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Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
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| Código Penal para el Estado Libre y Soberano de Tlaxcala | Código Penal de Tlaxcala | In 2022, Decreto No. 160 modified the Criminal Code by adding Title XX, “Of the Crimes Committed Against Animals.” It has only one title: “Crimes Against the Life, Integrity, and Dignity of Animals,” which comprises articles 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, and 442. Article 435 deals with acts of mistreatment and animal cruelty. | Statute | ||
| CÓDIGO PENAL PARA EL ESTADO LIBRE Y SOBERANO DE TLAXCALA | CÓDIGO PENAL PARA EL ESTADO LIBRE Y SOBERANO DE TLAXCALA | In 2022, Decreto No. 160 modified the Criminal Code by adding Title XX, “Of the Crimes Committed Against Animals.” it has only one title: “Crimes Against the Life, Integrity, and Dignity of Animals,” which comprises articles 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, and 442. Article 435 considers acts of mistreatment and animal cruelty: unjustifiably causing the death of an animal; killing an animal using methods other than those established in official Mexican standards or depriving an animal of life using any means that causes excessive or unnecessary suffering or prolongs its agony; any mutilation, injury, or permanent mark for nonmedical purposes; inflicting injuries that endanger the life of an animal, that generate permanent partial or total disability, that reduce any of its faculties, or that affect the normal functioning of an organ or member; causing the ingestion or application of any toxic substance or object that endangers the life of an animal or causes its death; depriving an animal of air, light, food, water, space, mobility, medical care, or adequate shelter appropriate to its species, with the purpose of causing harm; abandoning an animal or neglecting it for prolonged periods that compromise its well-being; or inciting animals to attack each other or being neglectful when the animals' aggressiveness or physical power could potentially result in harm or death. Under this modification, animal cruelty is punishable with imprisonment ranging from six months to five years. If the injuries inflicted on the animal put the animal's life at risk, the punishment will be increased by half. If the animal dies as a result of the cruel behavior, the penalty will imprisonment from two to four years, and if the methods utilized caused excessive or unnecessary suffering or prologue the animal’s agony, the punishment will be increased by half. Sexual conduct with vertebrate animals is punishable with jail time ranging from six months to two years. Dog fighting is also proscribed as a criminal offense. Lastly, under Article 497, certain exemptions apply, such as the death of an animal resulting from cultural activities, the death or mutilation of an animal considered a pest, justified death or mutilation of an animal under the care and supervision of a specialist, marking or shoeing of vertebrate animals for the purpose of distinguishing livestock, and the slaughter of animals for human consumption in accordance with Norm NOM-033-SAG/ZOO-2014. With this amendment, the state takes a step toward enhancing animal protection. The next steps should focus on implementing this law, Investing in training government employees, and promoting awareness and education about animal cruelty laws and their implications within the state. Through these efforts, trust in a government capable of conducting investigations into animal cruelty and enforcing sanctions will encourage citizens to report such cases. | Statute | ||
| Código Penal, 1991 - Peru | Decreto Legislativo No. 635, 1991 | Perú ha incorporado en su Código Penal disposiciones que protegen a los animales basadas en los derechos de propiedad, el derecho a un ambiente saludable y la salud pública. La crueldad animal se regula en el capítulo IX, "Daños," artículos 205-207, bajo delitos contra la propiedad. Los delitos contra la fauna silvestre se regulan de manera más extensa en el Título XIII, "Delitos Ambientales," artículos 304-314. | Statute | ||
| Coe v. Lewsader | 64 N.E.3d 817, appeal denied, 77 N.E.3d 81 (Ill. 2017) | 2016 IL App (4th) 150841, 2016 WL 5679604 | In this case, Ryan and Hillary Coe filed suit against Eric and Trish Lewsader for damages resulting from an accident involving the Lewsader’s dog. Ryan Coe was driving his motorcycle while intoxicated on a public highway when he hit the Lewsader’s dog that was lying in the middle of the street. Coe suffered severe injuries as a result of the accident and filed suit against the Lewsader’s according to Section 16 of the Illinois Animal Attacks or Injuries statute. According to the Act, “if a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks, attempts to attack, or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself or herself in any place where he or she may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in civil damages.” In order to be awarded damages under the Act, the Coe’s needed to establish “some overt act” of the Lewsader’s dog . As a result, the question before the court was whether or not the Lewsader’s dog was acting overtly when it was lying in the middle of the street at the time of the accident. Ultimately, the court held that the dog was not acting overtly by lying in the middle of the street. Also, the court rejected the Coe’s argument that the dog had acted overtly when it walked into the street before lying down. The court rejected this argument because the overt act needed to take place at the time of the injury, not before. As a result, the court found that the Lewsader’s were not liable for civil damages under the Act because the dog had not acted overtly at the time of accident and therefore the Act did not apply in this situation. | Case | |
| Coffey v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. | 249 F.Supp.3d 488 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017) | 2017 WL 1411465 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017) | As the court here states, "Plaintiff Debbie Coffey knows a great deal about wild horses and burros—and how those animals are treated by the federal Bureau of Land Management—but she wants to learn more." As such, Plaintiff, a hose welfare advocate, filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the BLM to obtain communications between its officials and private citizens, namely those with long-term holding contracts, involved in the Wild Horse and Burro Program. In conjunction with her request, the BLM charged plaintiff $1,680 in processing fees, but ultimately refunded her the fees a year and half later because it failed to meet FOIA statutory response deadlines. On appeal, Coffey filed a FOIA suit and both sides moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff first argues that the BLM violated FOIA when it failed to give her interest on her processing fees. The court, however, found that awarding interest here would violate the longstanding "no-interest rule," where there was no congressional intent to award interest in such cases. As to plaintiff's argument that BLM's search for records was inadequate, the court agreed with plaintiff that the words and phrases used by BLM were too limiting to meet plaintiff's request and were thus unreasonable. The court held that BLM must choose a different set of search terms (including those suggested by plaintiff) and conduct the FOIA search again. However, the court found that plaintiff's additional contentions that: (1) the search terms were too vague; (2) the database and software needed to be identified; and (3) BLM needed to also include phone records in its search to be without merit. The parties' motions for summary judgment were granted in part and denied in part. | Case | |
| Cohen v. Clark | 945 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 2020) | 2020 WL 3524851 (Iowa June 30, 2020) | Karen Cohen possessed a severe allergy to pet dander which was medically documented. Cohen was even more severely allergic when exposed to cat dander which required her to carry an EpiPen with her. Initially her allergy to cats was the same as her allergy to dogs, however, with repeated exposure, her allergy to cats became worse. Cohen feared that her allergy to dogs would similarly progress if she were repeatedly exposed to dogs. As a result, Cohen entered into a lease agreement with 2800-1 LLC to rent an apartment relying on the fact that the apartment complex had a no pet policy. Two months into her lease, David Clark entered into a lease agreement with 2800-1 LLC to rent an apartment down the hall from Cohen. Shortly after moving in, Clark presented 2800-1 LLC with a letter from his psychiatrist explaining that due to Clark’s chronic mental illness a dog would benefit his mental health. Clark request a reasonable accommodation to have an emotional support animal (“ESA”) on the apartment premises. Jeffrey Clark, the leasing and property manager, notified the other tenants in the building of the request to accommodate the ESA and asked if any tenants had allergies to dogs. Cohen responded to Jeffrey detailing the allergies that she had to dogs and cats. Jeffrey subsequently contacted the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (“ICRC”) and requested a review or a formal agency determination. A staff member of the ICRC informed Jeffrey that he had to reasonably accommodate both Cohen’s allergies and Clark’s ESA request. There was no formal finding that this would constitute a reasonable accommodation. 2800-1 LLC allowed Clark to have a dog as his ESA while at the same time trying to mitigate Cohen’s allergies by having Cohen and Clark use separate stairwells and purchasing an air purifier for Cohen’s apartment. Despite the attempts to accommodate both tenants, Cohen still suffered allergic reactions and she had to limit the amount of time she spent in her apartment building. On September 27, 2017, Cohen brought a small claims action against 2800-1 LLC seeking one month’s rent as damages and alleging that 2800-1 LLC breached the express covenant of her lease that provided for no pets. Cohen also alleged that both Clark and 2800-1 LLC breached her implied warranty of quiet enjoyment. The small claims court dismissed Cohen’s claims. Cohen filed a notice of appeal three days later to the district court. The District Court concluded that 2800-1 LLC made sufficient efforts that would have justified denying Clark’s request for accommodation or asking him to move to another apartment building, however, because Iowa law was not sufficiently clear, they also dismissed the claims against 2800-1 LLC and Clark. Cohen filed an application for discretionary review to which 2800-1 LLC consented. The Supreme Court of Iowa granted the parties’ request for discretionary review. The Supreme Court noted that there is no law in Iowa or any other jurisdiction that clearly establishes how landlords should handle reasonable accommodation questions with ESAs. The Court ultimately found that Clark’s ESA was not a reasonable accommodation and that the 2800-1 LLC breached its promise to Cohen that the apartment would have no pets other than reasonable accommodations. 2800-1 LLC had other apartments available in other buildings that allowed pets. Cohen also had priority in time since she signed her lease first. The Court ultimately reversed and remanded the district court’s dismissal of Cohen’s case. | Case | |
| Cohen v. Kretzschmar | 30 A.D.3d 555 ((N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2006) | 817 N.Y.S.2d 148, 2006 WL 1687460 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 04981 |
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the owners established that their dog did not have a propensity to jump up on people, and that they were not negligent in the manner in which they handled the dog at the time of the alleged accident. The judgment granting defendants' motion for summary judgment was affirmed. |
Case | |
| Cold Feet: Addressing the Effect of Human Activity in Antarctica on Terrestrial Wildlife | Andrew J. Koper | 10 J. Animal & Nat. Resource L. 165 | On the fringes of the frozen continent, penguins, seals, seabirds, and simple vegetation have gained a foothold. Humans have entered their frozen realm as a competitor for space along the coast, the only portion of the continent that can foster life. Humans and animals interact regularly through scientific activities and tourism. This paper will examine the extent of those interactions, as well as some of the negative impacts that human presence has had in Antarctica. Such impacts can range from an oil spill of a science program’s supply ship, to a tourist knocking over a camera tripod onto a penguin chick, crippling it so that it was attacked and had to be euthanized. This Note discusses the current management regime for Antarctic living resources: the Antarctic Treaty System. The Note focuses on when the ATS fails, and when those failures result in harm to Antarctic terrestrial wildlife. | Article | |
| Cole v. Hubanks | 681 N.W.2d 147 (Wis. 2003) | 2004 WI 74 |
Police officer was injured by homeowner's dog and sued for damages. The Supreme Court held that public policy does not dictate extending the firefighter's rule to the police officer, and therefore, that the officer could sue for injuries received as a result of the bite. Reversed and remanded. |
Case | |
| Cole v. Ladbroke Racing Michigan, Inc. | 614 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 2000) |
Plaintiff, a licensed horse exercise rider sued the operator of a horse racing facility after he had been injured when he was thrown off a horse that he had been exercising, when the horse became spooked by a kite on the Defendant’s premises. The court determined that the Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA) did not offer protection of immunity to the Defendant because the exercising was found to be an activity in preparation for a horse race and the EALA does not apply to “horse race meetings.” However, the Plaintiff had previously signed a release, which covered “all risks of any injury that the undersigned may sustain while on the premises,” therefore, the Defendant was released from liability of negligence. |
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