Results
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FL - Wildlife - Chapter 68A-15. Type I Wildlife Management Areas | 68 FL ADC 68A-15.004 | Fla. Admin. Code r. 68A-15.004 | These Florida rules provide that no person shall knowingly or negligently allow any dog to pursue or molest any wildlife during any period in which the taking of such wildlife by the use of dogs is prohibited. No person shall knowingly allow a dog under their care to enter or remain upon a critical wildlife area during any period in which public access is prohibited by the order establishing such area. | Administrative | |
| Fla. Dep't of Health v. Pups Pub TPA, LLC | --- So.3d ----, 2025 WL 1240026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2025) | No. 1D2023-1795 | The appellate court reversed the ALJ’s determination that the Florida Department of Health (DOH) had enforced an unadopted rule by prohibiting non-service dogs in bars, holding instead that DOH’s directives merely reiterated the plain language of rule 64E-11.003(6)(c), which broadly bans live animals, including dogs, from food service establishments, defined under § 381.0072(2)(c) to include bars and lounges. Pups Pub argued DOH’s authority was limited to regulating areas where food and drinks are prepared and served, but the court rejected this narrow interpretation, finding the statute unambiguously grants DOH jurisdiction over the entire premises of such establishments. The court emphasized that DOH’s interpretation aligned with the text and purpose of the regulatory scheme, which encompasses sanitation controls beyond immediate food-handling zones, rendering formal rulemaking unnecessary. Consequently, DOH’s enforcement actions were upheld, affirming its authority to exclude dogs from bars unless exempted as service animals. | Case | |
| Flanders v. Goodfellow | --- N.E.3d ----, 2025 WL 1127772 (N.Y. Apr. 17, 2025) | 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 02261, No. 29, 2025 WL 1127772 (N.Y. Apr. 17, 2025) | This landmark decision fundamentally reshapes New York's dog bite jurisprudence by overturning Bard v. Jahnke and reinstating negligence as a viable cause of action for injuries caused by domestic animals. The Court held that Bard's strict liability framework, which required proof of an owner's actual or constructive knowledge of a dog's vicious propensities, created an unfair exception to ordinary tort principles and had proven unworkable in practice. Recognizing that most jurisdictions permit negligence claims under Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 509 and 518, the Court established a dual-path system: plaintiffs may now pursue either strict liability (if vicious propensities are shown) or traditional negligence claims against animal owners. The decision also reversed summary judgment on plaintiff's strict liability claim, finding triable issues regarding whether defendants should have known of their dog's aggressive tendencies based on postal workers' affidavits describing the animal's repeated violent window-banging behavior. The Court's disposition reversed the Appellate Division's order and denied defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety, reinstating both causes of action. | Case | |
| Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force v. Montana | ---- F.Supp.3d ----, 2023 WL 8064884 (D. Mont. Nov. 21, 2023) | No. CV 23-101-M-DWM, 2023 WL 8064884 (D.Mont., 2023) | This case was brought by several environmental organizations against the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission to challenge the approval or regulations that authorize the trapping and snaring of wolves within grizzly bear habitat in Montana. The grizzly bear is listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Montana trapping regulations allow wolf hunters to use foothold traps large enough to capture grizzly bears. Grizzly bears rely heavily on their front and back paws to hunt for food, so crippling their limbs with these traps will lead to the incidental killing of grizzly bears from starvation. Plaintiffs contend that allowing the trapping of wolves in grizzly bear territory is in violation of § 9 of the ESA, as it will lead to the incidental unlawful taking of grizzly bears. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the start of the wolf trapping season, raised questions on the merits, and established a reasonable threat of harm to grizzly bears if the trapping and snaring of wolves is allowed in their habitat. On the merits of the claim, although defendants could prove that no grizzly bears had been killed with such traps in Montana for several years, the court found that plaintiffs succeeded on the merits as there was evidence of grizzly bears being killed by such traps in adjacent states. Plaintiffs also showed that there was a likelihood of harm to grizzly bears, with evidence that these traps will lead to the death of grizzly bears. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in part and denied in part, and enjoined the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission from authorizing wolf trapping and snaring. | Case | |
| Fleet v District Court of New South Wales | [1999] NSWCA 363 |
The appellant's dog was removed by police officers and later euthanised. The dog was emaciated and suffering from numerous ailments. The appellant was charged and convicted with an animal cruelty offence and failure to state his name and address when asked. On appeal, it was found that the court had failed to address the elements of the animal cruelty offence and that the charge of failing to state name and address could not stand. |
Case | ||
| Flikshtein v. City of New York | 273 A.D.2d 439 (N.Y. 2000) | 710 N.Y.S.2d 112 |
The New York appellate court held that the dangerousness or viciousness of plaintiff’s pet monkey was irrelevant, and that the city could remove the monkey regardless of its benevolent behavior. |
Case | |
| Flint v. City of Milwaukee | 552 F.Supp.2d 826 (E.D. Wis. 2008) | 2015 WL 1523891 (E.D. Wis. 2015) | In 2010, police obtained a warrant to search plaintiff’s residence for endangered species. While at the plaintiff’s residence, police shot and killed two Tibetan Mastiffs. Plaintiff was arrested and detained by police in an on the scene determination that she had violated Wisconsin's endangered species and mistreatment of animals law. These charges were later dropped. Plaintiff filed a section 1983 suit—asserting that defendants not only unlawfully searched her residence, seized and "slaughter[ed] ... her dogs," but that they also unlawfully detained her in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. After District Court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on her unlawful detention claim, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. District Court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration because she had not cited any intervening change in the law, any erroneous application of the law, or any newly discovered evidence that would compel the Court to reconsider its decision. Additionally, the District Court found the court had reviewed the unlawful detention claim using the proper legal standard. | Case | |
| Flint v. Holbrook | 608 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio App. 2 Dist.,1992) |
In this Ohio case, Lorraine Flint was bitten by a pit bull dog owned by Carl Holbrook (Flint was bitten and injured by Holbrook's dog in the alley between her residence and Holbrook's). Flint then brought suit against Holbrook and Turner Patterson, as the titled owner of the premises where the dog was kept. Patterson was essentially selling the property to Holbrook on land contract. In this case, the court held it was evident that the land contract agreement effectively transferred the ownership and equitable title to the property to Holbrook. Holbrook had exclusive possession and control of the premises upon which he kept his pit bull. While Patterson maintained the bare legal title as security for his debt, he exercised no control over the property; no clause affording him possession or control of the property was included in the land contract agreement. |
Case | ||
| Florice v. Brown | 679 So.2d 501 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/21/96) | 28,538 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/21/96) |
In this Louisiana case, an inexperienced rider was thrown from a horse and sued the horse's owner for negligence and strict liability. After the lower court dismissed the claim, the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, this court held that the horse did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm to the rider such as to warrant imposing strict liability on the owner. The court noted that not every risk of injury posed by an animal represents an unreasonable risk. Here, the evidence established that the horse had a gentle disposition and the movement that caused the plaintiff to be thrown was not unusual or aggressive behavior but rather was simply "horse-like behavior." |
Case | |
| Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Norton | 496 F.Supp.2d 1330 (M.D.Fla., 2007) | 2007 WL 2172785 (M.D.Fla.) |
The plaintiffs charge in that the Secretary of the Interior, in contravention of statutory duty, has failed to conduct the nondiscretionary, five-year status reviews of species listed as endangered or threatened in the Federal Register. Plaintiff seeks an order declaring that Defendants have violated the Endangered Species Act and that the failure to conduct the status reviews constitutes agency action “unlawfully withheld” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Defendants argue that their failure to conduct the mandatory status reviews is not an agency action that is reviewable under the APA. Defendants therefore assert that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's suit to compel agency action to the extent that it arises under the APA. Although not addressed by Defendants and although there is little authority on the issue, Defendants' failure to comply with a mandatory duty falls within the first category of actions reviewable under the APA as an agency action, or inaction, “made reviewable by statute” because the ESA explicitly “provides a private right of action." Defendants assert that budgetary and resource constraints precluded the Secretary from fulfilling the obligation imposed by Congress. However, the court stated that defendants ". . . should take up such constraints with Congress rather than let mandatory deadlines expire with inaction." |
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