Results
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Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
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| Determination of Threatened Status for the California Tiger Salamande | Krista Cotter | Animal Legal & Historical Center |
The FWS through this rule has designated a critical habitat in Santa Barbara County, California for the California Tiger Salamander (Ambystoma califoniese) (CTS) pursuant to the Endangered Species Act of 1973. This rule fulfills the final requirements of the settlement agreement reached in Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The reason for the designation of critical habitat for the CTS is the net loss in CTS grazing land over a 10 – 12 year period due to extensive farming, regardless of the efforts made to increase the amount of suitable grazing land. As a result of the designation of land as critical habitat for the CTS, federal agencies will have to consult with the FWS prior to undertaking or authorizing activities that may impact the habitat. |
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| Determining the Value of Companion Animals in Wrongful Harm or Death Claims: A Survey of U.S. Decisions and an Argument | Marcella S. Roukas | Animal Legal & Historical Center |
The law in United States categorizes animals as personal property. As a result, recovery of damages for the loss of a companion animal is oftentimes the fair market value. This inflexible approach to companion animals fails to distinguish between personal property such as a chair and a beloved pet. Some state court decisions have authorized human guardians of companion animals to plead and recover the “unique value” of the companion animal. Such decisions reflect a shift in the court’s view of companion animals, which acknowledges public policy concerns for the guardian of the companion animal. This article discusses the law in United States concerning recovery of damages in cases involving harm to companion animals and the reasoning behind why courts should acknowledge such a recovery. |
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| Determining the Value of Companion Animals in Wrongful Harm or Wrongful Death Claims: A Survey of U.S. Decisions and Legislative | Marcella Roukas | 3 J. Animal L. 45 (2007) |
The law in United States categorizes animals as personal property. As a result, recovery of damages for the loss of a companion animal is often times the fair market value. This inflexible approach to companion animals fails to distinguish between personal property such as a chair and a beloved pet. Needless to say, awarding damages at fair market value serves as little or no deterrence for the tortfeasor. This is especially true in cases where the companion animal lacks pedigree or special training. However, some decisions have authorized human guardians of companion animals to plead and recover the “unique value” of the companion animal. Such decisions reflect a shift in the court’s view of companion animals, which acknowledges public policy concerns for the guardian of the companion animal. This article discusses the law in United States on companion animals and proposes legislative action in the state of Florida for the recovery of the “loss of companionship” for owners of companion animals. |
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| DeVaul v. Carvigo Inc. | 526 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.,1988) | 138 A.D.2d 669 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.,1988) |
This New York case involved a dog bite victim who brought an action against the owner to recover for personal injuries. The Supreme Court, Nassau County entered judgment in favor of owner. On appeal with the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, the court held that the viciousness of German shepherd dogs was not appropriate subject of judicial notice. The court found that there is no authority for the proposition that judicial notice should be taken "as to the ferocity of any particular type of domestic animal." |
Case | |
| Diamond v. Chakrabarty | 447 U.S. 303 (1980) | 100 S. Ct. 2204; 65 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1980) |
In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States asserts that patent protection may exist for "anything under the sun," so long as it is created by man. This has permitted genetically engineered animals to be patentable subject matter in the United States. For more information on patent protection in the United States, see the Patent Act. |
Case | |
| Dias v. City and County of Denver | 567 F.3d 1169 (C.A.10 (Colo.),2009) | 2009 WL 1490359 (C.A.10 (Colo.)) |
The Tenth Circuit took up a challenge to Denver's breed-specific ban against pitbull dogs. The plaintiffs, former residents of Denver, contended the ban is unconstitutionally vague on its face and deprives them of substantive due process. The district court dismissed both claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) before plaintiffs presented evidence to support their claims. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by prematurely dismissing the case at the 12(b)(6) stage. The Tenth Circuit agreed in part, finding that while the plaintiffs lack standing to seek prospective relief for either claim because they have not shown a credible threat of future prosecution, taking the factual allegations in the complaint as true the plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the pit bull ban is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. |
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| Dicesare v. Stout | 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 9796 | 992 F.2d 1222 (Table), 1993 WL 137110 (C.A.10 (Okla.)) |
The plaintiff was convicted under an Oklahoma anti-cruelty statute after officer seized his malnourished and neglected horses. Later, plaintiff brought suit against the officers under 42 U.S.C 1983 claiming that the officers had violated his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim after it determined that a horse corral near a home was not protected by the Fourth Amendment where the area was used for pastureland and the fence enclosing the area did not and was not intended to prevent the public from viewing the area. |
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| DICKERSON v. BRITTINGHAM. | 86 A. 106 (Del.Super. 1913) | 4 Boyce 93, 27 Del. 93 (1913) |
In this Delaware case, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's horse, alleged to have been caused by the negligent driving by the defendant of his team. This resulted in a head-on collision, which caused the death of the horse days after. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the court held that if the jury believed from the evidence presented that the defendant was driving without ordinary care, the verdict should stand for the plaintiff. |
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| Did United States v. Hayashi Fail to Provide a Safe Harbor for Marine Mammals Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act? | April Fisher and Amber A. Bell | 27 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 67 (1997) |
This article examines the holding in United States v. Hayashi and concludes that by narrowly defining what constitutes "harm" under the MMPA, the Ninth Circuit ignored the plain meaning of the term, the legislative history of the MMPA and the regulations interpreting the MMPA. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Hayashi allows fishermen to harass marine mammals as long as the action does not seriously disrupt normal marine mammal behavior. |
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| Diehl v. Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co. | 686 A.2d 785 (N.J.Super.A.D.,1997) | 296 N.J.Super. 231 (N.J.Super.A.D.,1997) |
In this New Jersey case, the plaintiff was bitten by a dog when walking around the back of pickup and $55,000 in damages were awarded. The issue on appeal concerned the issue of which insurance policy, auto or homeowners, should cover this type of incident. The court adopted the nexus test; the auto insurance is liable if the injury arises out of the operation of a vehicle. The Court held : “We are satisfied that automobile liability insurance should cover this injury caused by a dog bite to the face occurring while the dog was in the open rear deck of a pickup truck because it arose out of the use of the vehicle to transport the dog. Moreover, the bite incident was facilitated by the height and open design of the deck. In our view the act was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the use of the vehicle, and there was a substantial nexus between the dog bite and the use of the vehicle at the time the dog bit the plaintiff.” |
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