Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conservation Force v. Salazar | 715 F.Supp.2d 99 (D.D.C., 2010) | 2010 WL 2244122 (D.D.C.) |
Plaintiffs to this suit — organizations and individuals that support sustainable hunting of the Canadian Wood Bison — alleged that the Secretary of the Department of Interior violated several provisions of the ESA in his treatment of that species. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the Secretary failed to: (1) make a twelve-month finding as to the status of the Canadian Wood Bison upon petition and (2) process Plaintiffs’ applications to import bison hunting trophies. In granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss, the court found that Plaintiffs’ intent to sue letter did not specify to the Secretary that they intended to challenge his subsequent failure to issue a twelve-month finding. Since Plaintiffs gave the Secretary inadequate opportunity to review his actions and take corrective measures, the claim was dismissed. Plaintiffs — four individuals who each successfully hunted a Wood Bison in Canada — sought declaratory judgment against the Service under the ESA for failure to process their applications to import bison trophies. The court also held that the request for declaratory judgment was moot where Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they ever intended to again apply for import permits. |
Case | |
| Conservation Force v. Salazar | 699 F.3d 538 (D.C. Cir. 2012) | 2012 WL 5665704 (D.C. Cir.) |
After waiting nine years for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) to take action on a permit that would allow the Conservation Force and other individuals to import Canadian wood bison as hunting trophies, the Conservation Force brought a suit against the U.S. Department of Interior and the USFWS for violating the Endangered Species Act. However, once the complaint was filed, the USFWS denied the permit; after this action, the district court dismissed the Conservation Force’s case as moot. Plaintiffs then sought to recover attorney fees and costs, but were denied recovery by the district court. On appeal by Plaintiffs, the Court held that since the USFWS delay in processing the permit was not a non-discretionary, statutory duty, as required to recover attorney fees and costs, the appeals court affirmed the lower court’s decision. |
Case | |
| Conservation Force, Inc. v. Jewell | 733 F.3d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2013) | 2013 WL 4417452 (D.C. Cir. 2013) |
Appellants’ claims that the US Fish and Wildlife Service’s violated the Endangered Species Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and due process rights in regards to the markhor goat were rendered moot due to subsequent agency action. The claim that the USFWS had an ongoing pattern and practice of neglecting to process permits was also dismissed dues to issues of ripeness and standing. The case was remanded to district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and was vacated in regards to the portions of the district court's order raised in this appeal. |
Case | |
| Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning | 301 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2002) |
This case questions whether Arizona's 10% cap on nonresident hunting of bull elk throughout the state and of antlered deer north of the Colorado River substantially affects commerce such that the dormant Commerce Clause applies to the regulation. The Court that Arizona's cap on nonresident hunting substantially affects and discriminates against interstate commerce and therefore is subject to strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. The case was remanded to determine the extent of Arizona's legitimate interests in regulating hunting to conserve its population of game and maintain recreational opportunities for its citizens. |
Case | ||
| CONSISTENTLY INCONSISTENT: THE CONSTITUTION AND ANIMALS | Mariann Sullivan | 19 Animal L. 213 (2013) | This article provides the introduction to Volume 19, part 2. | Article | |
| Constitución Política de la Ciudad de México | Constitución Política de la Ciudad de México | The Constitution, adopted in 2017, is the most recently enacted in the nation. It places a strong emphasis on human rights and also acknowledges animals as sentient beings. Specifically, Article 13(b) explicitly recognizes animals as sentient beings and mandates their dignified treatment. This article not only imposes a moral obligation, but also a legal duty to uphold the life and well-being of animals. Under this provision, authorities are tasked with ensuring the protection, well-being, and the dignified and respectful treatment of animals. | Statute | ||
| Constitutional Animal Law |
Constitutional Animal Law, Olivier Le Bot (2023)Constitutional animal law has become increasingly important in recent years. |
Policy | |||
| Constitutional Law of Human Rights and its Guarantees of Mexico City | Ley Constitucional de Derechos Humanos y sus Garantías de la Ciudad de México | This 2019 law is a secondary law that regulates the application of the constitutional mandate that the Mexico City government guarantees the fulfillment of the more than fifty fundamental rights established in the Constitution. This law addresses the issue of animal protection, specifically in Article 95. Article 95 states that animal protection shall be guaranteed in the broadest way to provide a livable city and seek people's fulfillment of the right to a healthy environment. | Statute | ||
| Contact us |
Welcome to the Animal Law Web Center - contact us at Michigan State University College of Law648 North Shaw Lane East Lansing, MI 48824-1300 Primary Contact: animallaw@law.msu.edu Professor David Favre, Editor-in-Chief |
Basic page | |||
| Conte v. Fossett | Not Reported in A.3d, 2013 WL 1143329 (Del.Super.,2013) | No. 12A-03-007 JRJ | Plaintiff and defendant were a non-married couple that shared ownership of a miniature dauschund. Defendant asked for the dog, but plaintiff repeatedly declined. Eventually, Plaintiff gave in and purchased the dog for defendant. The parties shared ownership, expenses, and labor involved in caring for the dog. Eventually, the parties broke up, and began a shared-custody arrangement for the dog. However, the relationship between the parties further soured, and defendant kept the dog in her possession. Plaintiff filed suit for sole possession of the dog. The trial court found that the dog was a gift from plaintiff to defendant in contemplation of the relationship, and awarded possession to plaintiff. On appeal, the court found that there was no basis to assume that the dog was a gift given in anticipation of marriage. Therefore, defendant had no basis to pursue recovery of the dog. | Case |
