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This note analyzes the challenges that the animal rights movement faces in reforming society’s relationship to animals--particularly in regard to farmed animals--by tracking a similar evolution of the concepts of “dominion” and “civilization” within the early feminist movement. Specific focus is on nineteenth-century white middle-class women, who viewed themselves as models of civilized, liberated womanhood, while asserting maternalistic dominion over their “primitive” and underprivileged sisters. Acknowledging the way in which nineteenth-century America--which, for socio-political and legal purposes, was composed almost exclusively of Protestant white men--was willing to gradually “grant” one class of women a voice in society, based on well-established perceptions of “true womanhood,” is important in considering the way in which modern society seems poised to acknowledge some degree of rights for companion animals, while ignoring the legally-sanctioned misery to which billions of farmed animals are subjected annually.

This article sets out for the reader how to research the full variety of animal issues for the Canadian legal system, with a focus on Ontario.

On September 25, 1999, a distinguished group of legal scholars met in New York City at the 5th Annual Conference on Animals and the Law, hosted by the Committee on Legal Issues Pertaining to Animals of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, to discuss how the law classifies nonhuman animals and whether the current legal framework is in accord with scientific understanding, public attitudes, and fundamental principles of justice. This conference took a monumental step in facilitating discussion about, and furthering the cause of, the legal protection and welfare of nonhuman animals.

Alex Leger instituted this action against the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Commission and Burton Angelle, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, to recover damages for the loss of his 1973 sweet potato crop.  Leger's primary contention was that, since the State of Louisiana is the owner of all wild quadrupeds according to statute, it is legally responsible for damages done to his potato crop.  The court held that the statutory  language compels the conclusion that the state's ownership is in a sovereign, and not a proprietary, capacity.  Thus, the nature of the ownership is as a trustee and the management duties are carried out under police power authority.  The court found nothing in the cited statutes or in the law which indicates that the state has a duty to harbor wild birds or wild quadrupeds, to control their movements or to prevent them from damaging privately owned property.