v. Reed | 12 F.3d 148 (8th Cir. 1994) |
Seizure of pet dog violated Fourth Amendment where police acted unreasonably in going to canine police officer's house to seize the dog after the dog bit a child. |
Case | ||
| Leslie Ann Mandel Will (pet trust) | This document contains a link to the will of Leslie Ann Mandel. The will contains a bequest and/or trust related to her 32 pet birds for their continuing care in the amount of $100,000. The will contains specific provisions for their care, including days of the week in which the cages must be cleaned and the specific type of feed. A trustee is appointed in the will to carry out the trust created in the will. | Pleading | |||
| Lesser v. Epsy | 34 F.3d 1301 (7th Cir. 1994) | Owner had a rabbitry, and the rabbits were sold for scientific research. Inspection of the rabbitry without a warrant occurred, and Owner claimed that his constitutional rights were violated. Search without a warrant was appropriate because any deficiencies could have been easily concealed if notice of a search was provided to the Owner. | Case |