Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dufer v. Cully | 3 Or. 377 (1871) |
This case involved a plaintiff who sued for damages when a bull strayed into, or broke into the plaintiff's enclosures, and the plaintiff, with two other men, went to drive the bull away. The court held that the owner of a domestic animal is not generally liable for injuries resulting from the vicious disposition of the animal, unless he is chargeable with notice. |
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| Duncan v. State | 975 N.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. Ind. 2012) | 2012 WL 4470240 (Ct. App. Ind.) |
A complaint regarding the welfare of horses led to the defendant being convicted of 6 charges of animal cruelty, all of which were class A misdemeanors. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that he had not knowingly waived his right to a jury trial, that Indiana’s animal cruelty law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was no sufficient evidence to overcome a defense of necessity. The appeals court agreed that the defendant did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial and therefore reversed and remanded the case on that issue; however, the appeals court disagreed with the defendant on the other issues. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Case | |
| Dunham v. Kootenai County | 690 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.Idaho, 2010) | 2010 WL 556803 (D.Idaho) |
This matter involves the Defendant Kootenai County's motion for summary judgment this federal civil rights case filed by Dunham. The facts underlying the case stem from 2008, when county animal control officers went to Dunham's residence to investigate complaints of possible animal cruelty. During their investigation, Defendants entered Dunham's property to ascertain the condition of the horses residing there in a round-pen. Despite the conditions of the horses which necessitated their removal and relocation to an equine rescue facility, Dunham was ultimately charged and found not guilty of charges of animal cruelty. Dunham claims that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they searched her property and seized her horses without a warrant. Defendants counter that the search was constitutional based on the open fields doctrine, and that the seizure was constitutional based on the plain view doctrine. Based on the open fields doctrine, the Court concluded that Dunham did not have an expectation of privacy in the searched area. |
Case | |
| Dunn v. Attorney General | 474 Mass. 675, 54 N.E.3d 1 (2016) | Plaintiff and farmer James Dunn brought suit to challenge the attorney general’s certification of Massachusetts Question 3. Dunn was joined by anti-poverty activist Diane Sullivan. Both plaintiffs received funding from Protect the Harvest, a nonprofit that opposes farming restrictions, to pursue the lawsuit. Plaintiffs argued that Question 3’s ban on the production and the sale of products made from restrictively confined animals were unrelated questions. Plaintiffs also argued that the bans on confinement of egg lying hens, pregnant pigs, and calves for veal were separate issues on which voters may have varying opinions, so they should be voted on separately. They also argued that the ballot measure’s statement of purpose improperly contained an “argumentative” policy statement that taints the petition and unfairly sways public opinion. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the ballot measure was compliant with the state’s requirements and that the attorney general properly certified Question 3 for submission to the public. | Case | ||
| Durocher v. Rochester Equine Clinic | 629 A.2d 827 (N.H. 1993) |
Plaintiff horse owner appealed from the orders of the Merrimack County Superior Court (New Hampshire), which dismissed his action for veterinarian malpractice for failure to designate an expert medical witness to prove that the owner's horse was permanently injured, and that defendant veterinarians' negligence caused such injury. On appeal, the court agreed that no medical expert testimony was necessary to determine whether a veterinarian was negligent in operating on the wrong animal. However, the court held that expert testimony was necessary to assist jurors in this case on the issues of causation and injury, and generally as to the standards of veterinary care. |
Case | ||
| Dutka v. Cassady | 2012 WL 3641635 (Not Reported in A.3d) | 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1901 | A rescue organization had adopted out a dog. The new owners were walking the dog unleashed when it attacked another dog. The plaintiff's filed a complaint of common law negligence and recklessness, which alleged that the rescue organization should have known and should have warned them of the dangerous tendencies of the specific dog but failed to do so. Connecticut law imposed strict liability on an owner or keeper of such an animal, and the statute had not been expanded to include the seller or transferor. The issue then was whether the court should expand the scope of such a negligence claim and create a duty of care owed by transferors or sellers of dogs with known and/or unknown propensities for aggression. The court found that there was no support for expanding liability in common law negligence when the organization in this case did not own, possess, harbor or control the dog. The court declines to impose a duty on the rescue agency to inform adoptive families. | Case | |
| Dyess v. Caraway | 190 So.2d (666 La.App., 1966) |
Plaintiff claimed damages for the death of five pedigreed Norwegian Elkhound puppies resulting from the negligence of defendant, Hugh L. Caraway, a duly licensed veterinarian. Specifically, defendant allegedly failed to make proper diagnostic tests, failed to give proper treatment for coccidia from which the puppy died, although the defendant had professional knowledge that the puppy was suffering from that disease, and failed to exercise the standard of care required by the average prudent veterinarian in the community. The court first noted the difficulty in diagnosing distemper. It also found the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in applicable in the instant case, primarily for the reason that the instant case involves a question of diagnosis and treatment of a professional nature which in itself requires judgment. |
Case | ||
| Dysfunctional Downlisting Defeated: Defenders of Wildlife v. Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior | Edward A. Fitzgerald | 34 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 37 (2007) |
Abstract: In 2003, the United States Department of the Interior (DOI) established three distinct population segments (DPSs) for the gray wolf, which encompassed its entire historic range. In addition, DOI downlisted the gray wolf from an endangered to threatened species in the Eastern and Western DPSs, despite the wolf's continued absence from ninety-five percent of its historic range. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon properly invalidated DOI's dysfunctional downlisting of the gray wolf. DOI's interpretation of “significant portion of its range” was inconsistent with the text, intent, and purposes of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In addition, DOI inverted its DPS policy, which provides different populations of the species different levels of protection in different portions of its historic range. Achieving the recovery plan goals did not warrant downlisting the gray wolf. DOI also failed to address the five downlisting factors of section 4(a) of the ESA across a significant portion of the gray wolf's historic range. Nevertheless, DOI could have established two DPSs encompassing the populations of gray wolves in the western Great Lakes and northern Rocky Mountains, and could have accordingly downlisted these populations to threatened species status. |
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| Dziekan v. Gaynor | 376 F.Supp.2d 267 (D. Ct. 2005) |
The plaintiff brought civil rights action against municipality and police officer after officer shot and killed his pet dog. Specifically, he alleged a violation of his substantive due process and Fourth Amendment rights, and the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On the defendants' motion for summary judgment the court held that the shooting and killing of pet dog was not unreasonable seizure, and the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. |
Case | ||
| E. LEE COX AND BECKY COX, D/B/A PIXY PALS KENNEL, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, RESPONDENT | 50 Agric. Dec. 14 (1991) | 1991 WL 294529 (U.S.D.A.) |
Lee and Becky Cox, owners of Pixy Pals Kennel, petitioned for review of a decision of the Department of Agriculture suspending their license for ninety days, imposing a $12,000 civil fine, and ordering the Coxes to cease and desist from specified violations of the Animal Welfare Act. The Coxes claim that (1) the suspension violated s 558(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act because there was insufficient evidence to support the Department's finding that their violations of the Animal Welfare Act were willful; (2) they were unconstitutionally penalized for exercising their first amendment rights; and (3) the sanctions imposed on them were excessive. In affirming the USDA decision, the Eighth Circuit held that the definition of "willfulness" was not called into question; rather the Department had presented substantial evidence to demonstrate willfulness. Further, since petitioners' first amendment claim concerned the Department's "motivations," the court held that proof of motivation is a question of fact rather than law, not subject to de novo review. The sanction imposed by the Department, although severe, was not excessive given the size of petitioners' business and the severity of the violations. |
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